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The doctrinal web surrounding the free speech clause of the
first amendment is one of the most complicated and confusing in
constitutional law.' Perhaps in part in an effort to bring order to
this confusion, the Supreme Court has turned increasingly in recent
years to larger organizing principles that cut across the various lines
of doctrine. One of the most important of these is the distinction
2
between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.
The distinction has enjoyed growing prominence as a judicial tool
for categorizing government actions regarding expression and for
justifying the level of scrutiny applied to those actions.3 Although
both the coherence and the usefulness of the distinction have
generated great controversy among commentators, 4 the Supreme

1 See S. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 3 (1990);
Schauer, Codifying the FirstAmendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285,
308-09.
2 The Court has also developed two other large organizing principles. The first
is the public forum doctrine, which allows the Court to relegate certain regulations
of speech to lower levels of scrutiny because they apply to speech on government
property that has neither traditionally nor voluntarily been opened to the public for
speech purposes. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 802-03 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45-46 (1983). The second organizing principle is the categorization of speech into
certain content categories that receive less than full constitutional protection. See,
e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (child pornography); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (commercial speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (commercial speech). These two principles have
been just as controversial as the content discrimination principle that is the subject
of this Article. For a sampling of the commentary on the latter principle, see
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265 (1981); Schlag, An Attack on CategoricalApproaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 671 (1983).
Although all three organizing principles intersect at various points, see, e.g., Peny,
460 U.S. at 46 (finding viewpoint discrimination illegitimate even in a non-public
forum), they are fundamentally independent, and my focus is on the content
discrimination principle. I will, therefore, consider almost exclusively cases involving
fully protected speech taking place in a public forum.
s See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendmen 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 189-97 (1983).
4 See, e.g., Farber, ContentRegulation and the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist View,
68 GEO. LJ. 727 (1980) (supporting the Court's use of the distinction); Redish, The

1991]

CONTENT DISCRIMINATION

Court has continued to use the distinction, to develop it in new
ways, 5 and to apply it in new contexts.6
The Court's growing focus on content discrimination as the
central concern of the first amendment has met with mixed
enthusiasm from legal scholars. This new organizing principle in
first amendment jurisprudence has been criticized, among other
things, as ignoring the impact that content-neutral regulation can
have on the total quantity of speech.7 As Justice Marshall put it,
the principle condemning content discrimination has been used by
the Court to turn equality from a floor guaranteed to all into a
ceiling.8 I believe that these criticisms are justified and that the
content discrimination principle is by no means a sufficient
foundation for first amendment doctrine. I also believe, however,
that the principle is a quite powerful one and that it does capture
one of the central and essential elements of the free speech
guarantee. Rather thin criticizing the Court's overly exclusive
reliance on the content discrimination principle, I would like to
suggest that, in an important sense, the Court has not used the
principle enough.
One of the major problems with the Court's present use of
content discrimination is simply that the Court has not understood
and applied the principle broadly. The Court, with the concurrence
of most commentators, has interpreted'content discrimination quite
narrowly as involving a particular type of government purpose
served by the regulation of speech. It has, therefore, ignored other
types of content discrimination unrelated to the government's
purpose. This refusal to recognize other types of content discrimiContent Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 113 (1981)

(stating that the Court's content distinction "is both theoretically questionable and
difficult to apply"); Stephan, The FirstAmendment and Content Discrimination,68 VA.
L. REv. 203,203-06 (1982) (arguing that government should be able to regulate based
on subject matter but not viewpoint of speech); Stone, supra note 3 (arguing that the
content distinction is necessary); Note, ContentRegulation and the Dimensions of Free
Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1856 (1983) (suggesting an alternative approach
to content-based regulation of speech).
5 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1986)
(involving city ordinance restricting location of adult theaters); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-71 (1976) (same).
6 See e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1988) (regarding ordinance
prohibiting protests within 500 feet of foreign embassies).

7See, e.g., Redish, supra note 4, at 128-31.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 313 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 See
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nation has resulted in the systematic underprotection of speech and
serious doctrinal confusion.
Most observers appear to agree with the Court that the special
danger in cases of content discrimination lies in the fact that the
government's purpose is connected to the "communicative impact"
"Communicative impact," although
of the speech regulated. 9
defined slightly differently by 4ifferent authors, 10 involves the
function of the speech act as communication-its transmission of a
message to the mind of a listener-rather than the function of the
speech act as a physical event in the world. For example, the
communicative impact of a sound truck announcing "The Vice
President is an idiot" is the outrage, or amusement, of the recipients
of the message; a noncommunicative impact might be the increased
noise on the street. All expression takes place through some
physical medium, therefore all speech has both communicative and
noncommunicative effects." As a general rule, the communicative
effects of a given speech act will depend upon the content of the
message communicated, while the noncommunicative effects will
usually be independent of the message. Therefore, according to the
Court, content discrimination occurs when the government's
purpose concerns the communicative impact of the speech, and not

9 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2, at 789-91 (2d ed.
1988); Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 547, 553 (1989); Ely, Flag
Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of CategorizationandBalancingin FirstAmendment
Analysis, 88 HAtv. L. REV. 1482, 1497 (1975); Friedman, Why Do You Speak That
Way?-Symbolic ExpressionReconsidered, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587,599-601 (1988);
Nimmer, The Meaningof Symbolic Speech Underthe FirstAmendment 21 UCLA L. REV.
29 (1973); Schauer, Cuban Cigars, CubanBooks, and the Problern oflncidentalRestrictions
on Communications,26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 782-83 (1985); cf Stone, supra note
3, at 207-17 (arguing that although communicative impact alone will not explain the
prohibition on content discrimination, it is an important part of the explanation
because most content-based regulations are aimed at communicative impact). But see
Farber, supra note 4, at 743-47 (rejecting attempts to define content regulation in
terms of communicative impact). For evidence of the Court's own recognition that
content discrimination has to do with a government purpose concerned with
communicative harms, see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753-55
(1989); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 48; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976).
10
See, e.g., M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.04 (1984 . Supp. 1989); L. TRIBE, supranote 9, § 12-2, at 78991; Ely, supra note 9, at 1497.
1 If the speech does not reach a listener, there may be no actual communicative
impact. There may, however, still be the potential for a communicative impact about
which the government might legitimately be concerned.
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when the government's purpose concerns the noncommunicative
12
impact.
This focus on a narrow concept of content discrimination has
meant that the vast range of "content-neutral" regulations of
speech-which once generated a broad and flexible array of tests and
standards-have been relegated to a secondary status, their distinctions often ignored and their fate a very deferential level of review.
The largest single class of such regulations is comprised of "time,
place, or manner" (TPM) restrictions. This category is itself a small
universe, ranging from parade permit requirements to total bans
on particular speech formats, such as handbilling 14 or posting
signs on public utility poles.15 In addition, many symbolic speech
cases also fall into the content-neutral category, including, for
example, United States v. O'Brien,16 which concerned the validity of
a law prohibiting draft card burning. Finally, the category also
includes a variety of other less easily classifiable cases, often
involving the incidental impact of non-speech oriented regulations
17
on speech or speakers.
One of the most noticeable yet least noticed results of the
Court's growing neglect of "content-neutral" regulations of speech
has been its collapse of the previously independent lines of doctrine
regarding TPM regulations and symbolic speech regulations into a
single standard.18 The Court, arguing that the two standards were
19
always functionally identical, has melded them into one test.
12 See infra notes 26-89 and accompanying text.
13 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
14 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
15 See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
16 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
17 See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (involving the closing,
under a general public health nuisance law, of an adult bookstore which was the site
of prostitution); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575 (1983) (concerning a tax on ink and newsprint that affected only a small
portion of the press and supplemented the general sales tax).
18 For a look at some of the rare commentary on this doctrinal collapse, see Day,
The Hybridizationof the Content-NeutralStandardsfor the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 195, 196-97 (1987); Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 491, 495, 518 (1988) [hereinafter Day, Incidental Regulation]; Werhan, The
O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 635, 637-38 (1987).
19 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989) (stating that "in
the last analysis [the O'Brien test] is little, if any, different from the standard applied
to time, place, or manner restrictions" (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984))); Taxpayers for Vincen 466 U.S. at 804-12
(using both the O'Brien and TPM tests in its analysis of content-neutral regulations).
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Legal scholars have largely abetted the Court in this move to unify
the treatment of "content-neutral" regulations of speech by arguing
that the O'Brien test was not intended to, and should not, be limited
to symbolic speech cases. 20 Although the two separate lines of
doctrine were far from robust even when they were independent,
the new unified doctrine provides even less protection for speech.
This result should be unsurprising given that the Court's move to

unify the standards arose out of a devaluation of the speech
concerns at stake in regulations that did not involve content
discrimination in the government's purpose.
This Article will argue, however, that content discrimination is
not one concept but many. There are several different types of
content discrimination. The government's purpose is one type of
discrimination, but it is only one. Content discrimination may
occur in the impact of the regulation on the marketplace of ideas
available to listeners, as when a regulation bans a certain format that
is systematically associated with particular speakers or points of
view, thereby reducing the availability of that point of view in the
marketplace. 21 Content discrimination may also occur in the
impact of the regulation on the speaker's chosen message, as when
a regulation removes certain symbols or symbolic activities from the
range of expression available to speakers. 2 2 Each of these types of
content discrimination may exist in conjunction with, or indepen20 See, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.06[A], at 2-85 to -93; Ely, supra note 9,
at 1484 n.11; Schauer, supra note 9, at 785 n.22; cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-23,
at 982-84 (arguing that if the government's purpose was understood as noncommunicative in O'Brien, then the Court's analysis was an appropriate application of the lower
level of scrutiny reserved for content-neutral regulations generally); Stone, ContentNeutral Restrictions, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 46, 48-52 (1987) (describing O'Brien as one of
the general content-neutral standards, essentially identical to the TPM standard, and
in no way restricted to symbolic speech cases).
21 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (pointing out that
door-to-door distribution of literature is "essential to the poorly financed causes of
little people"); Schneider v. NewJersey, 308 U.S. 147, 170-71 (1939) (striking down
a law that prohibited handbilling). But see Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 802 (1984) (upholding regulation barring posting of signs
on public utility poles); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37,50-54 (1983) (upholding regulation barring rival union from use of school mailbox
system).
22 For examples of such content discrimination in symbolic speech cases (although
it is not always recognized as such in the opinions), see United States v. Eichman, 58
U.S.L.W. 4744 (U.S.June 11, 1990) (striking down a law restricting the burning of the
American flag); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (same). But see United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a regulation against burning draft
cards).
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dently of, the other types. Content discrimination, then, can best
be understood not as a single concept, but as a family of concepts.
Each type of content discrimination raises related, but distinct,
first amendment concerns. As a result, each type should receive
somewhat different doctrinal treatment. The issue here is not
primarily one of the level or stringency of review but of tailoring the
standard to meet the problem. Certain doctrinal tools-for example,
least re- .rictive means, adequacy of alternatives, and restrictions on
official discretion-are particularly well suited to dealing with certain
types of discrimination. A variety of tests is appropriate (and will
not lead to chaos) if the tests respond to a range of discretely
identifiable problems.
The effort to construct such specific and context-sensitive
standards to deal with the different types of content discrimination
discloses the value of keeping distinct the old lines of doctrine that
the Court has recently elided. Several of the types of discrimination
unrecognized by the Court affect regulations that are, in the Court's
narrower view, "content-neutral." TPM regulations may have a
discriminatory impact on the free speech market by silencing some
messages more than others, and it is a central feature of the
symbolic speech cases that the regulation restricts not merely the
occasion for speech but the speaker's message itself. The old lines
of doctrine concerning TPM regulations and symbolic speech
regulations, far from being interchangeable, utilized different
doctrinal tools to respond to the different types of content
discrimination inherent in these various regulations. A broader
view of content discrimination leads to a greater understanding of
the differences between these lines of doctrine and of the valuable
and independent role of each.
Indeed, it is the Court's refusal to recognize the other types of
content discrimination and the usefulness of the old tests in dealing
with them that has led to doctrinal confusion. For example, the
Court has failed to give a coherent account of why the TPM and
symbolic speech lines were ever separate at all, of why the adequacy
of alternatives is constitutionally significant, and of why regulations
that chill certain types of speech should receive strict scrutiny if
content discrimination in the government's purpose is the central
concern of the first amendment. All of these doctrinal issues
become clear when the various types of content discrimination, with
their unique characteristics and difficulties, are recognized.
This Article will present an argument for using a broader
interpretation of the content discrimination principle to bring some
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order to this corner of first amendment doctrine. Part I will trace
the development of the Court's focus on content discrimination and
the erosion of the independent lines of TPM and symbolic speech
doctrine. Part II will then define more precisely the different types
of content discrimination, and discuss the sense in which they are
related to basic notions of equality and to the central concerns of
the first amendment. Part III will describe a doctrinal approach
sensitive to each type of content discrimination and will examine
some representative cases to illustrate the application of that
approach.
The goal of this Article is not to provide a comprehensive
framework for first amendment analysis, but simply to contribute to
the process of practical reasoning 3 concerning one part of the
Content
complex reality addressed by free speech doctrine.
discrimination, while not the only concern of the first amendment,
is a central concern and one that has been misunderstood. This
Article attempts to provide a more complete and coherent picture
of what content discrimination means, why it is significant, and how
recent doctrinal developments have reduced the tools that once
existed to deal with its various manifestations.
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
The development of free speech doctrine is generally traced to
the beginning of the twentieth century. 24 The concern with
content discrimination by government was a part of that doctrine
from very near the beginning and is in no sense a new idea. The
modern evolution of that idea, however, has taken two distinctive
directions.
First, content discrimination has evolved from a characteristic
of the regulation more generally, in either its words or its operation,
to a characteristic of the government purpose served by the
regulation. Under the Court's present approach, a regulation will
qualify as content discriminatory only if the government purpose
23 See Farber & Frickey, PracticalReason andthe FirstAmendment 34 UCLA L. REV.
1615, 1616-17 (1987) (rejecting the high level of abstract thinking common to modern
theories of the first amendment and explaining that the process of practical reasoning
is a complex process that is better "learned through example than through rules").
24 See Rabban, The FirstAmendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 516-17
(1981). Rabban argues that the years before the First World War also offer important
insights, but he acknowledges that the Court wrote a greater number of carefully
considered opinions in the period that is generally the focus of study. See id. at 51820.

1991]

CONTENT DISCRIMI1NATION

served by the regulation is related to the content of the speech.
Neither a content-discriminatory impact, either on the speech
market in general or on the speaker in particular, nor a content
distinction on the face of the regulation, will suffice to make a
regulation content-discriminatory in the absence of this type of
government purpose.25 This narrow, "government purpose"
interpretation of content discrimination is a dramatic change from
the broader, more pragmatic approach utilized by the Court earlier
in the development of the concern about content discrimination.
Second, this limited notion of content discrimination has
become so dominant a part of the Court's view of the first amendment that it has caused the Court to ignore other distinctions within
the class of "content-neutral" regulations. Different types of
regulations, even if they all share a lack of discriminatory government purpose, have the potential to create other serious and
distinct types of problems. Early first amendment doctrine,
developed in the case-specific common law method, was sensitive to
these variations and employed a broad variety of doctrinal tools to
assess the different problems each case presented. The Court,
however, recently has collapsed these previously independent lines
of doctrine into one, rather weak, standard.
These two developments are related. Once the Court became
preoccupied with the government purpose view of content discrimination, the most salient fact about "content-neutral" regulations was
a shared lack of this kind of discrimination. From this perspective,
such regulations looked more alike than different. It is, therefore,
unsurprising that the Court should be inclined to design a unified
standard to handle all of them. Similarly, if the focus is on content
discrimination in the government's purpose, then other dangers
posed by these "content-neutral" regulations seem less serious. It
is, therefore, also unsurprising that the unified standard should be
a fairly lenient one. Thus, I suggest that the Court's focus on the
narrow, government purpose model of content discrimination was
instrumental in reducing both the complexity and the stringency of
the doctrine applicable to "content-neutral" regulations.

25

See infra notes 26-89 and accompanying text.
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A. Content Discriminationin the Government's Purpose
The Court's concern with content discrimination in a regulation
originally included, but was not limited to, discrimination in the
government's purpose. This concern has gradually narrowed,
however, until the only locus of content discrimination recognized
by the present majority is the government purpose served by the
regulation. Although this narrowing took place primarily in the
context of sexually explicit speech, most of the Justices have recently
indicated that they are willing to apply this constricted notion of
content discrimination even to fully protected political speech.26
Despite some early indications of concern about content
discrimination, 27 the classic statement of the requirement of
content neutrality did not appear until 1972. In Police Department
v. Mosley,2 s the Court clearly announced the first amendment's
antipathy for content discrimination and, less clearly, described
what content discrimination meant. Although Mosley is somewhat
ambiguous, the best interpretation of the case is that the Court's
concern about content discrimination extended beyond discriminatory government purposes.
The local ordinance at issue in Mosley prohibited picketing
within a certain distance of school buildings during school hours,
but exempted "peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor
dispute." 29 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, first pointed
out that the regulation referred on its face to the content of the
speech: the law permitted picketers with labor-related messages on
their signs but prohibited picketers with other messages.3 0 He
then wrote the broad language that is often quoted as the clearest
statement of the Court's hostility to content discrimination: "above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
26 See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
27 In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), for example, the Court
struck down a tax that applied to only thirteen of Louisiana's newspapers, twelve of
which had opposed Governor Huey Long on a recent policy issue. Although the
opinion is far from a model of clarity, the Court was candid about its concern that
the tax had the "plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the
circulation of a selected- group of newspapers." Id. at 251. This opinion, then,
confirms that the Court was concerned, even quite early, with content-discriminatory
government purposes. For a discussion of some of the other early references to
content discrimination, see infra notes 316-23 and accompanying text (describing
early licensing cases).
8 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
29 Id. at 93.

So See id. at 95.
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to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
31
matter, or its content."
Although the opinion contains language suggesting that content
discrimination is per se unconstitutional, 2 Mosley, along with both
earlier and later opinions, makes clear that at least some contentbased regulations of speech may be upheld if supported by a
compelling enough state interest. The subversive speech cases are
quite clear on this point. The government may regulate such
speech if it can demonstrate the proper combination of intent to
cause harm and sufficient proximity between the speech and serious
illegal action.3s Similarly, Mosley itself recognized that "there may
be sufficient regulatory interests justifying selective exclusions or
distinctions among pickets.... But these justifications for selective
34
exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized."
The level of scrutiny applied to content-based regulations of speech
may often be fatal in fact, but that scrutiny must be applied in each
case: content discrimination is not per se unconstitutional. 5
Sl Id. The Mosley opinion relies on the equal protection clause as well as on the
first amendment to generate this anti-discrimination principle. See id. at 94-95. It is,
of course, entirely possible that the equal protection clause would require this
concern with content discrimination even if the first amendment did not. However,
the Court's subsequent focus on content discrimination in cases where the equal
protection clause is not mentioned makes it quite clear that thp first amendment is
itself an independent source of the anti-discrimination principle. See Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536-38 (1980); cf. Karst, Equality
as a Central Principle in the First Amendment 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 26-29 (1975)
(asserting that although the Court often addresses the relationship between the first
amendment and the equal protection clause, it uses the former asauthprity in Mosley).
But cf United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3123 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that concern about disparate treatment of different forms of speech,
rather than content categories, is better addressed under equal protection than under
free speech doctrine). Mosley itself has generally been read by commentators as a first
amendment case, see, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.07, at 2-98; L. TRIBE, supra
note 9, § 12-2, at 789; Karst, supra, at 26-29, and used by the Court as first
amendment precedent, see, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,571 (1987); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). I will, therefore, treat it as a first amendment analysis.
32 See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 ("The essence of this forbidden censorship is content
control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would
completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
33 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447-48 (1969).
3 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99.
35 See M. NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.05(B), at 2-28; L. TRIBE, supranote 9, § 12-2,
at 790 n.101.
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In light of the first amendment's suspicion of content discrimination, the Court went on to consider and reject the city's claim
that the regulation was justified as a means of preventing violent
and disruptive picketing.3 5 This discussion could be interpreted
as the Court's explanation of why the asserted state interest was not
either sufficiently compelling or sufficiently closely tailored to meet
the strict scrutiny standard applied to content-based regulations of
speech. Indeed, the Court explicitly asserted that the statute at
issue was "broad";3 7 that the legitimate harms could "'be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes'";38 and that "Chicago's ordinance impose[d] a selective restriction on expressive conduct far
'greater than [was] essential to the furtherance of [a substantial
39
governmental] interest.'"
This discussion may alternatively be seen as a hint of the
transformation of content -discrimination to come. The Court might
implicitly have been relying on a concept of content discrimination
focused on the government's purpose. This part of the opinion
would then have functioned as a rejection of the city's claim that it
had a non-content-discriminatory purpose that justified its regulation: preventing noisy and violent picketing that would disrupt
schools. The Court cast doubt on the city's claim that its goal was
simply to avoid disruption by pointing out that the regulation
prohibited even peaceful non-labor picketing. If the structure of
the regulation aid not match the asserted noncommunicative
interest, then maybe the city was really motivated by a desire to
silence certain categories of speech because of their content.
As these two readings of the opinion suggest, the case leaves
uncertain the relationship between a discriminatory government
purpose and the concept of content discrimination. The best
interpretation of Mosley, however, is that discriminatory purposes
and discriminatory operation are each independent and sufficient
grounds to find a regulation content-based and subject it to strict
scrutiny. The first bit of evidence for this interpretation is the
Court's assertion, at the conclusion of its review of the principle
banning content discrimination, that "[s]elective exclusions from a
public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be
See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100-02.
7 Id.at 102.
38 Id. (quoting Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948)).
39 Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
36
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justified by reference to content alone."4 ° The second half of this
conjunction clearly refers to the government purpose that the
regulation serves and that justifies the imposition of a burden on
speech. "[J]ustified by reference to content alone" could very easily
be translated into "justified by reference to a communicative
harm." 41 The first half of the conjunction, though, presumably
refers to something else, or there would be no sense in stating the
proposition as a conjunction. In light of the law at issue in the case
itself, as well as the cases cited by the Court as applications of this
principle, "based on content alone" most sensibly refers to content
42
discrimination on the face or in the operation of the regulation.
This concluding statement of the content discrimination principle
would then mean that either type of discrimination-in the government's purpose, or in the operation of the law-would be sufficient
to invoke a higher level of scrutiny.
The second piece of evidence indicating that Mosley recognized
the possibility of content discrimination even when the government
had a neutral purpose appears in the Court's rejection of the city's
argument about disruption. As I discussed above, this part of the
opinion can be read as casting doubt on the city's proclaimed
motive of preventing disruption and suggesting a motive based on
a more communicative harm. The city responded to this suggestion
by arguing that the content categories mirrored the noncommunicative harm because labor picketing was less likely to be disruptive
than other types of picketing. The Court rejected this argument as
well. First, the Court suggested that it simply disagreed with the
city's assessment of the relative orderliness of various categories of
pickets. The opinion refers to "'undifferentiated fear or apprehension'" 43 and asserts that "[s]ome labor picketing is peaceful, some
40 Id. at 96.

" Though other translations are possible, subsequent development of the case
law, see infra notes 47-69 and accompanying text, makes this the most plausible and
relevant translation.
42 The Court described a series of cases involving discretionary licensing schemes
that were, or might have been, used to discriminate against certain speech because
of its content. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96-97. In addition, the decision quoted at
length from a concurring opinion by Justice Black dealing with a statute that
discriminated on its face between labor picketing and other types "ofpicketing. See
id. at 97-98 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring)).
4

Id. at 101 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508

(1969)).
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44
disorderly; the same is true of picketing on other themes."
Second, the Court insisted that the city must make such judgements
about disruption "on an individualized basis, not by means of broad
classifications, especially those based on subject matter. Freedom
of expression ... would rest on a soft foundation indeed if
government could distinguish among picketers on such a wholesale
45
and categorical basis."
While the Court's first argument may simply reflect a higher
evidentiary standard, the second argument clearly indicates that
content-based classifications are suspect even in the absence of a
discriminatory government purpose. Without disputing the city's
claim that what it was worried about was noise and violence, the
Court refused to allow the city to pursue those legitimate, noncommunicative goals through means that were facially content-based.
It relegated the city, instead, to a ban on violent or disruptive
picketing and the task of determining on an individualized basis
whether any particular picketing posed that danger. Thus, the
content-discriminatory operation of the regulation alone must have
been constitutionally suspect, even if it was a generally accurate
proxy for the noncommunicative harm that was the government's
goal.
While ambiguous, Mosley suggests that content discrimination
can occur even when the government's purpose is noncommunicative, simply because a regulation operates b singling out a certain
content category of speech for different treatment. This interpretation of Mosley is somewhat inferential; the opinion does not directly
address the question of the relationship between content discrimination generally and a discriminatory government purpose. Nonetheless, the language the Court used to describe the proscribed
discrimination and the way it analyzed the city's disruption
argument make the inference a strong one.
And inference was, for a time, all the Court offered. In
subsequent cases, the Court reiterated its concern about content
discrimination while avoiding any clarification of the relationship
between operational discrimination and a discriminatory government purpose. 46 The Court finally faced the issue squarely in

44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating,

because it discriminated on the basis of content, an ordinance prohibiting drive-in
theaters with screens visible from public streets from showing films containing
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Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,47 which addressed a statute
restricting the location of movie theaters and bookstores purveying
sexually explicit materials but leaving the location of other theaters
and bookstores unregulated. Facially and in its operation, the law
placed a burden on certain speech because of its content. The city
claimed that its goal in regulating this speech was not to silence any
viewpoint or subject matter, but to prevent some of the urban blight
caused by aggregations of movie theaters and bookstores purveying
this category of speech: a rise in the crime rate, a drop in property
values, and increasing neglect and abandonment. The city claimed
it was trying to reduce these deleterious effects by dispersing such
48
businesses throughout the city.
The Court accepted this argument. Despite the fact that the law

was facially content-based, the Court applied the lower standard of
Justice
scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations. 49
5
0
Stevens wrote that "the regulation of the places where sexually
explicit films may be exhibited is unaffected by whatever social,
political, or philosophical message the film may be intended to

communicate."51 The government did not intend to regulate the
films because of such messages, or even because of their offensiveness. Rather, "[t]he [city's] determination was that a concentration
of 'adult' movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate . . . . It is
this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to
nudity).
47 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
48 See id. at 54-55.
41 See id. at 71 (finding for the government on the relatively weak basis that "[tlhe
record discloses a factual basis for the [city's] conclusion that this kind of restriction
will have the desired effect"); see also id. at 71 n.35 (accepting the district court's
finding that there will still be sufficient access to sexually explicit speech). But cf. L.
TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-18, at 930 & n.l (suggesting that City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) and American Mini Theatresrepresent one category
of "less-than-complete constitutional protection").
50 This part of the Stevens opinion wasjoined by only three other members of the
Court. Justice Stevens relied in his opinion on the lesser first amendment value of
sexually explicit speech. Justice Powell refused in his concurrence to endorse that
notion, finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue of lower-value categories in order
to decide this case. American Mini Theatrestherefore leaves unanswered the question
whether this type of analysis of the government's purpose could save from strict
scrutiny a content-based regulation that applied to a fully protected category of
speech, such as political speech. As discussed below, the Court is beginning to hint
at answers to this question in some recent opinions. See infra notes 70-85 and
accompanying text.
51 American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70.
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avoid, not the -dissemination of 'offensive' speech." 52 Justice
Powell, in a concurrence necessary to make a majority, agreed that
"the [city] did not inversely zone adult theaters in an effort to
protect citizens against the content of adult movies ....
[T]he [city]
simply acted to protect the economic integrity of large areas
....
"53
Believing that this purpose was unrelated to .the, suppression of free speech, Justice Powell also applied a lower standard of
review than that reserved for content-based regulations of
speech.5 4
In what sense is economic and physical deterioration a "secondary" effect distinct from the effect of offense to viewers or listeners? 55 Secondary effects are, in fact, noncommunicative effects
arising from the speech as a physical event in the world, not from
the communicative aspect of the speech. That is, the causal chain
connecting speech to a secondary effect does not include a link that
takes place in the mind of a recipient of the speech. Communication involves the transmission of a message of some kind from one
person to another. 56 If the harm at which the government is
aiming will only come about if some message is in fact received by
a listener, then the harm is a communicative one. Offense is, of
course, a communicative harm. The harm of offense can only occur

Id. at 71 n.34.
53 Id. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
54 See id. at 79-80 (applying the test stated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968)).
55 Surely, "secondary" cannot simply mean "indirect," despite the fact that some
Justices have interpreted it that way. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 336 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring). The number of intermediate links in the causal chain
connecting speech to any type of harm is almost infinitely malleable; the number is
entirely a matter of how one chooses to describe them. In addition, unless there is
some qualitative difference in the type of causal connection, there is no reason-in
terms of the purposes of free speech or the dangers of content discrimination-why
a longer causal chain should leave the government freer to regulate based on the
resulting harm than would a shorter one.
56 Some scholars have argued that communication is too narrow a description of
the protected functions of speech. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 992-96 (1978). But see Scanlon, A Theoy of
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 206-07 (1972) (arguing that "free
speech" protects communicative acts of expression). While the Supreme Court has
occasionally protected solitary, and perhaps noncommunicative, speech, see e.g.,
Stanleyv. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down law banning private possession
of obscene material), it is clear that communication is the primary speech function
that has concerned the Court. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-8, at 837 (usingJustice
Murphy's dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), as an
example); Nimmer, supra note 9, at 36 ("Whatever else may or may not be true of
52

speech, as an irreducible minimum it must constitute a communication.").
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if someone in fact receives a message from the speech. A drop in
property values is, however, a noncommunicative harm. Even if all
of the people who actually entered the "adult" theater were deaf
and blind, and therefore unable to receive any message from the
speech, the property values in the neighborhood of the theater
57
would still drop as long as the business continued to operate.
Justice Stevens's opinion in American Mini Theatres treated a
facially content-based regulation as content-neutral because the
stated government purpose was to control a secondary, or noncommunicative, effect. Indeed, Justice Stevens was quite explicit about
his belief that the "essence" of the principle banning content
discrimination is a concern about governmental purpose. 58 Justice
Powell also relied on the nature of the government purpose to
59
explain why a lower level of review was appropriate.
This limited, purposive interpretation of content discrimination
has been reaffirmed in a series of subsequent cases. In City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 60 which involved a regulation very
similar to the one in American Mini Theatres, the Court recognized
that the law facially discriminated among content categories of
protected speech. 61 Nonetheless, the Court explicitly found the
57

See Quadres, The Applicability of Content-Based Time, Place, and Manner
Regilations to Offensive Language: The Burger Decade, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 995,
1021 (1981).
58 See American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 67. Justice Stevens apparently takes an
even narrower view of content discrimination than the one here attributed to the

Court: only government purposes aimed at communicative effects arising from a
viewpoint are prohibited; the government is still free to regulate communicative effects
that arise from whole subject matter categories. Cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 745-46 (1978) (arguing that government may, in some circumstances, censor
words that are offensive because of their subject matter-depicting intimate bodily
functions-but not because of their viewpoint-the political point being made by the
use of such words).
59
See American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). Both
Justices Stevens and Powell did suggest that if the effect of the ordinance were

severely to limit access to these movies, then a stricter standard of review might be
appropriate. See id. at 71-72 n.35 (Stevens,J.); id. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
It is possible that they recognized the dangers of content-discriminatory effects even

where no government purpose to discriminate exists, but they were more likely
restating the requirement of "ample alternative channels for communication,"

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976), that was a traditional part of the test applied to content-neutral TPM
regulations without evincing any recognition of the content implications that arise
when the alternatives are inadequate. See infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text
(discussing TPM test).
60 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
61 See id. at 47.
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law to be content-neutral and properly appraised as a TPM
regulation because the government's primary concern was with the
secondary effects of the speech. 2 It concluded, "In short, the
Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of
'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.," 63 The
Court thereby transformed Police Department v. Mosley's two-part
statement giving equal concern to facial and operational content
discrimination, 64 into a single-focus standard concerned only with
the government's purpose. It explained this definition by pointing
to the "fundamental principle that underlies our concern about
'content-based' speech regulations: that 'government may not grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.'"65 The Court then proceeded to apply the TPM
standard and uphold the regulation against a series of challenges. 6 6 This opinion, unlike the Stevens opinion in American Mini
Theatres,was joined by Justice Powell and commanded a majority of
the Court.

67

After Renton, it was clear that the Court had adopted the
secondary effects analysis and its underlying purposive theory of
content discrimination with respect to zoning ordinances regulating
sexually explicit (but non-obscene) speech.
justice Stevens's
American Mini Theatres plurality opinion relied on the "lesser" first
68
amendment value of such speech in justifying this approach,
while the majority opinion in Renton qualified its holding by saying
that the content-neutral TPM standard would apply to such zoning
regulations "at least with respect to businesses that purvey sexually
explicit materials." 69 The question remaining is whether the Court
will extend the secondary effects approach to facially content-based
62 See id. at 48-49.
63 Id. at 48 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
64 408 U.S. 92, 99-102 (1972).
65 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49 (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96).
66 See id. at 50-55.
67

Justice Blackmun, who dissented in American Mini Theatres, concurred in the

result in Renton, although he did not join Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion.

Justice Stewart, who had also dissented in American Mini Theatres,had been replaced
by Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority opinion in Renton.
68 See American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70-71.
69 Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
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regulations affecting "higher" value speech, such as core political
speech.
Although this question has not yet definitively
been answered,
0
the recent case of Boos v. Barry7 indicates that an affirmative
response by a majority of the Court may not be far off. Boos
involved a law in the District of Columbia prohibiting, among other
things, the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy
if the sign tends to bring the foreign government into "public
odium" or "public disrepute." 7 1 A majority of the Court found the
law to be a violation of the first amendment; as many as six Justices
may have believed the secondary effects analysis to be appropriate
despite the political nature of the speech, and at least five Justices
interpreted that standard in such a way as to confirm the claim that
72
a secondary effect is a noncommunicative effect.
Justice O'Connor, in a section of the Court's opinionjoined only
byJustices Stevens and Scalia, applied the secondary-effects analysis.
She did not explicitly acknowledge that she was extending the
analysis beyond its previous realm of application; rather, she
described the Renton case as simply providing a general definition
of content-neutral statutes. 73 Thus the opinion does not explain
why it is appropriate to apply the secondary-effects test to fully
protected political speech. Justice Rehnquist, in a separate
opinion joined by Justices White and Blackmun, endorsed the
circuit court's reasoning, 74 a part of which claimed that the Renton
analysis might be applicable to this regulation of political speech. 75
As in the O'Connor opinion, neither the circuit court nor Justice
Rehnquist provided any explanation of why such an application was
appropriate given the special context in which the secondary effects
analysis developed. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall insisted
that the Renton analysis should not be extended to fully protected,
political speech.76 Thus, a majority of the Court may now be
prepared to apply the secondary effects standard to facially contentbased regulations of speech in general.
70 485 U.S. 312 (1988).

71 Id. at 315 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981)).
72

Justice Kennedy took no part in the case.

73 See id. at 320-21.
74 See id. at 338-39 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
75 See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1469 n.15 (1987).
76 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 335-38 (Brennan,J., concurring). These two justices also
continued to object to the use of the secondary-effects analysis to transform an
otherwise content-based regulation into a content-neutral one. See id. at 334.
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The Boos opinion also confirms that secondary effects are
noncommunicative effects, that is, the effects of speech as a physical
act in the world, rather than the effects of speech as communication. Justice O'Connor, joined by justices Stevens and Scalia, found
that the law in Boos was content-based even under the Renton
standard because the harm at which it was aimed-the offense to the
dignity of foreign diplomats-was not a secondary effect. She
explained that "[I]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of
'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton."77 Secondary effects
are features that "happen to be associated with that type of
Examples of secondary effects include congestion,
speech."78
visual clutter, and interference with ingress and egress. 7 9 They do
80
not include the "emotive impact of speech on its audience."
Justices Brennan and Marshall, while finding this standard unmanageable 8 l and dangerous, 82 interpreted it in the same way.83 At
least five members of the Court 84 have, therefore, subscribed to
85
the "noncommunicative effect" interpretation of the Renton doctrine.
77
78

Id. at 321.
Id. at 320.
79 See id. at 321.
80 Id.

81 See id. at 336.
82 See id. at 335, 337.
83 See id. at 334.
84 Three members of the Court may well disagree with this interpretation.
Although the Rehnquist opinionjoined by White and Blackmun, does not explicitly
address this issue, the circuit court opinion that Rehnquist endorsed argued that the
law might well be content-neutral under Renton. See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450,
1469 n.15 (1987), modified, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
85 The recent case of United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3114 (1990), illustrates
one of the difficulties in applying the communicative-impact approach. Kokinda
involved a post office ban on solicitation on the sidewalk connecting the building and
the parking lot. Obviously, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the rule is
content-based on its face: you can't be arrested if you say "support my cause," but
you can be arrested if you say "contribute ten dollars to my cause." Id. at 3134
(Brennan,J., dissenting). Moreover, Brennan suggested that the post office's purpose
in restricting the speech was related to a communicative harm: the embarrassment
or annoyance felt by listeners when asked for money. See id. The plurality and
concurrence, on the other hand, found the regulation content-neutral, see id. at 3124,
3125, because they believed the government's purpose was to prevent the congestion
and inconvenience caused by the physical acts associated with giving money to a
solicitor, such as taking out a wallet or writing a check. Such physical effects may
appear to be noncommunicativ, but they are not. If the solicitation took place in a
language unknown to the listeners, then no one would stop to give money to the
speaker. The causal chain connecting speech to harm necessarily involves a step in
the mind of a listener who receives and responds to the message. The harm,
therefore, was communicative.
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Thus the case law demonstrates that the meaning of content
discrimination has changed over time from "any restriction on
speech, the application of which turns on the content of the
speech" 86 to regulations that are justified "only by reference to the
content of speech." 87 The focus has shifted from the means
utilized by a statute and how they actually operate, to the government purpose those means are intended to serve.88 Moreover, the
government purpose proscribed is one aimed at a communicative
effect of speech, an effect involving the communication of some
message to the mind of a listener. Finally, this new principle of
content discrimination is now in the process of becoming a part of
first amendment analysis applicable even to fully protected, political
speech. 9

Although the plurality's failure to recognize the restriction as content
discriminatory does cast some doubt on the communicative-impact interpretation, the
relevance of the case is limited by the fact that the plurality did not believe that a
public forum was involved. In a non-public forum, the government is permitted to
engage in "reasonable" regulation on the basis of content as long as it does not
disadvantage particular viewpoints. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45-46 (1983). The plurality's discussion of content discrimination,
coming as it did within the analysis of a non-public forum restriction, can be read
either as dicta or as holding that the rule at issue was not viewpoint discriminatory.
In neither case is it a clear refutation of the communicative impact model, but it does
indicate the difficulty of applying that model.
86 Boos, 485 U.S. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 321 (plurality opinion).
88 This development represents yet another example of the growing importance
of legislative motive as a limiting principle in constitutional analysis. See, e.g.,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 n.3 (1990) (explicitly comparing
treatment of neutral laws that cause a religious burden to treatment of neutral laws
that cause a burden on speech or have a racially disproportionate impact);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that "the invidious quality of
a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose").
89 1 am, in effect, adopting as a descriptive matter the "third formulation"
examined by Dean Stone: a regulation is content-based if it turns on communicative
impact. See Stone, supra note 3, at 209. Stone objected to this formula as not
comporting with the case law. However, my description of the history satisfactorily
explains the cases he cites as counter-examples. See id. at 210-11. Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), which I agree does not involve a communicative-impact
approach, was decided before the Court adopted this approach in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), and New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), were both decided after American Mini Theatres, but are
both consistent with the Court's acceptance of a communicative-impact theory of
content discrimination.
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B. The Demise of Distinctions Within Content-NeutralRegulations
The meaning of content discrimination evolved alongside the
development of different doctrinal lines designed to deal with the
distinct problems of content-neutral regulations of speech. Two of
the most important of these lines are the symbolic speech doctrine
and the TPM doctrine. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court recently
collapsed these two lines into a single, combined standard that
apparently applies to almost all cases involving content-neutral
90
regulations.
1. The Time, Place, or Manner Doctrine
The TPM doctrine had its genesis in and acquired its name from
the early licensing cases. In Lovell v. City of Griffin,9 1 for example,
the Court pointed out that the ordinance at issue gave the city
manager unlimited discretion to deny a license for the distribution
of literature "at any time, at any place, and in any manner."92 The

In City of Madison, the state had prohibited non-union teachers from speaking on
matters related to collective bargaining at board of education meetings open to the
public, claiming that such speech constituted "negotiation" with someone other than
the union representative and therefore amounted to an unfair labor practice. See City
of Madison, 429 U.S. at 172-73. Speech constitutes negotiation, however, only when
it is communication on issues subject to collective bargaining, not because of any
physical effects of the act of speaking. The state, then, was concerned with a
communicative harm.
In Ferber,the state sought to prohibit the distribution of child pornography. See
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 750-51. The Court could have analyzed this case under the
standard of American Mini Theatres,since the primary harm the law sought to regulate
was the noncommunicative harm inflicted on children by the production of these
materials; distribution was attacked as a means of getting at production. See id. at
759. But the regulation in Ferber, unlike the one in American Mini Theatres,
completely prohibited distribution, and might have failed the TPM test by leaving
inadequate alternatives. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,
71, 76-77 (1981) (noting that regulation leaving inadequate alternatives fails TPM
test). The Court avoided this issue entirely by finding the content category at issue
to be excluded from first amendment protection, and thus undeserving of a stricter
standard of review despite the facially content-based regulation. See Ferber,458 U.S.
at 763-64. Once a category is excluded, the state is free to regulate it any way it
chooses, including completely prohibiting it. See id. The Court's opinion, which is
devoted to justifying the exclusion rather than examining the regulation under the
normal content-based standard, is, therefore, consistent with an acceptance of the
communicative impact conception of content discrimination as applied to at least
partially protected speech.
90 See infra text accompanying notes 146-72.
91 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
92 Id. at 451; see also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939).
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Court upheld a licensing scheme in Cox v. New Hampshire3 after
finding that it did not authorize discrimination on the basis of
content, asserting that "[i]f a municipality has authority to control
the use of its public streets for parades or processions, as it
undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in
94
relation to the other proper uses of the streets."
The .ame of this category of regulations-TPM-might suggest
that these restrictions are distinguished by the fact that they are not
total bans on speech but merely regulations of the circumstances in
which speech may occur. In other words, the "opposite" of a TPM
regulation would be a complete ban or prohibition. The language
in these early cases indicates, however, that a TPM regulation is
distinguished primarily by its lack of content discrimination, either
on its face or in its operation, rather than by the limited nature of
its prohibition. It regulates the circumstances of speech rather than
the content of the speech. 95 The "opposite" of a TPM regulation
96
is a content-based regulation.
The Court's approach to format bans confirms this understanding of TPM regulations. If any content-neutral rule9 7 ought to
qualify as a prohibition rather than a regulation of circumstances,
a ban on an entire format of speech, such as handbilling or posting
signs on public utility poles, would appear to be it. The Court,
however, has consistently treated format bans as TPM regula-'
13 312 U.S. 569
94 Id. at 576.

(1941).

" Cf Farber & Nowak, The MisleadingNatureof PublicForumAnalysis: Contentand
Context in FirstAmendmentAdjudication,70 VA. L. REV. 1219,1219 (1984) (stating that
traditional TPM regulations relate only to the physical context of speech).
There is, of course, a relationship between content discrimination and total bans.

It would be possible to have a total ban that was content-neutral, but it literally would
have to prohibit all types of speech, at all times, in all places, and through all manners
and media. Such a regulation, obviously, would be unconstitutional even under the
most lenient interpretation of the first amendment, regardless of the particular
doctrinal test applied. Short of such a regulation, however, no content-neutral
regulation will (technically) be a complete ban. If it leaves any time, place, or manner
open then it does not prohibit the speech entirely. Many content-based regulations
would also not be total bans, i.e., they would regulate a certain content category
without prohibiting it entirely, but content-based regulations do have the potential
to function as total bans on certain categories of speech without reaching the
absurdity of the total silence rule.
96 This is by no means an uncontroversial usage of the term, and not necessarily
the one I would choose if I were designing the doctrine, but I believe it is the one
most in accord with the Court's own usage. See cases cited infra note 99.
97 Other than the total silence regulation I discuss above. See supra note 95.
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tions.9 8 The Court has refused to do so only when the format
bans are themselves content-based. 99
It took some time and. a couple of false starts, however, before
the Court was able to specify the test to be applied to regulations of
the time, place, or manner of speech. 10 0 The first serious attempt
98 See Stone, supra note 20, at 65; see also Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,

74-77 (1981) (ban on live entertainment); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 155 (1939)
(ban on handbilling); cf. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 803-06 (1984) (analyzing a ban on postingsigns on public utilitypoles under
the combined TPM and O'Brien standard that developed later).
99 See, e.g., Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515-17 (1981) (rejecting
ban on billboards that made exceptions for some commercial billboards); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-61, 470 (1980) (rejecting ban on residential picketing that
made an exception for labor picketing); cf. Schauer, supra note 1, at 301-02
(discussing Ferberas an example of a content-based format ban).
Some commentators have argued for the interpretation I reject here. See, e.g.,
Ely, supra note 9, at 1497-98 (describing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969), as a TPM regulation aimed at the content of
the speech); Redish, supra note 4, at 115-16 (describing the opposite of a TPM
regulation as a total ban on expression). They approach the issue by assuming that
the category of TPM regulations is defined by the plain meaning of its name and then
criticize the Court for misunderstanding the implications of that categorization. They
also suggest that good reasons exist for treating total bans differently from
regulations of the circumstances of speech. See id. at 116. As to the plain meaning
argument, I demur. It may well be that the words are most naturally read that way,
but that is not how the Court has read them. My only purpose in this section is to
describe, in as coherent a fashion as possible, the actual state of the doctrine. I think
that my interpretation of the category of TPM cases is a better explanation of the
precedent than is the plain meaning argument.
As for the second argument, I have two responses to the claim that there are
good reasons to treat a ban differently from a regulation. First, short of the extreme
hypothetical discussed supranote 95, 1 do not believe that the line between a contentneutral ban and a content-neutral regulation of circumstances can easily be drawn,
and I have not seen a satisfactory description of it in the work of its proponents.
Second, I believe that the TPM test, properly understood, provides sufficient
flexibility to address the additional burdens created by the more restrictive
regulations that might be described as bans. See infra notes 368-71 and accompanying
text.
100 In a case several years after Co; the Court upheld a local ordinance restricting
the use of loudspeaker trucks on city streets. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949). Justice Reed's plurality opinion interpreted the ordinance as prohibiting only
sound amplifiers that emitted "loud and raucous noises." Id. at 85. After considering
the important government interests served by reducing noise on the streets and
mentioning the other means of communication left open, the plurality upheld the
ordinance, as limited by its interpretation. See id. at 86-87, 89. Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson, writing separately, rejected the plurality's interpretation of the law as
limited to loud and raucous noises and stated that sound trucks could be regulated
or even prohibited as long as the city avoided content discrimination. See id. at 89
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to his dissent in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
Given that both
558, 562-66 (1948)); id. at 97-98 (Jackson, J., concurring).
concurrences were necessary for a majority, neither the statutory interpretation nor
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to define a standard came with the "compatibility" approach in
Grayned v. City of Rockford.10 1 The majority in Grayned held that
"[t]he nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate
the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are
reasonable.'... The crucial question is whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
the incipient doctrinal standard in the plurality opinion could have much precedential
value. Indeed, asJustice Rutledge pointed out in his dissent, a majority of the Court
interpreted the law as a complete prohibition on sound trucks, regardless ofwhether
they were emitting loud and raucous noises. See id.at 104 (Rutledge,J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, later Courts have cited Kovacs as authority for the proposition that
restrictions on decibel levels are acceptable TPM regulations. See, e.g., Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 656 (1984).
In several other cases, the Court's analysis of TPM regulations relied on doctrines
that have since been discredited and abandoned. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965), for example, the Court avoided the issue of the constitutionality of a contentneutral ban on parades and meetings on public streets because it found the ordinance
at issue to have a history of discriminatory application. See id.at 558. Nonetheless,
in the course of the opinion, the Court referred to the doctrine that parading and
picketing, because they are "speech plus" action, are less deserving of constitutional
protection than "pure speech." See id.at 555. The Court reaffirmed this doctrine in
Cox's companion case. See Coxv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,563-64 (1965). In the face
of fierce criticism by commentators, however, the Court largely has abandoned the
"speech plus" approach. For a sampling of the criticism, see L. TRIBE, supra note 9,
§ 12-7, at 825-27; Ely, supra note 9, at 1495.
Similarly, in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), the majority relied on the
since-discredited right of "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property,...
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated," id.
at 47, to uphold a trespass conviction for protesting on the grounds
of ajailhouse. The dissent in Adder/ey does hint at the TPM doctrine that was soon
to develop, with Justice Douglas admitting that "[t]here may be some instances in
which assemblies and petitions for redress of grievances are not consistent with other
necessary purposes of public property. A noisy meeting may be out of keeping with
the serenity of the statehouse or the quiet of the courthouse." Id. at 54.
101 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Like Adderley, Graynedposes two questions. First, is the
government-owned property the type of place in which the public has a right to
engage in first amendment activity? And second, even if it is, does the Constitution
allow particular content-neutral restrictions on that activity? The "government as
private property owner" argument is clearly an attempt to answer the first question
in the negative and thereby eliminate the need to consider the second. The Court
has abandoned this argument and now uses the considerably more complex and
ambiguous "public forum" doctrine to answer the first question. See Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983). If the Court finds
that the property at issue is not a voluntary or traditional public forum, then the test
used to answer the second question changes dramatically. See id. at 46-47 (upholding
regulation because it was "reasonable"). This Article uses TPM to refer only to the
type of test applied to answer the second question in the context of a public forum.
Neither Adderky nor Graynedclearly distinguishes these two questions, so I limit my
discussion of the opinions to what they reveal about the test to be applied in
answering the second question.
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particular place at'a particular time." 10 2 The only specific doctrinal formula suggested by the Court to implement this approach
was that "the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the
State's legitimate interest." 10 3 The opinion's broader TPM statement indicates that both the tailoring of the regulation and the state
interest asserted were to be assessed in light of the functions of the
place involved. In other words, Grayned calls for a highly contextual
and case-specific analysis, focused on the degree of and justification
for the government's intrusion on expression.
The Grayned compatibility approach has, however, been
overtaken by a more structured, and generally more lenient, test.
The first statement of the modern TPM test appears, strangely
enough, as a passing reference in a case creating new doctrine in a
different area of first amendment jurisprudence. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counci, Inc., 104 the
Court announced a new approach to commercial speech. In the
course of its analysis, however, it purported to summarize existing
doctrine on TPM regulations, asserting that such regulations are
constitutional "provided that they are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, .that they serve a significant
governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample
10 5
alternative channels for communication of the information."
The first two branches of the three part test do not raise any
problems. The content neutrality requirement is a reasonable
inference from the early licensing cases. 10 6 The "significant" state
interest requirement also has a foundation in precedent.
A
significant state interest represents a type of lowest common
denominator: some of the earlier cases required a stronger state
interest than that, but all required at least that much. The last
branch of the test is, however, a substantial departure from
precedent. The cases cited in support of this test-Grayned, United
States v. O'Brien,10 7 and Kovacs v. Cooper' 0 8-simply do not con102 Grayned, 408

U.S. at 116 (quoting Wright, The Constitutionon the Campus, 22

VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1042 (1969)).

1o3 Id. at 116-17.
104 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

lo5 Id. at 771.

106 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. When phrased in terms of the
justification for the regulation, however, this test appears to adopt the government
purpose conception of content discrimination.
107 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
108 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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tain this formula. Although the Kovacs plurality, mentions the
alternative channels of communication left open, it did not present
the existence of those alternatives as a constitutional requirement.10 9 Indeed, the plurality specifically refused to consider the
much greater cost of the alternatives as relevant to the constitutionality of restrictions on loud speaker trucks.11 0 Neither of the two
concurring opinions in Kovacs-both of which were necessary for a
majority-mentioned the adequacy of alternatives at all.'
On the
other hand, both Grayned and O'Brien required that the government's means be closely tailored to serve the state interest assert12
ed.1
Although the names of the two tests sound similar, there is a
substantial difference between a tailoring requirement, like the least
restrictive means test, and an ample alternatives requirement. The
tailoring requirement asks about the relationship between the end
the government wants the regulation to serve and the means it uses
to achieve that end. In particular, the Court examines whether
there is a different method of achieving the government's goals that
places fewer restrictions on first amendment freedom. The "least
restrictive means" test is the strictest type of tailoring requirement:
in theory the regulation will be struck down if there is any alternative method of achieving the government's goal that is less intrusive
109 See id. at 89.
110 See id. at 88-89.
1' Indeed, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), one of the early TPM cases
striking down an anti-handbilling ordinance, indicates that an inquiry into alternatives
is not only unnecessary but inappropriate. The opinion states, in often quoted
language, that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
Id. at 163. The regulations in Schneiderwere struck down because there were more
narrowly drawn means of achieving the state's goals of preventing litter and fraud.
See, e.g., id. at 162 ("There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst
these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets."). Any
residual litter or fraud caused by the fact that these alternatives are not as effective
as a complete ban is simply too small a government interest to warrant a sweeping
prohibition of an important avenue of speech. See id. at 164 ("If it is said that these
means are less efficient and convenient.... the answer is that considerations of this
sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press."); see
also Cass, FirstAmendment Access to Government Facilities,65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1291 &
n.28 (1979) (noting requirements in early cases that the government find means other
than restrictions on speech to further nonspeech interests).
Thus, Schneideris evidence of both the existence of a tight tailoring requirement
in the early TPM test and the unprecedented character of the adequate alternatives
requirement.
12 See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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on speech. The "narrowly tailored" standard, as recently interpreted by the Court, is considerably weaker, requiring only that the
means/end fit be good, reasonable, and not an unnecessary
intrusion on speech.1 15 All tailoring requirements, however, are
concerned with the fit beveen the government end served by the
regulation and the means used.
The Virginia Pharmacy ample alternatives test, on the other
hand, concerns the avenues of speech left open to the speaker if the
government regulation is upheld. It asks not about the governThe
ment's alternatives, but about the speaker's alternatives.
requirement exists because the Court believes that if adequate
alternative channels of communication remain, then a regulation
restricting a particular alternative will have no more than a minimal
effect on speech. This test can also have degrees of strictness. The
Court has sometimes described the requirement as one of ample
alternative channels, 114 which appears to set a high standard. In
practice, however, the Court has often applied an "adequate"
alternatives test, not an "ample" alternatives test. For example, in
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,115 the Court
upheld a ban on the posting of signs on public property, asserting
that the remaining modes of communication were adequate without
Moreover, the
specifying what alternatives were available.11 6
Court suggested that while it will sometimes consider the relative
cost of allegedly available alternatives, "this solicitude has practical
117
boundaries."
Virginia Pharmacy does not mention any type of means/end
tailoring requirement, apparently substituting the adequate
alternatives requirement for the tailoring requirement. Thus, the
Virginia Pharmacy test, far from being a mere restatement of
established doctrine, was a substantial deviation from precedent,
accomplished almost casually, without explanation or argument.
Despite the test's questionable beginning, the Court reiterated
its reliance on this three-part standard in several subsequent
cases. 118 The adequate alternatives branch became firmly estab113 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989).
114See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648
(1981).
115 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
16 See id. at 812.
117

Id. at 813 n.30.
118 See, e.g., Regan, 468 U.S. at 648 (applying the test to a statute regulating the
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lished and, although applied rather differently by different members
of the Court, it was relatively uncontroversial.
The content
neutrality and tailoring prongs, however, generated substantial
variation in the test. The meaning of content neutrality has, as
discussed above, changed greatly over time. The description of the
strength of the government interest required to justify a TPM
regulation has varied as well. The major controversy, however,
came to center around whether the test included a tailoring
119
requirement, and if so, how stringent a requirement.
This issue was recently settled in the case of Ward v. Rock
Against Racism. 120 The Court held that although a TPM regulation must be "narrowly tailored," it need not be the least restrictive
means of serving the government's interest. Indeed, the tailoring
requirement is satisfied as long as the "'regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less
I
printing of photographs of United States currency); Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (applying
a modified version of the test to a statute prohibiting the display of political flags or
banners at the Supreme Court); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516 (applying the test to an
ordinance restricting the use of outdoor advertising); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48
(applying the test to a regulation governing the distribution of literature at a state
fair).
119 For example, the Court provided a truly ambiguous opinion in Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). Justice
White, writing for the majority, quoted a version of the three part standard that did
not include a tailoring requirement. See id. at 648. He then proceeded to reject the
argument that the state interest could have been served by a less restrictive means.
He did not, however, take the simplest route and explicitly deny that the test included
a tailoring requirement. Instead, he held that the less restrictive means offered would
be ineffective, thus suggesting that effective alternatives might have created a
constitutional problem for the regulation. See id. at 652-54. On the other hand, he
rejected the alternatives without any discussion. This lack of serious consideration
suggests that the closeness of the means/end fitis not constitutionally significant. See
id. at 654. The case, in other words, is filled with mixed signals.
The confusion continued through the next several years. In United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), the Court quoted a version of the TPM test that explicitly
included a requirement that the regulation be "'narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest,'" id. at 177 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)), and proceeded to strike down the law at
issue because it "[did] not sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as
itsjustification." Id. at 181. The following year in Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641
(1984), however, the Court held that "[t]he less-restrictive-alternative analysis invoked
by Time has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and
manner regulation. It is enough that the ... restriction substantially serves the
Government's legitimate ends." Id. at 657. These variations could, of course, be
explained by different opinions held by different members of the Court. Heffron,
Grace, and Regan were, however, all written by the same Justice: Justice White.
120 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).

644

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:615

effectively absent the regulation ' " 12 1 and the regulation does not
"burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
122
government's legitimate interests."
Thus, the TPM test has developed, from hazy and variable
beginnings, into a fairly clear and fairly lenient standard. The
government interest and tailoring requirements are quite close to
the rational basis standard applied to regulations that do not affect
fundamental rights at all. But the adequate alternatives branch of
the test is unique and provides a foundation for a more protective
approach towards speech.
2. The Symbolic Speech Doctrine
Symbolic speech occurs when the speaker attempts to communicate through non-verbal means. Such means include the simple
presentation of recognized symbols, like the swastika or the
Marseillaise,123 as well as the more active use of symbols, traditional or otherwise, such as the burning of a flag 124 or of a draft
card. 125 In a true symbolic speech case-one in which it is crucial
that the communication takes place through symbolic action-the
regulation would have to be aimed at particular non-speech
activities, rather than at certain content categories of speech, and
the government's purpose would have to be to prevent some
noncommunicative harm caused by such activities. That is, the
government action would have to be content-neutral in the ways
that the Court has recognized. Only if these conditions are met
could the government accurately say that the regulation impacts on
speech only because of the speaker's choice to use that activity as a
symbolic part of her message. Because the regulation will be
content-neutral, a true symbolic speech case may look very much
like a TPM case. Indeed, the regulation may be identical to a TPM
regulation, differing only in that in a symbolic speech case it
121 Id. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
122 Id.

123 See Casablanca (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942) (containing a scene in which
Victor Laslo leads the patrons of the club in singing the French national anthem as
a symbol of resistance to the Nazi occupation of France and the collaborationist Vichy
government).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (striking down a
federal statute that prohibited flag burning); Texas v.Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989)
(striking down a state statute that prohibited flag desecration).
125 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). See generally infra
notes 128-42 and accompanying text (discussing O'Brien).
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interferes with speech by preventing symbolic action rather than by
restricting the time, place, or manner of verbal expression.
The Court initially responded to this distinction between the two
types of cases by designing a test for symbolic speech cases that was
significantly stronger, on its face, than the test for TPM regulations. 126 It had little opportunity, however, to apply that test to
subsequent symbolic speech cases. Gradually, the Court lost sight
of the distinction and began to treat the two types of cases as the
same. This process culminated in the virtual abandonment of the
weak version
symbolic speech doctrine in favor of applying a fairly
127
of the TPM test to all "content-neutral" regulations.
The Court first encountered a true symbolic speech case in
United States v. O'Brien.128

The Selective Service. law at issue

126 See id. at 377; see also infra text accompanying note 134 (setting forth the
O'Brien four-part test).
127 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757-58 (1989).
128 391 U.S. 367 (1968). At least the case was a symbolic speech case under the
Court's interpretation of the facts. Under other, perhaps more plausible interpretations of the facts, O'Brien might have been a subversive speech case. See infra note
138.
The Court had previously addressed a symbolic speech problem in Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), in which a teacher was prosecuted for leading a
group of children in a pro-communist pledge to a red flag. Unlike the statutes in true
symbolic speech cases, however, the regulation at issue in Stromberg was facially
content-based: it prohibited the display or saluting of any red flag intended to
symbolize opposition to organized government. See id. at 361. Because the activitydisplaying or saluting a red flag--was prohibited only if it carried a certain messageopposition to organized government-the statute was clearly intended to prevent a
communicative harm rather than a noncommunicative harm. See O'Brien, 391 U.S.
at 382. The Court, therefore, treated Stromberg as a content-based regulation and
rejected the statutory prohibition as too broad and vague to involve the type of
serious and immediate threat required tojustify regulations of potentially subversive
speech. See Stromberg 283 U.S. at 368-70. Stromberg is thus better understood as a
subversive speech case than a symbolic speech case.
The same analysis might apply to the recent and controversial flag burning cases.
See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v.Johnson, 109 S. Ct.
2533 (1989). The Court held that the laws at issue in those cases, like the one in
Stromberg were concerned with the communicative effects of the proscribed act. See
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2408-09;Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542-43. The question for the
Court, therefore, was not how much the government may incidentally limit expression
through symbols in the course of its normal regulation of non-expressive behavior-as
it would be in a true symbolic speech case-but when it is legitimate for the
government intentionally to regulate the messages speakers may offer. The
government's concern in these cases was itself a symbolic one-it wished to send a
message of contempt for, and intolerance of,hated speech-rather than some practical
welfare consideration. Perhaps the cases generated so much anger in the public and
in Congress precisely because of the perception that the Court's decision prevented
the government from sending that message. The public outcry could be seen as a
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prohibited the knowing destruction of a draft registration card.
O'Brien had burned his draft card on the steps of the Boston
Courthouse as a protest against the Vietnam war. 129 The Supreme Court upheld his conviction and provided a clear statement
130
of the test to be used in a symbolic speech case.
Although worried about the potentially limitless range of
symbolic expression, the Court proceeded on the assumption that
O'Brien's act qualified as speech within the meaning of the first
amendment. 131 It thereby postponed the difficult task of defining
symbolic speech for constitutional purposes. 132
Noting that
"speech" and "nonspeech" elements were combined in O'Brien's
expression, the Court held that "a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify

confirmation of the majority view that it was dealing with a content-based regulation
deserving of strict scrutiny.
129 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
130 See id. at 376-77.
131 See id. at 376.
152 The only case in which the Court has seriously considered this definitional
issue is Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). The case involved a college
student who was prosecuted under a state "improper use" statute for displayinga flag
with a peace symbol attached to it. The Court recognized that it had to "determine
whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall
within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 409. In order to
make this determination, the Court looked to "the nature of appellant's activity,
combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken," id.
at 409-10, and concluded that "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id. at 410-11. This
conclusion has become the basis for a two-part test applied in order to determine
whether purportedly symbolic behavior qualifies for first amendment protection. For
example, the Court applied this test in one of the recent flag burning cases. See
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2539. The Court did not attempt to refine this test any further
in the few symbolic speech cases between Spence andJohnson, preferring instead to
adopt the O'Brien expedient of simply assuming that the symbolic activity qualified
as protected speech. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (assuming for purposes of decision that "overnight sleeping in
connection with a demonstration is expressive conduct protected to some extent by
the First Amendment"). But see id. at 301-02 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing that
making this assumption, rather than carefully examining the basis of the first
amendment claim, led the Court to undervalue the speech interest at stake). The
Court did offer an interesting view of the symbolic speech issue in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which it found that political expenditures were themselves
speech acts (like parading) rather than symbolically expressive conduct, while political
contributions were primarily symbolic expressions of support. See id. at 16-17, 20-22.
Unfortunately, the Court's cryptic discussion of these issues did nothing to clarify the
standard for determining which activities qualify as symbolic speech.
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incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."1 3 3 The
four-part test announced in O'Brien allows such incidental restriction if the regulation is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
13 4
interest.
The language of this test seems to represent a fairly high
standard of review. For example, it calls for an "important or
substantial" state interest with the means "no greater than is
essential" to serve the end. 135 The Court's application of the test
to O'Brien's facts, though, presaged the lax and deferential way in
which it has been used ever since.13 6 The Court found that the
Selective Service law met all parts of the test. First, Congress had
the constitutional power to pass a law prohibiting the destruction of
government documents used in the conscription of an army.
Second, "important or substantial" government purposes unrelated
to the suppression of free expression were served by preservation
of the registration cards, including verification of status and
emergency identification. Finally, preventing the destruction of
these cards was no more restrictive than essential to insure their
continued availability.' 3 7 The Court, therefore, upheld O'Brien's
conviction.

138

The most interesting aspect of O'Brien is that the Court
articulated a new four-part test rather than applying the TPM test
already available in the case law. The new test was not, of course,
133 O'Brie, 391 U.S. at 376.
154 Id. at 377.
135 See id.
136 See, e.g., Schauer, supranote 9, at 787-88 (explaining that the test was applied

toothlessly in O'Brien and never used by the Supreme Court thereafter to uphold a
speaker's claim). The test has, however, become a more serious hurdle for the
government in the hands of lower courts. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR,J. CHOPER,

& S. SHIFFRIN, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 254 (6th ed. Supp. 1989) (citing lower court
cases).

137 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377-82.
138 Along the way, the Courtalso rejected O'Brien's claim thatit should invalidate

the law because Congress was not motivated by any of the practical purposes the
Court considered, but rather by the desire to punish draft card burners precisely
because Congress disliked the message of their speech. See id. at 382-83. There was
substantial evidence in the legislative record to support O'Brien's contention about
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created without reference to existing standards. Indeed, there is
evidence that the test was merely a restatement of the strict scrutiny
standard, but the Court was simply too nervous about the floodgates
effect to apply it properly. 139 Regardless of its relation to strict
scrutiny, however, it is clear that the four-part test announced in
O'Brien was distinct from the TPM test and designed to deal with a
different problem.
The O'Brien test differs from the traditional TPM standard in at
least two ways. First, the TPM test's tailoring requirement is
relatively weak. 140
It certainly has never demanded that the
restriction be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the
government] interest. " 141 On the other hand, the TPM standard
includes an assessment of the adequacy of alternative avenues of
speech. This prong is entirely absent from the O'Brien analysis,
despite a concurrence by Justice Harlan specifically raising the
14 2
issue.
The Court had little opportunity, however, to apply the test after
O'Brien. There have been only a handful of cases involving
communication through symbolic activity since O'Brien, and in each
case, the Court has avoided applying the four-part test. 143 None-

congressional motive. See Velvel, Freedom of Speech and the Draft CardBurning Cases,
16 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 162-63, 167 (1968). Nonetheless, the Court reiterated the
"familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383.
139 See infra notes 339-46 and accompanying text (discussing the O'Brien standard
as strict scrutiny). The O'Brien standard is distinguishable from strict scrutiny because
it requires that the government purpose be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, while strict scrutiny applies to regulations that are admittedly aimed at
silencing certain speech, such as subversive speech laws. Clearly, the Court intended
this requirement of the O'Brien test to mark its recognition that symbolic speech cases
are different from the normal run of strict scrutiny cases because they do not involve
content discrimination in the government's purpose.
140 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
141 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.

142 See id. at 388-89 (Harlan, j., concurring).
143 -Ayear after O'Brien, several school children were disciplined for wearing black
armbands as a sign of their opposition to the war in Vietnam. See Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court decided the
Tinker case without even citing, lei alone applying, O'Brien. The conspicuous absence
of this recent precedent may have been due to the fact that the school officials acted
to silence a particular viewpoint by banning the armbands while allowing students to
wear symbols of other political allegiances. See id. at 510-11. Such content
discrimination would indicate a government purpose related to the suppression of
certain speech and, thereby, take the case outside the scope of the O'Brien test. It is
also possible that the school officials were attempting to silence political expression
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theless, it reserved O'Brien for the symbolic speech context, never
attempting to apply it to run-of-the-mill TPM cases. 144 Thus,
generally, rather than a single viewpoint. See id. at 509 n.3. Such a goal would also
take the regulation outside of the O'Brien test. Or perhaps because the Court found
no evidence to support the school officials' claim that the armbands would cause
disruption, see id. at 508-09, the school authorities simply had no legitimate reason
to prevent the demonstration, and the Court had no need to complete the O'Brien
analysis by asking whether their reasons were sufficiently substantial and their means
no broader than essential.
Similarly, in three cases involving the symbolic use of the United States flag, the
Court failed to apply O'Brien. In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), the Court
believed that Street's conviction might have rested on the words he spoke while
burning the flag rather than on his conduct. See id. at 588-90. Thus, it treated the
case as a government effort to silence "pure speech" because of its content, instead
of as a symbolic speech case. Because the speech did not fall into any excluded
category (i.e. fighting words) and the strict scrutiny standard for content-based
restrictions on protected speech was not met, the Court overturned Street's
conviction. See id. at 590-94. In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), the Court
reversed a conviction for "publicly... treat[ing] contemptuously" the United States
flag after Goguen was prosecuted for wearing a small flag sewn to the seat of a pair
of trousers. The Court found that the statutory language was too vague to give
adequate notice of what kinds of behavior were prohibited at a time when casual and
unceremonious treatment of the flag had become common. See id. at 572-76. The
opinion thus failed to consider first amendment issues at all, resting instead on the
due process ground of vagueness. Vagueness may be an independent first
amendment concern, see infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text, but in this case
the Court was explicit about the due process foundations of the argument. See
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 572-76. Finally, in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974),
the Court found that the government interest in statutes proscribing the improper
use of the flag was not unrelated to the suppression of speech and that the O'Brien
test was therefore inapplicable. See id. at 414 n.8.
The Court did finally apply the O'Brien test in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984), but only after it had, less than two months
earlier, combined O'Brien and the TPM test into a single standard. See Members of
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-12 (1984); see also infra
notes 146-72 and accompanying text.
144 O'Brien was cited for a number of propositions in the years before Vincen, but
it was never applied by the Court to a straightforward TPM case. See e.g., Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 69 n.7 (1981) (citing O'Brien as support for
a fairly stringent tailoring requirement); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n.8
(1972) (same); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (citing O'Brien as
support for the Court's unwillingness to scrutinize legislative motive); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968) (same). And although the Court in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982), quoted O'Brien's four-part test in a
footnote, see id. at 912 n.47, it did not explicitly apply the test. In any event, Claiborne
Hardwareinvolved constitutional protection for a boycott, and might therefore qualify
as an instance of symbolic speech rather than a TPM case. Cf FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 779 (1990) (suggesting that ClaiborneHardware
marks the boundary of O'Brien's protection for expressive boycotts against the
antitrust laws). As far as I have been able to determine, the closest the Court ever
came in those years to treating O'Brien as a TPM case was including it in a string cite
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
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O'Brien, both in its inception and for fifteen years thereafter,
functioned as a separate and distinct test for symbolic speech cases,
145
but not TPM cases.
3. The Collapse of the Two Lines of Doctrine
As this brief history of almost half a century demonstrates, the
Court developed two disdnct lines of doctrine to deal with TPM
cases and symbolic speech cases. The Court, however, never
carefully articulated the differences between the two types of cases
that warranted this disparate treatment. It is unsurprising, then,
that the two types of cases should come to look more alike under
the pressure of a growing focus on content discrimination in the
government's purpose. Disregarding the separate lines of development and different doctrinal standards for TPM and symbolic
speech cases, the Court has, in the last decade, responded to this
pressure by collapsing the two standards into a single test.
The process of consolidation began in Members of the City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent,146 in which the Court upheld a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public utility poles.
The regulation represented a straightforward, indeed almost a
classic, instance of a time, place, or manner restriction. 147 The
regulation was both facially and operatively content-neutral, and it
was designed to combat the noncommunicative harms of distraction
to motorists and visual clutter. Moreover, the would-be speakers
never suggested that the use of the utility poles carried any symbolic
U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
145 See Day, Incidental Regulation, supra note 18, at 495.
146 466 U.S. 789 (1984).

147 The speakers asserted, and the Court denied, that the utility poles were a
"public forum." See id. at 813-15. The case might therefore alternatively be described
as one involving a non-public-forum regulation, but I think this description would be
misleading because the Court applied the TPM and O'Brientests-both of which deal
with regulations of speech oocurring in a public forum-rather than the tests
developed under Perry Education Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983), for non-public fora. I think the Court is most accurately described as having
treated the utility poles as part of the larger public forum of the streets, just as a
statue would be part of the public forum of the park in which it stood, but refusing
to recognize the poles themselves as an independent and important forum. As a
result, it assessed the regulation as a restriction on one manner of communicating in
the larger public forum of the streets. The Court has recognized, though, that the
distinction between these two approaches-classifying the regulation and classifying
the speech location regulated-may often be somewhat artificial. See Vincen 466 U.S.
at 815 n.32.
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or communicative significance for them; it was simply a cheap and
efficient means of reaching a substantial audience.
Despite the obvious appropriateness of the TPM test, Justice
Stevens, for the majority, stated that O'Brien "set forth the appropriate framework for reviewing a viewpoint-neutral regulation of this
kind" 148 and proceeded to apply the O'Brien standard to the case.
The Court did not, however, completely ignore the TPM line of
doctrine; the opinion is sprinkled with references to TPM cases and
the TPM test.1 49 Indeed, the majority opinion devotes a separate
section to discussing the adequacy of alternative methods of
speech, 150 despite the fact that the O'Brien test as quoted by the
Court included no such inquiry.151 Thus the majority opinion,
although purporting to apply O'Brien, actually mixed the two
standards for content-neutral regulations. The dissent explicitly
concurred in the standard applied, 152 while disagreeing with the
majority's application of it, and so joined in the mixing and melding
of symbolic speech and TPM doctrine.1 53 In short, no member
of the Court addressed and explained, let alone objected to, the
combination of the two standards.
Six weeks later, the Court reaffirmed its combined test and
addressed the issue somewhat more directly. In Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 154 the majority upheld, a National Park
Service regulation prohibiting sleeping in Lafayette Park in
Washington, D.C. This rule had been challenged by a group
wishing to sleep in tents in the winter as a symbolic protest of the
plight of the homeless. 155 The Court began its analysis by stating
that expression, including symbolic expression, is subject to
148 Vincen, 466 U.S. at 804.

149 See, e.g., id. at 805 ("[A] city is [not] powerless to protect its citizens from...
expression which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance" (citing Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949))); id. at 808 (discussing whether the city's regulation, as
a TPM regulation, was narrowly tailored to serve its interest (citing Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981))).
150 See id. at 812.
151 See id. at 805.
152 See id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("These are the right questions to
consider when analyzing the constitutionality of the challenged ordinance .... ").
153 See id. at 821 & n.2 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stating that the test for a contentneutral regulation is "(1) whether the governmental objective advanced by the
restriction is substantial, and (2) whether the restriction imposed on speech is no
greater than is essential to further that objective" and "leave[s] open ample alternative
avenues of communication").
154 468 U.S. 288 (1984).

155 See id. at 290-92.
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reasonable time, place, or manner regulations that are "justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, ...
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." 156 The Court also stated that symbolic conduct may
be forbidden if the O'Brien test is met. 157 The Court then applied
the TPM standard in detail and, finding each branch of the test to
be met, 15 8 concluded its assessment by observing that "the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Park Service regulation [was]
sustainable under the four-factor standard of UnitedStates v. O'Brien
for validating a regulation of expressive conduct, which, in the last
analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time,
place, or manner restrictions."159 The Court explained its conflation of the two tests in a footnote consisting of two largely
unsatisfactory reasons for treating the two unique standards as
60
interchangeable. 1
First, the Court asserted that "[i]t would be odd to insist on a
higher standard for limitations aimed at regulable conduct and
having only an incidental impact on speech" than for "reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions [that] directly limit oral or
written expression." 161 Time, place, and manner regulations do
not, of course, always explicitly limit expression. Traffic regulations
may be addressed directly to obstructions of the street, which are
generally considered to be regulable conduct, but may also be used
to prevent a speech in the middle of Main Street. If "direct" means
"explicit," then, as this example illustrates, not all TPM regulations
are direct. If "direct" does not mean "explicit," then it is not at all
clear what it does mean. In what sense is a TPM regulation like the
traffic ordinance a more direct limit on expression than a restriction
that prevents the burning of a draft card? Both regulate activities
that are usually engaged in for purposes other than communication
and both affect speakers as part of the larger category of actors
rather than singling them out. Without further explanation, the
156 Id. at 293.
157 See id. at 294.
158 See id. at 294-98.
159 Id. at 298 (citation omitted). As if to prove the point, the Court then spent a
paragraph reviewing why the regulation would pass the O'Brien test as well. See id.
at 298-99.
160 See id. at 298 n.8.
161 Id.
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reference to directness simply will not justify reducing the facially
more stringent O'Brien standard to the level of the TPM test.
The other explanation the Court offered was a reference to the
precedent provided by Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent. 162 The majority noted that the Vincent "Court framed the
issue under O'Brien and then based a crucial part of its analysis on
the time, place, and manner cases." 163 While this is true, it is not
an exp'-nation. Clark, therefore, makes the blending of the tests
explicit but offers no further justification for it.
More recent cases have confirmed the demise of the TPM/symbolic speech distinction without providing substantially more by way
164
of explanation. For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
the Court, quoting from Clark, reasserted the similarity of the two
tests and held that neither O'Brien nor the TPM standard required
the government to use the least restrictive means of achieving its
goal.1 65 The only explanation offered for the lower tailoring
standard shared by the two tests was that they both concerned
content-neutral, rather than content-based, regulations. 166 And
again the dissent, although disagreeing with the majority's characterization of the standard, did not question the combination of the two
tests. 167

These two lines of parallel doctrinal development, then, have
miraculously ended in a single point. Despite the different
circumstances under which they arose and their very different verbal
formulations, the Court has collapsed the TPM and symbolic speech
doctrines into a single, rather weak, standard.
162

466 U.S. 789 (1984).

163 Clark, 468 U.S. at

298 n.8 (citation omitted). This "crucial part" was the

discussion of the tailoring requirement and the use of TPM cases to explain why no
more narrowly drawn restriction would have sufficed to prevent the visual blight with
which the city was concerned. See Vincent 466 U.S. at 808-10.
164 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).

165 See id. at 2757-58.
166

See id. at 2758 n.6.

167 See id. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the majority opinion

implicitly separated the two lines of doctrine again in a case handed down shortly
after Ward. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989). Although insisting
that both TPM and symbolic speech doctrines included only a weak tailoring
requirement, the majority opinion described the two lines separately and explicitly
referred to them as "two lines of authority." See id. at 3034 & n.3. This was all dicta,
though, since the Court treated the case as involving commercial speech and
therefore subject to a separate test altogether. When it matters to the outcome, the
Court has shown itself consistently unwilling to distinguish between the two lines of
doctrine.
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Although the Court continues to refer to the O'Brien test, the
unified standard that has -evolved is really just a weak version of the
TPM test. It includes the TPM test's adequate alternatives branch
but leaves aside O'Brien's explicit demand for heightened attention
to both the strength of the government interest and the degree of
means/end fit. Unlike some versions of the TPM test, the new
standard does purport to include a tailoring requirement. That
requirement, however, amounts to little more than the most
minimal rational relation review as defined in Ward.168 In the
absence of a meaningful tailoring requirement, the new test borrows
nothing from O'Brien and is functionally identical to the TPM
standard as described in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 16 9 As a result, the range of doctrinal tools available to deal with complex first amendment problems
has been reduced, and real first amendment protections have been
lost.
The Court's growing focus on content discrimination and its
gradually narrowing definition of discrimination in terms of
government purpose may have caused the Court to conflate the
various types of "content-neutral" regulations and to devalue the
threat that such regulations pose to freedom of speech. When this
narrow, government-purpose version of content discrimination
becomes the central concern of the first amendment, then all
"neutral" regulations come to look the same and it is plausible that
all should receive the same doctrinal treatment. 170 Moreover,
that doctrine is likely to be fairly weak since "neutral" regulations
do not pose the type of threat with which the Court is primarily
concerned. 1 71 Thus, the collapse of these independent lines of
doctrine appears to be tied directly to the Court's increasingly
17 2
restricted interpretation of content discrimination.

168 See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2762 (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority thus has
abandoned the requirement that restrictions on speech be narrowly tailored in any
ordinary use of the phrase.").
169 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 104-17.
170 See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2758 n.6.
171 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (Stevens, J.) (stating
that "it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain
neutral in the marketplace of ideas"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50,
70 (1976) (Stevens,J., concurring) (noting "the government's paramount obligation

of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication").

172 See supra text accompanying notes 24-89.
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II. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In order to understand why the two related doctrinal developments described above are misdirected, it is necessary to examine
the concept of content discrimination. This is by no means a novel
endeavor. A tremendous amount of scholarly attention has focused
on the types of content discrimination and the justification, or lack
thereof, for the Court's proclaimed prohibition of content discrimination. 173 The focus of this section will, however, be slightly
different. I will assume that content discrimination is one of the
most serious concerns of the first amendment. My goal here is to
describe and explain the significance of three different types of
content discrimination, of which the Court has recognized only one.
The first subsection will define these types and distinguish them
from the degrees of content discrimination that are often the focus
of scholarly literature. The second subsection will examine general
theories of equality, equal protection doctrine, and the more
specific theories of free speech in order to justify treating all three
types of content discrimination as serious first amendment
problems.
A. Types of Content Discrimination
The most common approach to content discrimination defines
different degrees of discrimination along a continuum in terms of
the kind of content category at which the government is aiming, and
how evenhanded or biased the content category is. At the most
biased end of the continuum is viewpoint discrimination, where the
government singles out and disadvantages one view on a subject
while leaving other points of view untouched. 174 In the middle
of the spectrum is subject-matter discrimination, where the govern175
ment silences or disadvantages all views on a particular subject.
Many scholars have noted the Court's apparent waffling on whether
subject-matter regulations receive full content-discrimination
scrutiny. 176 At the other end of the spectrum is content-neutral
173

See sources cited supra note 4.

174 The subversive speech cases are good examples of viewpoint discrimination.

See supra note 128.
17?For example, a state utility commission might forbid utilities' including
literature on controversial public issues in their billing envelopes, regardless of the
viewpoint expressed. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530 (1980).
176 See e.g., Redish, supra note 4, at 117-18; Stone, Restrictions ofSpeech Because of
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regulation, which applies to all speech, regardless of subject matter
177
or viewpoint.
The degrees of content discrimination are crucial in understanding the function and significance of the concept of content
discrimination to the Supreme Court. 178 Nonetheless, I would
like to suggest and flesh out a different, perhaps more basic,
typology. The types of content discrimination that I will describe
can, with some modification, take the form of each of the degrees
of content discrimination in this schema. The two typologies are
thus complementary, not inconsistent.
In order fully to understand content discrimination, we need to
recognize not only the degree of discrimination, as defined by the
schema above, but also the locus of discrimination. The Court and
commentators have predominantly focused on discriminatory
government purpose. The method for determining when content
discrimination has occurred is usually phrased in terms of communicative impact. When the harm the regulation seeks to remedy
necessarily flows from the communicative impact of the speech,
then the government's purpose is related to content and the
regulation is deemed content discriminatory. Regulations aimed at
some noncommunicative impact have no discriminatory purpose
toward speech and are seen as content-neutral. Thus, the concept
of communicative impact offers a means of determining when
governmental purpose should be suspect under the doctrine of
content discrimination. The communicative impact model fits
comfortably with the motives made suspect by a variety of theories
of speech. 179 I will adopt the communicative impact model as an
adequate interpretation of the type of content discrimination that

its Content: The PeculiarCase of Subject-MatterRestrctions,46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 83.88
(1978).
177 For examples and applications of this approach to degrees of discrimination,
see Stone, supra note 176, at 108-15.
178 This schema does, however, have some difficulties-most notably in finding a
place for some of the other types of content-related discrimination that have come
before the Court. For example, speaker-identity discrimination and format
discrimination do not easily fit into this schema, but both types of discrimination may
have serious implications for communication of certain subject matters or viewpoints.
See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 819-20
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (format discrimination); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 63-66 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (speaker
identity discrimination).
179 See infra notes 233-302 and accompanying text.
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occurs in the government's purpose because it fits both case law and
180
literature.
180 It is worth noting that a regulation may aim at communicative impact without
being content-discriminatory; the fit between the two is not perfect. The government
may regulate to prevent a harm that arises from the fact of communication alone.
Here, the government is aiming at a communicative impact-a harm that would not
occur unless a message were being sent and received-but one that does not depend
on the content or viewpoint of the message, only on the fact that it is intended and
understood as a message. For example, when hecklers interrupt a public speaker, the
government could seek to punish them for disrupting a public meeting regardless of
what they are shouting. The government's interest does not depend upon whether
the content of their speech is obscenities or political oratory, or whether their
viewpoint is identical to the speaker's or opposite to it. If, however, the "hecklers"
were making noise because they were all ill and could not help coughing, then the
government would be much less likely to act against them. The governmentes interest
is not simply in minimizing noise; it is in enforcing the rule of order that requires
people to restrain their own urge to communicate while someone else has the floor
in a public meeting. This latter interest is, of course, legitimate: without such rules
public communication might deteriorate into chaos. It is nonetheless an interest
aimed at a communicative harm: only if something is intended to be communicated,
and is in fact understood as communication, does the harm occur. As a result, the
very same act of coughing would be proscribed if engaged in as communication
(heckling) but not if engaged in for some other purpose (clearing one's throat). Such
a rule would bejustified by a government purpose to prevent a communicative effect,
but it could not properly be called content discriminatory because it would silence all
content categories of speech evenhandedly.
Because such communicative impacts arising from the mere fact of communication should be relatively rare, this lack of fit does not cause significant problems for
the model. Communicative impact is, after all, merely a useful tool for determining
when the government is acting with a content-discriminatory purpose. It has no
independent constitutional significance of its own.
It is important to note the difference between the example of the hecklers and
a case in which the government's intention, although perhaps even more suspect, is
to regulate a noncommunicative harm and is therefore non-content discriminatory.
In the example above, the communicative harm is both legitimate and serious enough
to distinguish speech from other noise-producing activities and may justify the
relatively limited infringement on expression posed by a rule against heckling. In
some cases, however, the choice to limit speech, but not other activities that cause the
same harm, may flow simply from ajudgment that the speech is not valuable enough
to counterbalance the noncommunicative harm, while other activities are. For
example, imagine a noise pollution ordinance that interferes with speech, but not
with other activities that might cause the harm, by requiring that loudspeaker trucks
be licensed, but not lawnmowers or construction machinery producing the same level
of noise. In the absence of some other explanation, the only reason for this different
treatment would appear to be that the government values the practical effects of
lawnmowers and construction equipment more highly than the communicative effects
of speech.
Not surprisingly, even when officials are not hostile to speech, they may value it
less than other activities. Officials may inflate their estimate of the harm such speech
causes because their power will thereby be increased. Or they may undervalue speech
because the political power of speakers is poorly correlated with their social utility.
See GoldbergerJudicialScrutiny in PublicForum Cases: Misplaced Trust in theJudgment

658

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:615

The government purpose/communicative impact analysis,
however, addresses the question of content discrimination solely
from the viewpoint of the government officials responsible for a
challenged regulation and thus identifies only that type of content
discrimination the government intentionally inflicts. There are at
least two other speech players from whose perspective content
discrimination can be perceived:
the audience (or potential
audience) and the speaker. When these perspectives are considered, other types of content discrimination emerge.
Commentators opposing the Court's narrow view of content
discrimination have often noted that even regulations serving a
noncommunicative purpose can have a discriminatory effect on the
speech market available to would-be listeners.18 1
From the
perspective of the audience, the relevant question concerning
discrimination is whether the impact of the regulation falls evenly
across the speech marketplace or disproportionately on one part of
it. Even if the government has no wish to discriminate, even if it is
aiming at a noncommunicative harm, a regulation may silence some
content categories of speech more than others. For example, the
Court has long recognized that certain formats, like leafletting, are
82
essential to communication by the poorer segments of society.1
Restrictions on such formats, even if they serve a noncommunicative

of Public Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 175, 206-10 (1983) (arguing that officials
overregulate potentially controversial and disruptive speech because the disruption,
were it to occur, would be more visible and hence more damaging politically than the
suppression of speech, and the speakers do not have the power to change the officials
minds). Indeed, the relation between the social utility of speech and the political
power of the speaker may often be one of inverse correlation. Cf. id. at 208-09
(discussing the special incentives to avoid controversial speech).
Despite these natural incentives to undervalue speech (or perhaps because of
them), the first amendment forbids such a low valuation by singling out speech for
special constitutional protection. Just as government dislike of a certain viewpoint
is inherently suspect, so too is government dislike of speech as compared to other
activities. Although it cannot in any obvious way be called content discrimination,
this type of discrimination is just as deserving of a stringent level ofjudicial review.
See Baker, UnreasonedReasonableness: Mandatory ParadePermits and Time, Place,and
Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 937, 956-60 (1983).
181 See Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger Cour4 68 CALIF. L. REV.
422, 472 (1980); Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The
Doctrine of Time, Place, and MannerRegulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
757, 764-71 (1986); Redish, supra note 4, at 130-31.
182 See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). The Court's sympathy in
response to this fact has, however, been sporadic even in the best of times, see Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949), and has been declining in recent years, see
Members of the City Council v. Twxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,812 n.30 (1984).
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purpose like reducing litter, would fall disproportionately on the
subjects on which and points of view from which poorer people
might speak. If those subjects or points of view are systematically
different from the ones that wealthier speakers would raise, then the
effect of the "content-neutral" format regulation is to disadvantage
some content categories of speech relative to others. From the
government's perspective, this result might appear to be simply an
unfortunate and unintended byproduct of a neutral regulation.
From the perspective of the audience deprived of these points of
view, however, it raises a serious issue of content discrimination, an
issue independent of the government's purpose.
Government purpose and the impact on the speech market are
both fairly obvious loci of discrimination. There is, however, a third
type of content discrimination that is somewhat less obvious and
much less discussed: that resulting from the impact of a regulation
on the speaker. Imagine a law banning all bonfires in public places.
The harm the government seeks to control is the danger of the fire's
getting out of control and causing damage. This is a noncommunicative harm because it does not depend on anyone's sending or
receiving any communication. In this sense, the law is contentneutral in terms of the government's purpose. Suppose also that
bonfires are not regularly associated with any particular subject
matter or viewpoint. The impact of the law on the marketplace of
ideas would then also be content-neutral: the prohibition would not
cause some ideas to be systematically disadvantaged relative to
others. Finally, imagine that there are two groups who wish to build
bonfires in violation of the law. The first is a student group
protesting continued investment by the university in businesses
operating in South Africa. They will be burning old newspapers to
attract a crowd to hear the speakers they have assembled. The
second group is made up of students from the People's Republic of
China. They wish to burn their student visas as a symbolic protest
against the President's veto of a bill that would have allowed them
to stay in the United States.
The impact of this law on these two different groups illustrates
a third type of content discrimination: discrimination in the impact
on the speaker. In order to demonstrate that this impact is a form
of content discrimination, however, I must introduce a distinction
mentioned-although neither clearly defined nor really relied upon-
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183
by the Court in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence:

the distinction between facilitative and communicative aspects of
speech.18 4 A facilitative aspect of speech is that part of the
speech activity which the speaker uses to aid in the transmission or
receipt of the message, but which does not itself play a role in the
representation of the message. A communicative aspect of speech
does play a role in the representation of the message. Communication takes place through symbols that represent a message, whether
85
those symbols are words, sounds, actions, images or whatever.
Some aspects of any speech activity function as such symbols, and
some do not. For example, the decibel level of a loudspeaker truck
announcing "A vote for Joe is a vote for the environment" is likely
to be facilitative rather than communicative. The loudness itself
does not carry or represent a message, it merely makes it more
likely that the message carried by the other symbols (here, words)
will reach a larger audience than if the loudspeaker were quieter.
If, however, the truck were painted green, then that color might
well be communicative (as a symbolic representation of the message
of environmentalism) rather than simply facilitative (eye-catching so
as to increase the chance that passers-by will pay attention to the
message carried by the words).' 6
183 468 U.S. 288 (1984).

See id. at 296.
185 Cf Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and the First Amendment 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 761,763-64 (1970) (stating that communication is the transfer of messages, and
messages are made up of "any patterned output no matter how primitive the
patterning"). Moreover, the nature of the symbol should have no impact on the
strength of the prima facie claim, although it may, of course, affect the strength of
the government's interest in restricting the expression. As one commentator has
noted:
[Ilt would be surprising if those who poured tea into the sea and who
refused to buy stamps did not recognize that ideas are communicated,
disagreements expressed, protests made other than by word of mouth or
pen. Words may be less ambiguous than other symbols and are common
coin of communication, but there is no reason to limit the constitutional
protection to that form of communication alone-as the Court itself has
recognized when its sympathies sharpened rather than blurred its vision.
Henkin, Foreword: On DrawingLines, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968).
186 This distinction may collapse in extreme and unusual cases, as, for example,
where the "message" being represented is simply "Hey, caught your attention!" In
addition, the distinction is not always easy to apply in practice, since the speaker's
uses for various aspects of the speech activity are often unclear and sometimes mixed.
Nonetheless, whatever difficulties it may entail are worth undertaking because the
distinction captures a fundamental difference in the speaker's attitude that ought to
carry first amendment signjficance if we are concerned about content discrimination.
In any case, as the analysis employing it demonstrates, the distinction is generally a
184
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Now, consider the pro-divestment student group in my earlier
hypothetical. The anti-bonfire law does not interfere with a
communicative aspect of the group's activity, only a facilitative
aspect. The bonfire does not act as a symbol representing a part of
their message; it simply helps to increase the number of people to
whom the message can be transmitted. If the group can find
another way to draw as large a crowd, the ban on bonfires will not
affect their speech at all. And even if they cannot find another way
to draw as large a crowd, only the effectiveness, not the content, of
the message will have been altered.
The law as it affects this group is most appropriately analogized
to a traditional TPM regulation prohibiting parades down Main
Street during rush hour. Clearly a parade at rush hour will reach
more people, so the regulation interferes with the speech of wouldbe paraders who now have to find some other time or place for
their expression. This interference is why the first amendment
applies to such TPM regulations and raises the level of judicial
scrutiny above the mere rationality standard. But such laws are not
content discriminatory, and the same is true of the bonfire ban as
applied to my first student group.
The group of Chinese students, on the other hand, is experiencing a type of content discrimination, despite the fact that neither
the government's purpose nor the general impact of the law on the
speech marketplace is discriminatory. The discriminatory effect
arises because the prohibited activity-building a bonfire-is, in this
case, inherently communicative rather than merely facilitative. The
bonfire is itself a symbolic message. To tell this group that it may
not build the fire is not merely to alter the effectiveness of its
speech; it is to change the very content of the group's message, to
limit what the group may say.
It is true, of course, that the group could try to send a similar
message through different means. The members might explain that
they wanted to burn their visas but were prevented from doing so,
or perhaps they could destroy the visas by cutting them up or
trampling on them. But the message would not be the same. The
fire itself carries certain connotations-raging destructiveness, hell
fire, etc.-that are not captured by a denotative description of the
manageable one. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text; infra notes 375-83
and accompanying text.
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act or by a different means of destruction. The content of the
187
speech is necessarily altered.
The point is clearer when placed in the context of that set of
symbols we call words. I the government put certain words off
limits-like "tyrant" and "tyranny"-speakers would find other words
to try to express their thoughts. Nonetheless, what they could say
would be different, lacking in the historical and patriotic nuances
inherent in the word "tyra:nny." Speakers would experience such a
law as a limit on the content of their message and not merely on the
format or manner or medium. Moreover, a law restricting the very
words one may use is surely so obvious a content-based regulation
of speech that no consideration of the government's purposes is
necessary.18 8 When the symbols used by a speaker are not words,
other types of regulations may have this same limiting impact on a
communicative aspect of speech activity, and should also be seen as
1 89
content discriminatory.
All three types of content discrimination-in the government
purpose, in the impact on the audience, and in the impact on the
speaker-may appear in different degrees.
The government's
purpose may be related to the communicative effect of a particular
viewpoint or of an entire subject. A regulation aimed at a noncommunicative effect may result in the audience's loss of access to
a particular viewpoint or to a whole subject category. Furthermore,
the inherently expressive activity restricted in the impact on the
speaker may contain a message tied very closely to a particular
viewpoint, as in my example, or it may communicate only a general
subject matter. But these distinctions of degree are less meaningful
in the context of this last type of discrimination than they were in
the other two. From the speaker's perspective it may not matter
very much whether it is her particular viewpoint or an entire subject
matter that is affected; in either case, the speaker is being told she
cannot say what she wishes to say. And although there can be
relevant differences of degree-for example, how central the speech
is to the overall message she wishes to convey-the view187 See Friedman, supranote 9, at 594-95 (making a similar argument that the act
of sleeping in Clark had communicative impact).
188 But see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987) (upholding a statute banning unauthorized use of the word
"olympic").
189 See Note, Symbolic Conduc 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1091, 1100 n.53 (1968)
(analogizing the restriction of symbolic speech to "government['s] telling a speaker
not to use a metaphor, because simile is a reasonable alternative").

1991]

CONTENT DISCRIMINATION

point/subject matter distinction does not capture them very
well. 90
The three types of content discrimination, then, correspond to
the perspectives of the three players I have identified in speech
situations: the government, the audience, and the speaker. Each
player experiences regulations affecting speech from different
perspectives, and will consider different kinds of regulations
content-discriminatory. Nonetheless, the audience and speaker
perspectives share one logically necessary connection: whenever the
speaker experiences content discrimination, there will also be
content discrimination from the audience's perspective. Clearly, if
a regulation silences content from the speaker's point of view, then
the audience will be deprived of that content category as well. For
instance, if the Chinese students cannot communicate the message
inhering in a bonfire, then neither can the audience receive it.
Alternative methods of expression are inadequate channels to
provide the audience with the speaker's view because such alternatives do not merely communicate less effectively, they communicate
something different.
The converse of this inference, however, does not necessarily
hold true. That is, it is possible to have a regulation that only acts
upon a facilitative aspect of the speech, and therefore is not
content-discriminatory from the speaker's point of view, and yet
effectively silences a certain content category from the audience's
perspective. For example, TPM regulations that reduce access to
media favored by certain groups can silence those groups without
ever affecting a communicative aspect of their speech. The various
types of content discrimination are, therefore, related but distinct.
They must be recognized, separated, and dealt with individually.

190 Indeed, the degrees of discrimination may have decreasing utility as we

progress along the continuum of discrimination. The arguments for considering the
degrees of discrimination are strongest in the case of discriminatory governmental
purpose. They become somewhat weaker in the case of discrimination that has an
impact on the speech market. And the degree distinctions seem quite irrelevant to
the case of content discrimination in the impact on the speaker. This is completely
appropriate since the degree schema was designed in light of the Court's present
focus on government purpose.
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B. Justificationsfor the Three Types of Content Discrimination
In light of the differences among these three types of content
discrimination, two larger questions arise. First, what do these
three distinct problems share that would incline us to view them as
instantiations of a single concept or principle? And second, why is
that unifying concept content discrimination, which we consider to
be quite serious, rather than some less important principle? An
examination of how the three types of discrimination identified
above share a relationship to the concerns underlying content
discrimination yields an answer to both questions.
Identifying the concerns underlying the ban on content
discrimination has proved to be no simple task. Commentators
have generated a broad range of possible answers. 19 1 Many such
answers, however, focus on the question of why we should avoid
discrimination in the government's intent, and are therefore too
narrow for my purposes.1 9 2 It is also possible to frame the question too broadly. Asking why content discrimination is such a bad
thing is quite different from asking whether content discrimination
is a bad thing at all; the first amendment commits us, at a minimum,
to a positive attitude toward speech that makes any restriction on it
a prima facie problem. The better question, then, is whether
content discrimination is an evil independent of the quantity of
speech actually restricted; whether the first amendment means
anything more than just that speech is (for whatever reasons)
valuable, so the more of it we have, the better.
The starkest way to frame the inquiry is: Are there any reasons
why it might be worse (or at least a different type of evil) to silence
some people, based on the content of their speech, than to silence
everyone? There could be many ways to answer this question; I will
offer two. Both answers help explain why the three types of
discrimination defined above 193 are related to each other and to
the concerns underlying content discrimination. The first answer
looks to the reasons often adduced to support the general principle
of equal treatment, of which the ban on content discrimination may
be seen as a particular application. 194 The second looks to the
theories that specifically argue for a special solicitude for speech.
191 See e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 200-33.

192 See id. at 212-17, 227-33.
193 See supra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
194 See Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact andIllicitMotive: Theoriesof Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 101 (1977); Karst, supra note 31, at 21.
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Along with many others, I am inclined to believe that the free
speech guarantee serves many purposes or values. 195 Taken in
the aggregate, the major theories represent a rich resource
196
responding to a broad range of first amendment issues.
If these answers are persuasive, and the three types of discrimination can be described as aspects of content discrimination, then
the path is cleared to a better understanding of why the Court's
doctrinal developments are counterproductive. A conception of
195 See, e.g, L. BOLLINCER, THE TOLERANT SOcIETY 104-05 (1986) (asserting that
free speech performs many functions in society); S. SHIFFRIN, supra note 1, at 2-4,
132-33 (providing a "laundry list" of issues bound up with the notion of "how free
speech should be"; and identifying issues to consider in balancing first amendment
concerns); L. TRIBE, supranote 9, § 12-2, at 792-93 (noting that various concerns must
be weighed in ascertaining the reach of first amendment protections); Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendmen 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963)
(identifying several "values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of
expression").
196 1 will be assuming, rather than attempting to prove, that each of my answers
is in fact a good statement of the concerns underlying content discrimination, an
assumption I believe is reasonable. First, the focus of this Article is on a later stage
in the analysis; ajustification of any particular theory upon which I rely would require
a separate article. Second, the assumption should be less problematic given the
answers I am suggesting. No one, that I am aware of, denies that these theories of
speech are relevant to the meaning and purpose of the principle condemning content
discrimination. Someone may, of course, disagree with my interpretation of those
theories, but the general approach should be unexceptionable.
There is, on the other hand, some serious disagreement over the usefulness of
general equality theories in understanding the concept of content discrimination. For
example, Geoffrey Stone has argued that while the general concern with equality
"may support the content-based/content-neutral distinction, it does not in itself have
much explanatory power." Stone, supra note 3, at 207. I agree that the general
arguments will not explain the particulars of first amendment doctrine and I rely
much more on the theories dealing specifically with speech to serve that function.
It is possible, however, that Stone intends a deeper criticism of equality
arguments. He may be suggesting that equality, being an empty and tautological
concept-"treat like cases alike"-cannot specify which differences matter, and in
particular, cannot explain why content differences do notjustify different treatment.
See id. at 207 & n.77 (citing Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537
(1982)). The deeper criticism is tenable only if one shares this tautological and
impoverished conception of equality. The equality arguments on which I draw are
meant to provide a richer content for the idea of equality by explainingwhy we might
find it important and suggesting why some types of distinctions might be more
troubling than others as the basis for differential treatment.
Of course, as soon as I provide more content for the idea of equality, I run the
risk of invoking controversial arguments that need to be defended in their own right
rather than merely assumed. While some of the implications of the arguments I
provide are undoubtedly controversial, I believe that the theories of equality I discuss
are basic to our shared political culture. If we are committed to equality for these
reasons, as I believe we are, then we should hold a conception of content discrimination that responds to these concerns.
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content discrimination that focuses exclusively on government
purpose will be shown to be too narrow. An expansion of that
focus to include the two other types of discrimination will, in turn,
lead to a resurrection of the independent TPM and symbolic speech
doctrines. As the final section will demonstrate, these doctrines are
well suited to the problems illuminated by such a broadened
conception of content discrimination.
1. Equality Theories
General theories of equality, widely shared although variously
interpreted, apply to many areas of social life, including speech.
These theories provide strong support for the claim that a concern
with equality should lead one to scrutinize not only the motives of
the discriminator, but also the impact on both the person discriminated against and society more generally. The doctrine and
commentary surrounding the equal protection clause provide a
particularly clear illustration of the importance of all three of these
concerns, and an interesting analogy to the free speech clause. A
diverse array of arguments can be and has been offered for treating
people equally. 197 I will highlight only three because I believe
they are widely shared, deeply held, and sufficient to support my
claim.
a. Social Contract Theory

It is hardly controversial to assert that if one is concerned about
equality, one should see a serious problem in government actions
motivated by a desire to discriminate. The connection between
equality and a concern with government motive may be based on a
fundamental commitment. to equal respect. One way to understand
this commitment is through the social contract arguments that form
197 See, e.g., Benn, Egalitarianismand the Equal ConsiderationofInterests, in NOMOS
IX: EQUALITY 61, 69-70 (1967) (proposing that society should respect the interests
of individuals equally, "giv[ing] to the interests of each the same serious consideration"); Schaar, Equality of Opportunity,and Beyond, in NOMOs IX: EQUALITY 228, 229
(1967) (analyzing the doctrine of equality of opportunity); Williams, The Idea of
Equality,in 2 PHILOSOPHY, POLITMCS, AND SOCIETY 110 (P. Laslett &W. Runciman eds.
1962) (presenting several bases for a claim of equality).
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part of our political culture. 198 Social contract arguments generally assert that the foundations of political organization and
obligation lie in a social contract 1g9 that includes a provision
requiring the government to respect the equal moral status of its
citizens. 20 0 These contract theories argue that people began in a
state of fundamental moral equality because they all met the
criterion for moral personhood, whether that be reason, 20 1 free
will, 20 2 or a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of
justice. 20 3 When people came together to form the social contract they would have insisted that the contract require the
government to respect their equal personhood since, acting as selfinterested bargainers, 20 4 it would not be rational for them to join
a compact that did not include this protection. Any government
that violates this basic norm of equal respect thereby abrogates the
social contract and dissolves the basis for political obligation on the
20 5
part of the citizens.
198 It might also be possible to derive this commitment to equal respect from
other foundations, like moral intuitionism or communitarianism. I rely here on social
contract theory not because it is the only path, or even necessarily the best path, but
because it is the most familiar path to this conclusion.
199 See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (T. Peardon ed.
1952). Locke seems to have believed that the contract was an actual historical event,
see id. at 56-65, while more modern philosophers generally posit a hypothetical
contract, seeJ. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 11-17 (1971). The historical accuracy of
the theory is irrelevant for the purposes of my argument.
200 See, e.g.,J. ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 23-25, 32-35 (D. Cress trans.

1983).
201 See, e.g., J. LOCKE, supra note 199, at 4-6 (arguing that all men are equal in the
state of nature by virtue of their similar faculties, including reason, which allow them
to understand
the laws of nature).
20 2
See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 24 (L.W. Beck
trans. 1969). Kant argued that moral laws apply to all rational beings, see id.; that
rational beings as such, including but not limited to human beings, have the capacity
to will in accordance with laws, see id. at 28-29; and that willing in accordance with
universal laws constitutes a free will, and all rational beings have the capacity for a
free will, see id. at 64-67. Although not explicitly a social contract theory, Kant's
theory shares important features with liberal social contract theories and has become
part of the tradition out of which they grow. SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 199, at 11.
203 SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 199, at 19.
204 SeeJ. LOCKE, supra note 199, at 70-73;J. RAWLS, supra note 199, at 13-14.
205 SeeJ. LOCKE, supranote 199, at 84-85. There is broad agreement that Locke's

brand of social contract theory is liberal, even among those who disagree about what
liberalism is. See, e.g., C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM 1-2 (1962); R. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 13-17 (1985). Because of the perception that republican political theories
historically have been less concerned with equality, the recent republican revival has
involved an attempt to make republican principles consistent with a commitment to
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Two quick caveats must be added. First, equal respect does not
necessarily mean equal treatment.

Indeed,

there is dramatic

variation among philosophers on what equal respect means in
practical terms. 20 6 Whether or not equal respect requires practical equality, it certainly requires that the government not have a
purpose to display or to encourage less respect for the personhood
of some people than for that of others. Such a requirement
explains in part why a concern with government motive flows so
naturally from this type of social contract approach. 20 7 Second,
not every purpose to create inequality is intended to show less

a more egalitarian society or politics. See, e.g., Deutsch, Truth and the Law: A Critical
View of Community, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 635, 645 (1989) (proposing reliance on "the
checks and balances in our political system... to preserve the multiple facets of our
political process"); Michelman, Law's Republic 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1528-29 (1988)
(suggesting that the pursuit of political freedom through law requires the inclusion
of the "hitherto absent voices of emergently self-conscious social groups"); Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Reviva 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1577 (1988) ("[R]epublican
understandings would point toward large reforms of the electoral process ... to
promote political equality and citizenship."). To the extent that such an attempt is
successful, republicanism, with its non-contractarian explanation of the purpose and
foundation of political obligation, would provide a different type of explanation for
equality.
206 For example, there is great disagreement over whether equal respect requires
the government to protect the free market and its distribution of property, see R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32-33, 149-82 (1974) (referring to a concept
of "neutrality" between citizens that is equivalent to equal respect for their
entitlements), or actively to redis tribute property more equally, see Held, Men, Women,
and Equal Liberty, in EQUALITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 66, 71 (W. Feinberg ed. 1978);
Schaar, supra note 197, at 242. For a discussion of the differences between equal
respect and equal treatment, see R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 190-91 (1985).
207 The requirements placed on government by the social compact may, of course,
go far beyond keeping its own motives clean. First of all, the equality required may
be not merely equality of motive, but equality of treatment with respect to basic
liberties. Second, the social compact can be read to go even further and demand
equality of outcome. The government would then be required to assure, for example,
not only that everyone has the legal right to use the mass media for communication,
but that everyone has the means to do so. The inequality in this example arises not
from the legal regime, but from the combination of law and the distribution of wealth
that leaves some people without a meaningful opportunity to speak. But if
distribution of wealth is held to be outside the scope of governmental concern, then
social contract theory might require only equal legal rights.
How far one should go in holding government responsible for the underlying
social and economic structure is one of the most important disagreements among
various social contract theorists. Depending on the position one takes along this
continuum, other types of (non-purposeful) content discrimination, and even other
types of completely neutral regulations, could also be seen as violations of the
obligation of equal respect. But while the implications of the social contract may go
beyond the issue of content discrimination in the government's purpose, it is certain
that, at a minimum, such intentional discrimination should be illegitimate.
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respect for the personhood of those disadvantaged, and some
created inequalities in relation to some social or economic goods
may be consistent with equal respect. 208 Freedom of speech,
however, is a basic liberty. Speech is so intimately connected with
the characteristics that make us persons in a moral sense-reason,
free will, etc.-that the intentional denial of an equal right to speak
denies some people their equal personhood. If the government's
purpose in regulating speech is'to deny equal personhood in this
way, then it has clearly violated the social compact on which its own
legitimacy depends.
It is not surprising, then, that the concern about government
purpose seems so natural a focus in first amendment doctrine.
There are, however, other theories that offer explanations of what
equality means and reasons why it is important. These alternative
reasons can in turn be threatened by different types of discrimination.
b. Democracy Theory

A second theory suggests that unequal treatment under the law
violates one of the basic tenets of democracy. Modern conceptions
of democracy 20 9 rest on the premise that all citizens, the class of
people empowered to take part in the decision of public issues, are
equal as citizens. 210 When a dembcratic government denies equal
rights to some of its citizens, it creates a kind of second-class
citizenship that is inconsistent with democratic ideals and violative
of the premise upon which that government's legitimacy rests.
Treating all citizens badly2n1 may be bad policy, or even unjust,
212
but treating some worse than others is simply illegitimate.
208 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 206, at 190 (stating that the government

would have to provide more disaster relief to an area seriously devastated by a flood
than to one less seriously affected to treat both areas with equal respect).
209 Certain ancient (generally republican) conceptions of democracy included great
inequality. The most obvious basis for such inequality was that many people-women
and slaves, for example-were not permitted to be citizens at all. See J. ELSHTAIN,
PuBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN 41-47 (1981) (describing Aristotle's withholding of
political rights from women, children, and slaves).
210

See Raphael, Equality, Democracy, and International Law, in NOMOS IX:

EQUALITY 277,278-79 (1967); cf.J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 4-5

(1980) (describing the different types of equality concerns central to unitary and
adversary democracy).

211 Where a fundamental right is implicated, denying that right to all citizens may
also strike at the government's legitimacy. But inequality raises legitimacy concerns
even where no fundamental right is at stake.
212 This discussion doesn't address the difficult question of which differences
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Such a loss of legitimacy may not be worse than the evil of mistreating everyone, but it is certainly a separately identifiable harm.
The essence of this kind of harm is not the government purpose
served, but the impact on those discriminated against. It may be
that you can only be disrespected when disrespect is intended. 2 13
But the government can make you a second-class citizen even absent
an intent to do so. This theory of equality says we should be
concerned when government creates second-class citizens-even
inadvertently-because the impact on those discriminated against
itself is a violation of that part of the meaning of equality that
follows from our commitment to democracy.
Just as not every inequality constitutes disrespect, not every
inequality constitutes second-class citizenship. Speech, however, is
one of the most important aspects of citizenship in a democracy. If
the government silences a group of people, it makes them secondclass citizens in a clear and dramatic way: it robs them of the full

2 14
opportunity to participate in the governance of their society.
And content discrimination is a type of speech regulation particular2 15
ly likely to interfere with such political participation.
Certain kinds of inequalities can interfere with democracy in
another way as well. Democracy is sometimes justified on the

between peoplejustify different treatment and which do not. I am simply cataloguing
general arguments for equality without attempting to explain what, in particular,
equality requires. In doing so I rely, in the first amendment context, on a great deal
of doctrine spelling out what equality requires. Nonetheless, I would be inclined to
agree with Kenneth Karst that equality-at least the equality with which our
Constitution is concerned-is not merely the formal, almost tautological claim that
one must treat like cases (or persons) alike, but includes a substantive element
specifying the social goods in relation to which people are to be treated alike. See
Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendmen 91 HARV. L. REV.
1, 4 (1977).
218 Whether or not dogs know the difference between being tripped over and
being kicked, people certainly do. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (M. Howe
ed. 1963). But cf. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-44 (1987) (describing unconscious
racism). It is important to recognize, moreover, that if you are tripped over often
enough, the indifference to your pain that such behavior implies may itself constitute
a type of disrespect. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 16-21, at 1519 ("[I]f one is first
dragged toward the boot and then stumbled over often enough, the pains and bruises
become indistinguishable from those inflicted by kicking.").
214 Some other goods may be foundational in a similar way. For example, a vastly
unequal distribution of wealth may also leave some citizens without the opportunity
for meaningful participation in the political process and, therefore, violate the
equality principle inherent in our concept of democracy.
215 See infra notes 250-54 and accompanying text (discussing content discrimination in context of democracy theories).
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utilitarian 216 grounds that allowing all citizens to register their
preferences through the political process enables the government
to reach policy decisions that maximize the total quantity of
satisfaction in the society.2 17 This calculus only works properly,
however, if all the persons who may be affected by a policy are
equally represented in the decisionmaking process. 2 18 Unequal
distribution of the right to participate in the political process
interferes with the purposes of democracy not just by making some
people second-class citizens, but by destroying the ability of the
political process to generate reliable conclusions about which
policies are in the general welfare.
This danger to the welfare calculus is independent of the
government's purpose in creating the inequality. Even when a
government intends no disrespect toward those excluded, their lack
of opportunity to participate means that the final tally will not
accurately represent the interests and desires of everyone affected
by the proposed policy. The danger is intimately connected to the
threat of second-class citizenship; that lower status is necessarily
created whenever a right is so essential to political participation that
interference with it harms the welfare calculus. Speech is such a
basic political right.
There is, however, an interesting difference between the harms
caused by unequal citizenship and the harm inherent in this damage
to the welfare calculus. The latter harm falls on all members of the
political community, not merely those excluded. The political
thermometer on which they all rely has been miscalibrated. Such an
imbalance will likely result in short-term difficulties, including
216 1 use here that variety of utilitarianism that does not presume to define utility

in abstract terms and then measure it objectively, but assumes that each person's
utility is maximized by satisfying her desires. This utilitarianism sees the democratic
process as an accurate mechanism for generating policies that respond to the utility
curves of the various individuals affected. This view of democracy is by no means
inconsistent with the social contract theory above. Indeed, if one of the basic
characteristics that makes someone a moral person is the capacity to define what is
for her a good life, then this utilitarian approach may be the most natural view: it
precludes the possibility of legislation based on the paternalistic (and fundamentally
disrespectful) claim that someone else knows what is in your best interest better than
you do. For further discussion of different theories of democracy, see infra notes
245-54
and accompanying text.
2 17
See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32-34
(1985) (describing the pluralist understanding of government).
21'

This aspect of equality is captured by the Supreme Court's famous guiding

principle in the apportionment cases: one person, one vote. See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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policies that fail to achieve their goals or generate unexpected
problems, and-possibly-serious unresolved problems in the long
term. These results will likely affect every member of the society as
a whole, those included in the political process as well as those
excluded. Thus, inequalities that damage the welfare calculus are
characterized by their costs to society more generally, not by the
government's intentions or the harm to the individual victims.
These equality theories suggest that if we value equal respect,
equal citizenship, and equal political weight, then we should be
particularly concerned about three problems: intentional discrimination by the government; inequality, whether intentionally created
or not, that imposes second-class status on the person discriminated
against; and inequalities that distort basic social institutions and,
thereby, harm society in general. The three types of content
discrimination I define above 2 19 are particular examples of these
more general types of inequality. Government purpose to suppress
speech because of its communicative effects disrespects the moral
and intellectual personhood of both speaker and listener; a
regulation the speaker perceives as silencing the content of her
viewpoint relegates her to a lower level of participation, and thus a
lower level of citizenship; a law that results in the systematic
silencing of a content category from the audience's perspective robs
all society of information and ideas necessary to the general welfare.
c. The Equal Protection Clause
If these equality arguments are an important part of our
political culture, then we would expect to find some recognition of
the various concerns they raise in the area of our constitutional law
most directly devoted to considerations of equality: the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In fact, a comparison of first amendment content discrimination doctrine and equal
protection clause jurisprudence does produce some striking
parallels.
First and most obviously, the Court has been preoccupied in
both areas with the issue of government purpose or motive. In
Washington v. Davis22 0 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli219 That is, content discrimination in the government purpose, in the impact on
the audience, and in the impact on the speaker.
accompanying text.
220 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

See supra notes 179-90 and
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tan Housing Development Corp.,221 the Court held that improper

government motivation is the hallmark of an equal protection claim.
Without evidence of an illegitimate governmental purpose, the
Court is unwilling to find a violation of the equal protection clause,
even if the obvious effect of a rule is to exclude the members of a
suspect classification from a benefit. These cases clearly established
the "basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced
22 2
to a racially discriminatory purpose."
There is a significant difference, however, between the treatment of government purpose in equal protection and speech
doctrines: the Court has not yet abandoned strict scrutiny for
facially discriminatory laws in the equal protection area. The need
to prove a discriminatory motive in order to command strict
scrutiny only arises when the law does not contain a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification on its face. 223 No equal protection
doctrine parallelling the holdings in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc.224 and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,225 yet exists.
221 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
222 Davis,426 U.S. at 240; see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65; Sunstein,

Public Values, PrivateInterests,and the Equal ProtectionClause, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 127,
131 ("Modern equal protection jurisprudence thus operates as a limitation on the
reasons ... that are permitted to underlie statutory classifications." (footnote
omitted)).
225 See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 16-14, at 1466; Sunstein, supia note 222, at 12728.
224 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
225 475 U.S. 41 (1986). One equal protection case looked as though it might be
moving in this direction. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court
upheld a state employer's refusal to extend employee disability benefits to pregnancy.
The Court's ostensible explanation was that the relevant disadvantaged category"pregnant persons"-was not a suspect class, and no fundamental right existed to the
benefits denied, so only rational basis review was warranted. See id. at 496 n.20. The
absurdity of describing the category "pregnant persons" as gender neutral has been
demonstrated too often to need repetition here. See; e.g., Karst, supra note 212, at 54
n.304 (criticizing Geduldig's"Alice-in-Wonderland view of pregnancy as a sex-neutral
phenomenon"); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983
(1984); Williams, Equality 'sRiddle: Pregnancyand the Equal Treatment/SpecialTreatment
Debate; 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 337-38 (1985).
If we were to take Geduldig seriously, however, it would seem to hold that a
government policy that discriminates on its face against a subset of a quasi-suspect
class may be tested against the low, rational basis standard if the policy serves a
legitimate, non-suspect purpose. This reading of Geduldig would make it strikingly
similar to American Mini Theatres, in which the Court used the lower, content-neutral
standard of review to assess a law facially discriminating on the basis of content
because the government's purpose was to address a noncommunicative harm. See
supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
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One explanation for this difference is that the Court may be

more willing to presume an illicit motive in a law facially directed
at a suspect class than in one facially directed at a content category
of speech. Such a distinction would not be unreasonable. Certain
types of discrimination-most notably racism and sexism-have a
long and virulent history in this country, perhaps unmatched by
hatred for any particular ideology or point of view. Equally
important, discrimination against groups of people can become so
embedded in social stereotypes and assumptions that it becomes
almost unconscious, so that legislators may be largely unaware that
they are influenced by it.226 This phenomenon may be less
common with animus against particular content categories of
speech. Reasons like these might well incline the Court to be more
systematically suspicious of facially discriminatory laws in the equal
protection context.
But perhaps the Court's willingness to use strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause for facially discriminatory laws marks a
grudging acceptance of the fact that there is more at stake than just
government motive. Even if the government is not moved by racial
animus, a discriminatory law creates a risk of stigma for the group
and individual disadvantaged and, if such laws accumulate, could
lead to systematic and long term subordination of some people to
others. The risk of these broad social harms is significant enough
to require a strong showing of necessity for the law regardless of the
government's motive. 227 The first amendment parallel to this
situation is a facially content-discriminatory law where the government's purpose is to deal with a noncommunicative harm. If such
a law disadvantages one content category of speech, then it can lead
to serious social harms, including distortion of the public debate,
interference with the democratic process, and a possible consequent
loss of political legitimacy. 228 If these harms are among the sorts
of things the first amendment is supposed to prevent-just as stigma
and subordination are among the things the equal protection clause
is intended to prevent-then the standard of review should be high
regardless of the government's noncommunicative purposes.
226 See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 16-21, at 1519 n.44; Brest, Foreword: In Defense of
the AntidiscriminationPrincip 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1976).

227 See Brest, supra note 226, at 8-11; Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,

5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 150-51 (:1976); Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1040-41 (1979).
228 See infra notes 233-302 and accompanying text (discussing theories of speech).
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If, however, these social harms raise serious constitutional
concerns, then these concerns should arise whenever a law generates such results, whether or not the law is facially discriminatory.
This notion is at the heart of the "disparate impact" argument in
equal protection doctrine, which claims that if a law disproportionately disadvantages a suspect class, it should receive a higher level
of scrutiny than mere rational basis even if neither the government's
motive nor the law on its face is explicitly discriminatory. 229 The
first amendment analogy here is to a facially neutral regulation of
speech serving noncommunicative purposes that, nonetheless, has
a systematically different impact on certain content categories of
speech. For example, a law preventing any interference with the
flow of people into and out of commercial establishments would be
content-neutral on its face and might serve noncommunicative
public safety and commercial purposes. Nonetheless, it would
clearly impact disproportionately on speakers involved in labor
disputes with commercial establishments for whom on site picketing
is a traditional and particularly effective means of speech. Such a
content-based effect should arguably be subjected to a more
stringent standard of review. The Supreme Court has so far refused
to accept this type of argument in either its first or its fourteenth
amendment guises.
In addition to the social harms caused by discrimination, there
are harms borne by the individual victim. In equal protection
theory, individualized harms are quite explicitly recognized. They
can include a loss of self-respect, a lowering of life expectations, a
reduced sense of responsibility for society and for oneself, and an
apathy toward public participation. 230 That the Court considers
such harms to be important is demonstrated in its insistence that
purely symbolic discrimination, which causes no material, physical,
or economic harm and is therefore unlikely to lead to long-term
subordination of the suspect class, receives strict scrutiny. 231 The
229 See Karst, supra note 212, at 50-52 n.287; Perry, supra note 227, at 1040-41; cf.
Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 57-83 (proposing "the causation principle" as a

mechanism for taking account of impact in the absence of illicit motive).
230 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); Karst, supra note
212, at 6-8.
231See, e.g.,Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61,62 (1963) (per curiam) (striking down
law requiring segregation in courtrooms); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350,
353 (1962) (per curiam) (striking down segregation in a municipal airport restaurant);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (per curiam) (striking down segregation

on buses).
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primary harm in such cases is the emotional and psychological harm
to the individuals subjected to such discrimination.
Once again, there is a parallel in the first amendment context.
A speaker who is silenced because of the content of her speech-told
she may not say that-experiences emotional and psychological
harms as well. These may include frustration, feelings of exclusion
and isolation, and the sense that her expression, perhaps even she
herself, is undervalued. Moreover, these harms may occur even
when the rule under which she is silenced is facially content-neutral,
serves a noncommunicative purpose, and would not necessarily
interfere with others wishing to express similar points of view. In
other words, the Chinese students in my example above 232 may
experience these harms. The recent collapse of the symbolic speech
line leaves such speakers with no real protection.
Equality theory generally, and equal protection doctrine in
particular, indicate why all three types of content discrimination are
of serious concern. But -we can go further and explain why the
three types of discrimination are not just a threat to equality, but a
serious threat to freedom of speech.
2. Theories of Free Speech
I will examine a cross section 233 of the major theories of
speech in order to determine why content discrimination matters to
each and, in light of those concerns, which of the three types of
discrimination each theory recognizes. This examination serves two
functions: it illustrates why the three types of discrimination are
232 See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
233 There are other theories that have received a great deal of attention and that
should not be left out of any thorough study. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in
FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 521 (proposing the theory that
free speech is valuable because it can check the abuse of power by public officials).
I am not attempting a thorough survey here. I review only a collection of the most
general and widely recognized theories. That other, important theories might also
be analyzed in terms of these three types of content discrimination does not disturb
my argument. I am not aware of any prominent theory that would refuse to
recognize at least one of the types of discrimination I discuss as a serious threat to
free speech, or that would insist on some other type of content discrimination that
does not fit my schema. While many theories may suggest that certain types of
content-neutral regulations could also pose a threat to free speech, the focus of this
Article is not on the relative importance of content-based and content-neutral
regulations. Whether or not we accept the Court's apparently more lenient approach
to content-neutral regulations, the category of content-based ones must be larger than
the Court has so far recognized. Nothing in the omitted theories casts doubt on my
central claim.

CONTENT DISCRIMINATION

types of content discrimination, and it demonstrates that these
theories, taken in the aggregate, indicate that first amendment
doctrine should take seriously and respond to all three types of
content discrimination.
a. Truth Theory

The truth theory is perhaps the best established theory explaining why speech should receive special protection. It argues that a
free exchange of ideas is indispensable to the acquisition and
expansion of human knowledge. The theory is often credited to
John Milton 234 and John Stuart Mill,23 5 but there are many
modern versions and revisions as well. 236 Moreover, this theory
has enjoyed some real acceptance in the courts. The Supreme
Court's references to the truth theory run from Justice Holmes's
famous metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas," 237 through
Justice Brennan's use of Mill in New York Times v. Sullivan,238 even
to Justice Rehnquist's assessment of the fact/opinion distinction in
239
libel law in terms of the marketplace of ideas.
The truth theory focuses on the value of speech to the listener,
not the speaker. Through witnessing the clash of ideas and
struggling to reconcile new ideas with old assumptions, the listener
comes to a clearer and more accurate perception of the truth. This
benefit accrues almost regardless of the speaker's motive or means
of speech. 240 Similarly, the benefit is lost when speech is siSeeJ. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (J. Suffolk ed. 1968) (1644).
SeeJ. MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz ed. 1975) (1859).
23
6 See generally DuVal, Free Communicationof Ideas and the Questfor Truth: Toward
a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161
(1972) (arguing for an approach to free speech emphasizing the purpose of freedom
of expression as modification of beliefs and ideas); Wright, A Rationalefromj.S.Mill
for the Free Speech Clause, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 149, 156-63 (outlining a Millian
framework for interpretation of free speech clause in which protected speech must
communicate a social idea).
237 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting)
(explaining that "the ultimate good desired is best reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market").
238 376 U.S. 254, 272 n.13 (1964).
239 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990).
240 This theory may generate some limits on the speaker, but they are minimal.
For example, coercion by a speaker might well interfere with a listener's ability to
assess the message rather than promote it. Fraud may be another exception,
although it is possible that even intentional falsehood could contribute at least to the
livelier impression of truth. SeeNew York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (endorsingMill's
234
235
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lenced, regardless of the government's reasons for doing so. The
truth theory, in other words, sees the value of speech and the
danger of restrictions from the perspective of the audience. From
this perspective, what is the danger of inequality generally and
content discrimination in -particular?
Unequal treatment is dangerous because it distorts the freespeech market, 241 reducing its ability to generate truth. This
distortion is, in some cases, at least as damaging as a more general
silencing. If a very large quantity of speech is silenced, either across
the market or in a large part of it, then the truth-producing
function of speech is destroyed, but that effect is quite obvious to
any observer. No one would rely any longer on the remaining
marketplace of ideas to determine the truth. This phenomenon is
commonplace in totalitarian countries, where the people regularly
assume that the speech made available to them by the government
is false or misleading. If, on the other hand, the silencing is not
severe and is evenly distributed across the market, then the impact
on the truth-producing function of speech may not be very great:
all voices will be proportionately quieter, but if all can still be heard
then the struggle for truth can continue with the relative strengths
of the contestants unaltered. 242 But if a fairly small part of the
speech market is silenced or disadvantaged relative to the rest, the
truth-producing function will be crippled, and yet the injury may
not be readily apparent to those who rely upon the marketplace.
Such distortion, although causing less damage, may be as dangerous
as a broader silencing because it is more easily hidden, overlooked,
or ignored.
Content discrimination, in the context of the truth theory,
should be defined as any government action that has the effect of
systematically 243 silencing or disadvantaging 44 particular con-

argument for the usefulness of falsehood). But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (rejecting the idea that falsehood is useful to the exposition of
ideas or the search for truth).
241 See Stone, supra note 3, at 198.
242 The truth-seeking process may be slowed or reduced in importance by such a
general reduction in speech, but no distortion of outcome should be produced.
Truth is only one social value among many. The existence of the first amendment,
under the truth theory, indicates that truth is an important value, but it does not
provide any clear framework for deciding how it ranks as against other values. Where
the truth-seeking function is not distorted or destroyed, but merely somewhat
reduced in importance relative to other social goals, the truth theory alone does not
provide a clear basis for finding a constitutional violation.
243 Almost any government action could, under the right circumstances, silence
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tent categories of speech. Since it is generally the content that
carries whatever truth value the speech may have, a regulation that
impacts unequally on the time or place of speech without causing
any disproportionate impact on content would not usually pose a
threat to the truth function. Impact on content is the primary, if
not the exclusive, concern of the truth theory.
Content discrimination, so defined, would be precisely the type
of inequality condemned by the truth theory. When the impact of
a regulation is limited to certain content-categories of speech, it has
the potential to do damage that is deep but not broad, thus causing
distortion without delegitimizing the marketplace. Thus, if we
accept the truth theory as an explanation of the first amendment's
protection for speech, we would be primarily concerned about the
type of content discrimination that appears from the audience's
perspective.
b. Democracy Theory

Another common free speech theory is the democracy theory,
which holds that the first amendment gives speech special protection because free speech is necessary to the proper functioning of
a democracy. The democracy theory is associated primarily with
Alexander Miekeljohn2 45 and Robert Bork,24 6 but, once again,
or disadvantage some content category of speech. In order to restrict the reach of

the first amendment under the truth theory, it is necessary to adopt some limitation,
such as requiring that this effect be systematic. By systematic, I mean that the impact
occurs within the normal range of circumstances under which the regulation could
reasonably be expected to operate, and that the impact is not random but is targeted
at a particular content category.
244 Even when the impact of the regulation is proportionately equal on all
speakers or viewpoints, the regulation should qualify as content discrimination if the
burden is great enough that the weaker ones are effectively silenced. From the
audience's perspective, a voice that it would have heard is now unavailable to it and
the truth-seeking process is distorted as a result. In other words, telling both rich and
poor that they may not leaflet or use sound trucks will still qualify as discrimination,
at least if the poor person has no other means of communicating. Cf. Kalven, The
Concept of the PublicForum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 30 ("We would
do well to avoid.., new epigrams about the majestic equality of the law prohibiting
the 245
rich man, too, from distributing leaflets or picketing.").
See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (asserting that freedom of speech and an educated citizenry are
the basis of the social compact); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960)
[hereinafter A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM] (stating that a responsible
electorate requires the freedom of speech necessary to participate directly in

governing).
246

See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
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there are many other scholars who have adopted and modified
it.

247

Assuming that all adult citizens may vote on issues of public
concern in a democracy, why must they also be able to speak on
those issues? There are at least two explanations of why free speech
might be necessary to democracy, each corresponding to a rather
different model of democracy. First, although people may express
their preferences and opinions by voting, those opinions must be
informed rather than ignorant if the democratic process is to
generate responsible and workable policies.
Free and open
discussion of issues of public concern is, therefore, indispensable if
democracy is to lead to good results.
In this model of democracy, the value of speech is to the
audience, those potential voters who will hear the speech and use
it to make their decisions. This version of the democracy theory is
simply a variation on the truth theory, but the truth for which
listeners search is the truth about issues necessary to make political
decisions. 248 Arguments about how inequality in general and
content discrimination in particular distort the marketplace of ideas
are equally applicable here.24 9 This democracy theory is primarily
(1971).
247 See, e.g., G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONsTITUTIONALisT:

NOTES ON THE FIRST

AMENDMENT (1971) (tying protection of speech to a theory of republican government); A. BICKEL, THE MORALM' OF CONSENT 62 (1975) (arguing that free speech
should be protected and encouraged so long as it serves to make the political process
work by persuading majorities of voters); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiy into the Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1978) (expanding the political process theory to include other pragmatic and
institutional concerns); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendmen4" 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191, 209 (arguing that the
decision marks the Court's acceptance of Meiklejohn's theory).
248 There is, of course, substantial variation among scholars on the question ofjust
which speech is relevant to the decision of political issues. CompareBork, supra note
246, at 26-31 (rejecting all but speech explicitly concerning political issues) with A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supranote 245, at 117 (including art, science, and
literature as relevant to forming political judgments).
249 Notice that this model of democracy can take either a classical liberal or a
republican form. In a liberal version, the truth that citizens search for is the truth
about what their own individual values are and about the most practical and least
costly policies for effectuating them. The democratic process then reaches a result
by summing up these preferences. In an even moderately sophisticated view, all sorts
of discussion by and with other people could be relevant to a citizen attempting to
decide what he actually wants and what is the most efficient way to achieve it.
In a republican version, the truth for which citizens search is an understanding
of the common good, rather than of their own individual conceptions of the good.
The democratic process is seen, ideally, as a way of reaching a consensus (or
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concerned about content discrimination from the perspective of the
audience.
The second version of the democracy theory relies on a model
in which the democratic process, including free political dialogue,
is valued not for the wise or just policies it may produce, but for the
process itself. Hannah Arendt is probably the best known exponent
of this theory, 250 but it has been adopted and modified by several
of the participants in the recent republican revival. 51 Participation in public decisionmaking is, under this theory of democracy,
essential to full citizenship, perhaps even to the attainment of full
humanity. Voting alone is, however, too solitary and infrequent an
activity to constitute full participation-a fully participating citizen
must engage in the free expression and exchange of views in which
the characters of both societies and individuals are formed. Free
speech is necessary in this second model of democracy, not because
it helps the process to reach good results, but because it is the very
stuff of which the democratic process is made.
The value of free speech in this theory is primarily to the
speaker. Speech is a means of participating in the life of one's
society, of being a full citizen and fulfilling one's human potential.
something close) about what the common good requires. Once again, discussion by
and with others is essential to the discovery and recognition of the common good
since no one citizen can be sure that she has all of the information or arguments that
are relevant until she has heard her fellow citizens. For a discussion of these two
types of democracies, see generallyJ. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 210.
In both the liberal and republican versions, the process of free political dialogue
is valuable not for its own sake, but because it is a necessary (although not, perhaps,
always sufficient) means of producing truth, a truth that is defined in terms
independent of the process itself. In this theory, democracy is a procedure for
reaching an antecedently defined goal. See J. RAWLS, supra note 199, at 85-86
(describing imperfect procedural justice).
250 See e.g., H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-33 (1958) (tracing the
genealogy
of the idea that the highest good lies in political action).
251

See, e.g., B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FORA NEw
AGE 150-55 (1984) (arguing for a system of "strong democracy" where every citizen
participates in the political process); W. SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC

PHILOSOPHY 155-70 (1982) (arguing for a revitalization of civic commitment and
participation). There is no classical liberal counterpart to this second theory of
democracy. Although liberalism does, of course, demand equal citizenship, the
notion of citizenship is a narrower one. Individuals come to the political union
already formed and the required equality is simply the right to have their wishes
considered equally with everyone else's, to be treated as creatures with their own
ends. Voting might well suffice as a basis for this equality. Because the democratic
process is simply a means of achieving just policies rather than an identity forming
experience, the liberal idea of democracyis too narrow to support this richer concept
of citizenship.
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This value remains even if the citizen's listeners never receive any
enlightenment from her speech.2 52 It is destroyed, though, by
any government prohibition of the speech. Even if the government's purpose shows no disrespect for the speaker, the effect of a
law that excludes her from public participation is the loss of the
democratic value of speech.
Content discrimination, from the perspective of this second
democracy theory, is a government action that restricts an aspect of
expression valued by the speaker as part of her message rather than
as merely facilitative; it is an unequal bar to full participation falling
on the content of the message. As such, content discrimination is
one of the most serious threats to the participatory democratic value
of speech.
My example of the Chinese students 253 illustrates why such
content discrimination is more dangerous than many other types of
inequality. A speaker whose chosen act of participation is frustrated
by a law which falls on a facilitative aspect of her speech can often
find an alternative method of conveying her message. The prodivestment students in the example might play loud music or flash
a large collection of lights into the sky in order to draw the crowd
that the bonfire was intended to attract. The impact on their
participation, on the expression of their message, is real and
therefore deserving of some first amendment scrutiny, but it is
minimal if some adequate alternative exists. There is, however, no
adequate alternative for tlhe symbols with which a speaker chooses
to express her message. The Chinese students' ability to participate
in the public debate is, from their own perspective, more severely
restricted than that of the pro-divestment students. When the
government action restricts the message from the speaker's point of
view, it cuts more deeply into the speaker's ability to function as a
fully participating citizen than when it restricts only a facilitative
mechanism for which alternatives exist. From the perspective of
this second democracy theory, the central issue raised by content
254
discrimination is the impact on the speaker.
252 They must, of course, listen with respect if the speech is to function as real
participation. But even if they all believe that they learned nothing of value, that-in
the terms of the other democracy theory-they received no information that helped
them to make a better and more responsible decision, the speech would still have
value to the speaker under this democracy theory.
253 See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
254 The two types of democracy theories also share a concern about certain
government motives for restricting speech. Both theories posit that, for either
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c. Self-Expression or Self Realization Theory
The third common theory of speech is the self-expression or
self-realization theory. Perhaps the two most influential proponents
of this theory are C. Edwin Baker 255 and Martin Redish.25 n
This theory suggests that special protection for speech is justified by
the role speech plays in the processes of self-fulfillment, 2 57 participation in change, 25 8 development of personal faculties, 259 and
control of one's own life-affecting decisions. 26 0
The authors

instrumental or intrinsic reasons, political decisions ought to be made by the people.
Certain government reasons for regulating speech evince a desire to take that power
out of the hands of the people. Such motives should be illegitimate in a democratic
system. At least, they should be illegitimate if the removal of the issue from
majoritarian control is not constitutionally required, as it is on issues of religious
belief. For example, a simple desire on the part of present officials to insulate
themselves from criticism of or threats to their own power would clearly violate the
premises of a democratic system. Similarly, official paternalism, in which the
government restricts speech "because it does not trust its citizens to make wise or
desirable decisions if they are exposed to such expression," Stone, supra note 3, at
213, contradicts the basic democratic commitment to the proposition that "the people
...are entrusted with the responsibility forjudging and evaluating the relative merits
of conflicting arguments." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
The concern about such illegitimate motives should lead a democracy theorist
to embrace the government purpose conception of content discrimination, but might
not suffice to convince a democracy theorist of the utility of the communicative
impact model. Under that model, the government's purpose is discriminatory when
it aims at a communicative harm of the speech. The suspect motives discussed above
both involve such communicative harms. There is, however, one other major
category of motives that would fall under the communicative harm model, but which
would not necessarily be suspect within the democracy theory: offense to listeners.
The communicative harm model would, therefore, be overinclusive from the
perspective of the democracy theories.
The democracy theories would recognize the dangers of content discrimination
in the government's purpose, but might endorse a narrower view of those purposes
than the communicative impact model suggests. If, however, the democracy theory
is supplemented by other theories-tolerance and dissent, for example-then the
composite theory fits very comfortably with the communicative impact model of
government purposes. Thus, democracy theory, although not sufficient by itself to
justify this model of discriminatory government purposes, does contribute to the
justification.
An exactly parallel argument could be made for the truth theory.
2 55
See generally C.E. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989)

(arguing for a free speech theory based on individual liberty and autonomy rather
than the marketplace of ideas); Baker, supra note 56 (same).
256 See generally Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982)
(asserting
that free speech serves the value of individual self-realization).
25 7
See C.E. BAKER, supra note 255, at 47-48.
258 See id.
259 See Redish, supra note 256, at 604.
260 See id.
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derive the requirement of protection for these types of personal
development from various sources. Baker relies directly on a theory
of equal respect for the autonomy of individuals as the necessary
foundation for legal obligation. 261 Redish, on the other hand,
argues that our constitutional commitment to democracy, while not
itself the justification for freedom of speech, provides evidence of
an underlying commitment to self-realization thatjustifies both free
262
speech and democracy.
While there is great variation in these theories, they share a
focus on the value of speech from the perspective of the speaker,
who will reap the benefits of self-expression and self-realization
most directly. 263 Once again, as in the second democracy theory,
these benefits will flow regardless of whether any listeners feel that
the speech has value to them, and the benefits will be prevented by
government action restricting the speech regardless of the noncommunicative purposes such action might serve.
The danger of inequality (as opposed to repression more
generally) from the perspective of the self-expression theory
depends on the basis for the value of self-expression. If, as in
Baker's theory, protection of self-expression is a necessary element
of respect for personhood, 264 then denial of this freedom to some
people is a denial of their personhood. Bad as it is when the
government denies your personhood, it is an independent and
additional harm when the government denies your personhood
while recognizing it for other people. When a government denies
a fundamental right inherent in personhood, it is saying either that
it does not believe the right to be necessary to personhood, or that
it does not intend to respect the personhood of anyone. When that
government respects the right for some but not for others, it is
saying either that the disadvantaged are not moral persons in the
same sense as the others, or that their personhood is not as
deserving of respect. Inequality includes the separate disrespect of
being told that you are, or can be treated as, less of a person than
265
others.
261 See C.E. BAKER, supra noe 255, at 49-50.
262 See Redish, supra note 256, at 603-04.
263 In Redish's theory, at least, it is possible that some

of these benefits also flow

to listeners who are better able to make autonomous decisions because of the
information they receive through free exchange of ideas. Cf id. at 605 n.54.
264 See C.E. BAKER, supra note 255, at 47-48.
265 See Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 247-49 (1983).
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Content discrimination, from the perspective of the selfexpression theory, occurs whenever government action interferes
with speech by silencing or disadvantaging the content of the
message from the speaker's point of view. While any interference
with speech serving the function of self-realization should raise first
amendment concerns, interference with the content of the message
may be particularly troublesome. 26 6 Baker recognizes that some
aspects of speech will be substantively valued by the speaker while
26 7
others will be merely a means of facilitating the expression.
For example, the time and place chosen for the speech may simply
be the best way to reach a large audience, rather than valued in
themselves. When a regulation of speech interferes with a substantively valued aspect of the speech, it causes far more damage to the
ability of speech to promote self-realization in all of its forms than
if the regulation affected only a facilitative aspect of speech.
The content or message of the speech will almost always be part
of what is substantively valued by the speaker. After all, the speaker
expresses herself, creates something, participates in the shaping of
the culture, or develops her faculties primarily through the content
of the speech. It is true that other aspects of the speech may be
substantively valued as well. For example, reaching a very particular
audience may be of substantive value to the speaker. And it is
possible, although very unusual, for the content of the speech not
to be a part of what is substantively valued, as where a group of
people value singing together who care little about the content of
the songs themselves. The relationship between substantive value
and content is not one of logical necessity. Nonetheless, there is a
high degree of correspondence: content will almost always be
among the aspects of speech substantively valued, and few, if any,
other aspects will as regularly share that position. The self-expression theory should consider content discrimination a particularly
serious issue because of its great potential to interfere with
substantively valued speech from the perspective of the speaker.

268

266 Baker rejects a focus on content because he sees it as tied both to the truth
theory, which focuses on the audience receiving information transfers, see C.E. BAKER,
supra note 255, at 51-52, and to the speech/action distinction, see Baker, supra note
180 at 941. If content is understood in a more non-propositional way and it is
recognized that content cannot exist separate from some form of expressive activity,
then a focus on content may become more consistent with an emphasis on the
speaker's perspective.
267 See C.E. BAKER, supra note 255, at 77-78.
268 See, e.g., id. at 177-80 (discussing cases involving TPM regulation of symbolic
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d. Tolerance Theory
The tolerance theory developed by Lee Bollinger 269 suggests
that free speech is a mechanism .through which we teach ourselves
to tolerate ideas and people that we might otherwise stifle with
irrational zeal. The value of speech, under this theory, is primarily
to the audience that hates the ideas expressed but nonetheless
learns to tolerate them.2 70 This lesson may be learned whether
or not the speaker achieves any satisfaction from the speech. And,
of course, a government regulation silencing the speech will prevent
this education, regardless of the purpose served by the regulation.
The tolerance theory, then, sees the value of speech as primarily to
the audience.
Content discrimination poses a danger to this lesson of audience
tolerance. The reaction of intolerance that must be curbed is most
often directed at content that outrages or offends. A government
regulation falling relatively evenly on various content categories and
silencing none will leave available the speech necessary to learn
tolerance, but a regulation significantly weakening or even silencing
some content categories may rob the audience of its chance to learn
tolerance. Indeed, the lesson is quite likely to be lost, given that the
legislature is most willing to sacrifice unpopular speech categories
to avoid either communicative or noncommunicative harms.
Such legislative motivation indicates a second harm in content
discrimination from the perspective of the tolerance theory: if the
discrimination is motivated by a hatred for the ideas, then it
represents a failure to learn the lesson of tolerance. The tolerance
theory is concerned with our present ability to tolerate, as demonstrated by the legal acts of our representatives, as well as with our
future tolerance. The tolerance theory would, therefore, focus on
the legislative purposes served by a law restricting speech. Any
purpose that relied on the inherent evil of the message, or on the
evil consequences of people either accepting or being offended by
the message, would qualifh as content discrimination deserving of
stricter scrutiny.

271

speech).
269 See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 195.
270 See id. at 8-11.
271 The communicative impact model captures fairly accurately these suspect
government purposes; all of the purposes rejected by the tolerance theory relate to
communicative impacts of the speech. In addition, the communicative impact theory
would catch few motives that do not fall into one of these categories. See Stone, supra
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e. Dissent Theory
In a new book, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance,272 Steven Shiffrin has suggested that one aspect of the first
amendment often overlooked by scholars and jurists is the value of
dissent. Dissent involves a challenge to any "prevailing conventions,
norms, authorities, and institutions," 273 whether political, social,
cultural, economic, or otherwise. Shiffrin criticizes the myopic

focus by both courts and commentators on content discrimination,
defined as a government purpose tied to a communicative effect of
speech.2 7 4 Nonetheless, certain types of content discrimination
do interfere with the values of dissent and are, therefore, suspect in
first amendment terms.
Shiffrin argues for dissent as an important organizing im275
age rather than as a foundation for a set of propositions deductively to be applied to cases. 276 The image of dissent makes its
mark on first amendment analysis by suggesting that where the
values it enshrines are threatened, the first amendment should be
understood to be endangered.2 7 7 The perspective of dissent

note 3, at 217 (arguing that when government regulates based on communicative
impact, it almost invariably relies upon paternalistic or intolerance-based grounds).
One exception to this generalization, although a fairly minor one, is discussed supra
note 178.
272 S. SHIFFRIN, supra note 1.
273 Id. at 86-87.

274 Shiffrin criticizes content discrimination as an organizing principle for first
amendment analysis on three grounds: First, content discrimination, when
understood as a government purpose aimed at a communicative harm, is both underand over-inclusive as a proxy for government hostility to the ideas expressed; second,
first amendment law has, in any event, been concerned with other things besides
government hostility to ideas; and third, government hostility to certain ideas, far
from being per se unconstitutional, has often been accepted as a legitimate basis for
regulations of speech. See id. at 17-24.
I agree with all of these criticisms. The arguments that Shiffrin marshals against
content discrimination as an organizing principle do not apply to the approach I am
suggesting for two reasons. First, my conception of content discrimination is much
broader than the restrictive, government-hostility model that Shiffrin criticizes.
Second, I am not claiming that content discrimination is the only, or even necessarily
the single greatest, concern of the first amendment. When content discrimination is
understood, not as a proxy for government hostility, but as a collection of related
problems making up a part, rather than the whole, of the meaning of the first
amendment, then most of these difficulties are avoided.
275 See id. at 86 (describingit as "another portrait in the first amendment gallery").
276 See id. at 110-39 (discussing the methodological implications of different
approaches to the first amendment and contrasting Kantian and eclectic methods).
277 One does not, in other words, simply ask whether the speech at issue is or is
not dissent, "(as if it had an essence)," but rather "whether the values associated with
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illuminates a number of values, perhaps the most important of
which flow to the dissenter herself. In dissenting, the speaker
affirms her individuality and her integrity.2 7 8 Dissent may also
provide some values to the listening audience or to society more
generally. First, the audience may achieve a greater appreciation of
truth because of the dissenter's challenges to conventional wisdom. 279 And second, society may move more quickly toward
needed social change when stimulated by the criticisms of those who
are unsatisfied with the status quo. 28 0 The value of dissent to the
audience should not, however, be seen simply in its usefulness for
attaining truth or change, but more generally in the constant
challenging of our assumptions that keeps us lively, engaged, and
growing. Finally, the value of dissent also suggests that certain
motives on the part of government regulators of speech may be
28
suspect, such as the desire to suppress dissent. '
If "dissent" referred to a particular category of speech identifiable by its content, then the dissent approach might well endorse
content discrimination that favored that category. 28 2 Although
such a dissent theory might still be suspicious of content-based
regulations for historical reasons, 28 3 it would have no general
objection to content discrimination.
If, however, dissent is
understood as a collection of values and concerns generated by
speech and the regulation of speech, then any speech that serves
those values and any regulation that implicates those concerns,
should raise first amendment scrutiny. Content discrimination is a
dissent are present." Id. at 107.
278 See id. at 90-93. Shiffrin also explains how dissent may be, and usually is, an
act of association rather than of isolation of the individual. He is quite right to
suggest that such an associative aspect helps to assure that the idealization of dissent
will not result in the glorification of atomistic individualism. See id. Nevertheless,
association is not, I think, a part of what is idealized in the image of the dissenter.
Indeed, the ability to maintain a certain critical distance from one's associations lies
at the heart of dissent. I, therefore, do not include association among the values of
dissent to the speaker.
279 See id. at 93-96.
280 See id. at 96-97.
281 Cf. id. at 81 (discussing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), from the
dissent perspective and noting that part of the "first amendment insult" comes from
the fact that the government silenced speech because they found it "unpatriotic,
threatening, and offensive").
282 But see id. at 105-06 (doubting the ability of bureaucrats to distinguish on an
ad hoc basis).
283 That is, most content-based regulations have disadvantaged dissenters rather
than privileged them.
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type of government action that should regularly interfere with those
values and raise those concerns.
First, from the speaker's perspective, any regulation that
interferes with her assertion of integrity and individuality through
speech should receive first amendment scrutiny. Regulations that
impact on the content or message of her speech, as understood by
the speaker, will almost always have this effect because it is generally
through the message that individuality is expressed. Regulations
that impact on an aspect of the speech not intended to be communicative by the speaker are far less likely to have this effect. For
example, O'Brien's expression of his own integrity and individuality
would have been stifled regardless of the government's purpose in
passing the regulation because, from his perspective, burning his
draft card was part of the content or message of his speech. On the
other hand, assuming that the location of the symbolic burning had
no communicative content and that other sites were available, being
told he could not block the steps of the courthouse would have
interfered far less with the function of the speech as an expression
of individuality. Thus, from the perspective of the dissenter,
content discrimination is any government interference with the
content of the message from the speaker's point of view. So
understood, content discrimination deserves strict first amendment
scrutiny because such interference would correlate highly, although
by no means perfectly, with an intrusion on the value of dissent for
the speaker.
From the perspective of the audience, content discrimination is
any government action that has the systematic effect of silencing or
disadvantaging some part of the cacophony of voices and points of
view that keeps the audience on its collective toes. Although a
general silencing would also interfere with the value of dissent for
the audience, the problem with a silencing of only some points of
view is distinct and independently important. The difference is
perhaps best captured by the distinction between apathy and
complacency. If the government silences speech generally, the
danger from the perspective of dissent is that the people will
become apathetic, no longer interested in pursuing truth or
promoting change. With no means of free discussion, they will
simply cease to care about those goals at all. The effect of silencing
only a relatively small number of points of view is rather different.
The people need not become apathetic, but they will very likely
become complacent, at least with respect to those issues on which
the silenced points of view would have challenged them. They may
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well continue to believe in the importance and efficacy of seeking
truth and change, but will rest satisfied with their present positions
on the issues on which dissent has been lost. Thus, apathy and
complacency are distinct and serious harms. From the perspective
of the audience, then, content discrimination poses a real28 4and
independent danger, deserving of first amendment scrutiny.
Finally, some of the danger of content discrimination from the
dissent perspective lies in the government purposes that so regularly
motivate it. As Shiffrin argues, "[t]o accept dissent as a value... is
to assume that wielders of power have advantages in defending their
position and that their use of power is more often self-serving than
they admit-even to themselves." 285 One who accepts the value of
dissent would be suspicious of the government's motives whenever
it interferes with speech. Most obviously, if the first amendment
protects dissent, then it should be a per se constitutional violation
for legislators or administrators to regulate speech in order to
suppress dissent because it threatens their own power. 28 6 More284

When the dissent perspective is compared to the truth theory, an interesting

lack of parallelism occurs. Both positions would see a harm in total silencing (apathy
for one, loss of truth-seeking function for the other), and both would see a harm in
silencing only some points of view (complacency, deception), but only the dissent
perspective suggests an independent harm in lowering the volume of the whole social
conversation without silencing anyone. Within the truth theory, such a general and
evenhanded quieting does not change the relative strengths of the contending points
of view and, therefore, should not affect the ability of the speech "market" to
generate truth. Cf Redish, supra note 4, at 130-31 (raising the issue of whether
silence is a less severe interference with the marketplace of ideas than distortion).
From the dissent perspective, however, there may be value simply in speech's capacity
to rile people up, which may depend on the "loudness" of the speech. "Loudness"
might take the form of quantity of speech, frequency with which the message is
received, or even decibel level. Quieting speech might interfere with its ability to
unsettle its audience and thereby endanger the value of dissent in a way that such
quieting does not endanger the value of truth.
285 S. SHIFFRIN, supra note 1, at 96.
286 Shiffrin has noted that under the dissent theory government does not
automatically violate the first amendment when it acts to silence speech simply
because it is hostile to the content. See id. at 12. Hostility, however, is a very broad
concept that could encompass many of the more specific reasons discussed in the
text. If the government official responsible does not like the content because she
believes it will offend people, or because she believes it will persuade them to behave
badly, then the motive, while suspicious, is not outright unconstitutional. If, on the
other hand, the official is hostile to the content because it threatens her own power,
then the motive is not merely suspicious, but illegitimate. The government, needless
to say, will rarely suggest such a motive. Moreover, this motive will rarely be the only
plausible purpose for a regulation (in which case the Court might be forced to
confront it even if the government did not raise it). In other words, this category of
per se unconstitutional purpose will have little practical significance. The category
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over, suppressing speech because it might offend people should
generally be suspect, since riling people up is part of the value of
dissent.28 7 Finally, the government sometimes suppresses speech
because people might be persuaded by it and behave in ways of
which the government disapproves. If one takes the value of dissent
seriously, however, one might suggest that the government often
uses this reason to silence speech simply in order to bolster its own
power, even when the behavior attacked is neither very dangerous
nor very likely. One response to this suspicion is to raise the level
of review for regulations justified in this way, perhaps by requiring
that the harm be both real and immediate. 288 Thus, the dissent
perspective illuminates aspects of all three types of content
discrimination.
f. Negative Theory

All of the foregoing theories are "positive" ones in that they see
a positive value in speech justifying its special protection. There are
also "negative" theories of free speech, which argue that it is not the
peculiar value of speech but the peculiar danger of censorship that
justifies the special solicitude for free speech. One of the most
289
forceful proponents of the negative view is Frederick Schauer.
Although the concern about content discrimination as an aspect of
the government's motives arises in some of the positive theois, however, consistent with b6th the case law, see Grosjean v. American Press, 297
U.S. 233,250 (1936), and the broader approach to content discrimination suggested
by this Article.
287 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
28
See e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (overruling Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), which had held that speech advocating violence to
effect social change is so dangerous to the security of the state that the government
may outlaw it).
289 See e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 782-83; Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78
Nw. U.L. REV. 1284, 1300-01 (1983) (arguing that the dangers of excess government
regulation justify free speech); Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendrnen 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (arguing that the first amendment is "an embodiment of a
risk-averse distrust of decisionmakers"); see also Cass, The Pefils of Positive Thinking:
ConstitutionalInterpretationand Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1405, 1490 (1987). Schauer is the source of the "positive/negative" terminology. See
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 80-81 (1982).
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ries, 290 the focus on government purpose becomes sharpest in the
291
negative theory.
Both pragmatic and conceptual reasons suggest that giving the
government control over speech is more dangerous than giving it
control over many other human activities. 292
One practical
difficulty arises from the bias or self-interest of the censors. When
speech is regulated because of the danger it poses to the government, allowing the government to fashion the regulations is very
much a case of putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. 293 This
is true whether the government is suppressing speech because the
speech is critical of the government, as in a sedition law, or because
it fears the speech will lead people to behave in ways dangerous to
the government, as in a subversive speech law. The government is
quite likely systematically to overestimate the risk of harm and
undervalue the social utility of such speech. While speech is not
unique in this regard, it is somewhat unusual. The range of
activities, other than speech, that pose so direct a threat to the
persons who make up the government-and who would administer
the regulatory system-is relatively small.- And, as the example of
treason indicates, other such activities may themselves be the subject
of special constitutional protection, perhaps for much the same
29 4
reason.
A second practical difficulty arises from the human desire for
unanimity or consensus. This urge toward intolerance may be
particularly strong with respect to speech, as opposed to other
forms of conduct, because it is so public and demands our attention. We may be prepared to tolerate far more unorthodox
behavior when we do not need to actually see or hear it.
As
Schauer suggests, "if the urge towards intolerance is greater with
290 The tolerance theory would be suspicious of government purposes aimed at
the content of speech, see supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text, as might the
democracy theories, see supra note 254.
291 See Schauer, supra note 9, at 782-83.
292 Other fundamental rights can also be justified in this negative way. For
example, one of the strongest and most common arguments for religious freedom
relies not on the value of religion itself, but on the dangers of government regulation
of religion. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971) (warning that
state entanglement with religion through public aid to parochial schools would
engender destructive political fragmentation along religious lines). Speech may not
be unique, but rather one of a small number of particularly poor subjects for
regulation.
293 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 289, at 81-82.
294 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3.
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respect to speech than with respect to other actions ....
then a Free
Speech Principle may be necessary merely to counter the tendency
295
toward over-regulation."
Finally, there are the conceptual difficulties that the need to
draw distinctions poses in any regulatory scheme. This slippery
slope problem may be particularly serious in the context of
regulating speech because of-the conceptual vagueness of our
categories for dealing with speech, and the counterintuitive
complexity of a scheme that could deal adequately with all of the
relevant variables in a speech situation. 296 While such conceptual
difficulties are a basis for avoiding regulation altogether, they are
also a reason to be especially concerned about improper government motivation. Vagueness and complexity provide convenient
cover under which governments can suppress speech contrary to the
interests of the powerful, or offensive to our desire for unanimity.
The primary focus of the negative theory, then, is on the
dangers posed by government regulation of speech, and, in
particular, regulation based on improper motives.
Content
discrimination under the negative theory would be defined in terms
of government purpose. The communicative impact model fits
quite comfortably with the negative theory as a method for
determining when the government purpose is closely enough tied
to the content of the speech to qualify as content discrimination.
The practical dangers discussed above, which can encourage
government censors to overregulate, are all related to the communicative harms of the speech. When a government regulation of
speech seeks to prevent a communicative harm, it provides a ready
opportunity for the type of government abuse with which the
negative theory is concerned. In addition, these suspect motives
should account for a rather large percentage of regulations aimed
at a communicative harm. Regulations aimed at a communicative
impact of speech should, therefore, receive a stringent level of
judicial review.
295 F. SCHAUER, supra note 289, at 83. It is interesting to note that Bollinger,
focusing on intolerance as ajustification for protection of free speech, does not agree
that we are more intolerant of speech than of other behavior. He argues that
intolerance of both speech and action comes from the same source, namely, a
concern with the mind that lies behind the activity. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 195,
at 110-13. The justification for protecting speech rather than other behavior is that
speech, for a variety of reasons, offers a particularly good arena for the lesson in
tolerance. See id. at 119-24.
296 See F.ScHAUER, supra note 289, at 83-85.
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Clearly, a regulation apparently aimed at a noncommunicative
harm could also be motivated by one of these suspect reasons. For
example, although the local ordinance in Young v. American Mini
Theatres2 97 explicitly cited the noncommunicative harms of crime
and depression of property values, 298 it might well have been
motivated by a desire to suppress speech offensive to the sensibilities of the majority. This possibility suggests that under the
negative theory, even regulations apparently aimed at non-communicative harms should be subject to stringent review. Stringent
review is, however, only warranted where there is reason to believe
that the regulation was in fact motivated by suspect purposes.
Unfortunately, this direct inquiry into motive is blocked by the
Court's consistent refusal in the free speech context to examine the
types of evidence (such a legislative history and common sense)
that would allow one to determine actual motive. 299 Absent such
evidence, it is unreasonable to subject all regulations aimed at
noncommunicative harms-the vast majority of which will be
innocent-to as stringent a review as regulations aimed at communicative harms. 30 0 In light of this restriction on the analysis of
actual motive, the negative theory fits comfortably with the
communicative impact model of governmental-purpose content
discrimination.
g. Summary
Thus, all three types of content discrimination find foundation
and justification in these theories of speech. Governmental purpose
is of concern to the negative theory, the tolerance theory, and the
297

427 U.S. 50 (1976).

298 See id. at 54 n.6, 71 n.34.
299 But see Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). The Court does,
of course, engage in precisely this type of inquiry in other contexts. See, e.g., Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,41 (1980) (looking behind the avowed secular purpose in an
establishment clause case to the pre-eminent "plainly religious" purpose of the state).
300 The Court has, however, sometimes used doctrines such as overbreadth to
examine legislative motive through the back door. See infra notes 305-15 and
accompanying text (discussing analysis of legislative motive). There is, of course, the
relatively simple solution justice Brennan has suggested: the Court could require the
government to regulate noncommunicative effects directly rather than using contentcategories as proxies for the effect. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part). This approach would resolve the American Mini
Theatressituation, but it would not help ferret out suspect motives behind laws that
are already facially directed at noncommunicative effects without any reference to
content, as in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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dissent theory.
Content discrimination from the audience's
perspective is a serious problem within the truth, democracy, and
tolerance theories. And the impact on content from the speaker's
point of view is a major issue in the self-fulfillment theory, one type
of democracy theory, and the dissent theory.
I intend this theoretical discussion to be illustrative rather than
exhaustive in two ways. First, each theory may connect to types of
content discrimination other than the one upon which I have
focused in discussing the theory. For example, both the truth and
democracy theories have implications for the government purpose
type of content discrimination, although I do not discuss those
implications in the text.30 1 Similarly, the truth theory may also
support a view of content discrimination from the perspective of the
speaker, or the self-expression theory may generate a concern about
content discrimination in the form of certain government purposes.
I believe that the connections I have drawn are the strongest and
most important ones, but additional connections would, of course,
simply strengthen the argument for the proposed recognition of all
three types of content discrimination. Second, the theories I discuss
may well suggest that certain types of interference with speech other
than content discrimination also deserve stringent review. For
example, the truth and democracy theories would view a government regulation having the effect of silencing speech broadly across
30 2
content categories as a serious violation of free speech.
The concept of content discrimination offers a foundation for
only part of first amendment doctrine. When the various types of
content discrimination are recognized, however, that foundation is
seen to be an exceptionally secure one. Some of the deep political
commitments giving content to the concept of equality provide an
explanation of the seriousness of the three types of discrimination,
and parallels between first amendment doctrine and equal protection doctrine help to shed light on the significance of equality in the
first amendment context. Also, all of the major theories of the first
amendment accept one or more of the types of content discrimination as very serious threats to free speech. Taken in the aggregate,
01 See supra note 254.

Although it may seem that every theory should find such a broad silencing to
be constitutionally suspect, it is not clear that the negative theory would. Under that
theory, broad effect alone should not be suspect because speech is not necessarily a
particularly valuable social good. Only the type of regulation that might hide an
illegitimate motive should raise such suspicions.
302
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the free speech theories explain and justify all of the types of
content discrimination.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
In the preceding section, I argued that content discrimination, while a central concern of the first amendment, is by no means
a unitary concept. In this section, I will sketch a doctrinal approach
based on recognition of the various types of content discrimination.
The sketch cannot be exhaustive, but I hope that it will provide a
clear outline of one area of the first amendment and the relationship between the different types of content discrimination and
30 3
several other doctrines.
My approach incorporates several general conclusions. First and
most generally, different types of content discrimination raise
different problems and require different doctrinal tools. The issue
here is not simply one of the degree of strictness, although issues of
degree are involved, but rather of tailoring the doctrine to meet the
specific nature of the problem.30 4 Second, contrary to the opinion of every member of the Supreme Court and most of the
commentators, the old lines of TPM and symbolic speech doctrine
are not and should not be a single unified standard. Indeed, these
two types of cases provide an excellent example of my first
conclusion: they involve two different types of content discrimination-from the perspective of the audience in TPM cases and from
that of the speaker in symbolic speech cases-and require different
doctrinal responses. And third, issues of remedy-whether the
regulation should be invalidated on its face or only as applied to
this speaker-also depend in part on the nature of the content
discrimination involved.

303 I will assume that the theoretical background informing interpretation of the
first amendment incorporates elements of all of the free speech theories discussed in
the previous section.
504 See Schauer, supra note 2, at 287 ("We are accustomed to thinking in terms of
levels of protection .... it may be that different categories of speech should be treated
differently, which does not necessarily entail more or less.").
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A. Government Purpose
1. Legislative Purpose
Some government purposes will be per se unconstitutional as
reasons for regulating speech. For example, it should be unconstitutional if the government silences or disadvantages speech because
it believes the ideas expressed to be false and wishes to prevent the
spread of falsehood.30 5 Similarly, it would be illegitimate for the
government to silence speech simply because the speech is critical
of those in power.30 6 The Supreme Court has also indicated that
offensiveness of the ideas expressed, at least where there is no
substantial privacy interest and no exposure to children, may be an
30 7
illegitimate basis on which to silence fully protected speech.
The doctrinal analysis should start by inquiring whether the
regulation serves one of these illegitimate purposes. 308 Such an
inquiry into purpose, however, raises several difficulties. First, there
are the institutional problems of impropriety and futility. It violates
a sense of the dignity of separate branches to allow judicial
inspection of the motives of individual legislators. And there is
305 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964). There are
some important exceptions to this generalization. The government can try to silence
false or misleading advertising because commercial speech does not receive full first
amendment protection. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). The government can also
attempt to silence false and defamatory speech under its libel and slander laws. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974). Here, however, only
statements of fact, and notunprovable statements of opinion or idea, can be the basis
of a suit. This protection for opinions and ideas places a premium on distinguishing
them from facts. After a substantial period of silence on this issue, last term, the
Court finally held that while there is no separate and independent protection for
opinion as such, existing first amendment doctrine does not allow a libel suit based
on statements that are not provable as false, at least where matters of public concern
and a media defendant are involved. See Milkovich v. Lorainjournal Co., 110 S. Ct
2695, 2706 (1990). This position is consistent with the claim in the text that the
government may not attempt to prevent the spread of an idea simply because it
believes it to be false.
s16 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272-73.
307 See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403

U.S. 15, 21-26 (1971). Once again, I am leaving aside the complex issue of lower
value categories of speech. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-48 (1978).
...There are two reasons for beginning with this inquiry. First, identification of
one of this handful of unconstitutional purposes is a reasonably straightforward way
to invalidate a regulation of speech. Second, this ground for invalidation requires a
fairly sweeping remedy, which some alternate line of doctrinal analysis would
probably not provide.
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always the danger that the judiciary will find itself impotent in the
face of legislative dissembling about motives. As Chief Justice
30 9
Warren argued in United States v. O'Brien:
What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is
not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the
stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We
decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which
could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another
legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it.310
Beyond these institutional concerns there is also the practical
difficulty in ascertaining motive. The motives of individuals are
often complex and ambiguous, even to themselves, and such
problems increase exponentially in the case of a legislature that is
both large and full of multi-faceted relationships that may affect
motive. Thus, both institutional and pragmatic reasons counsel
against using personal motives as the basis for an analysis of
legislative purpose.
There is a long-standing debate in the literature over how to
deal with these difficulties. Some commentators have suggested
that the problems are simply not that severe and should not prevent
an examination of actual motives.3 11 Others believe that a distinction can be drawn between motive and purpose, where purpose is
understood in a more objective sense that avoids some of these
pitfalls.3 12 It is unnecessary for me to enter this debate because
309 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
0

2

Id. at 384;seealso Ely, Legislativeand AdministrativeMotivationin Constitutional

Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-17 (1970) (discussing the problems with assessment of
legislative motive).
511

See Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 132-39 (arguing that motive analysis is

appropriate at least where rights of equality are involved, as they are in content
discrimination). See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of UnconstitutionalLegislativeMotive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95.
312 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(asserting that it is possible to find the objective purpose of a statute, but generally
not possible to find the subjective motives of those enactingit); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 209 (1962); Heyman, The ChiefJustice, RacialSegregation, and the
Friendly Critics, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 104, 115-16 (1961); Mac Callum, Legislative Inten4
75 YALE LJ. 754, 756-57 (1966); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1065, 1091 (1969). But see Ely, supra note 310, at 1217-21 (arguing that the
distinction is untenable).
If purpose is defined as the goal that a reasonable person looking at the
regulation would assume it was designed to serve, then this approach is similar,
although not identical, to the O'Brien Court's description of the accepted method in
cases such as Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936): "the inevitable
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either of these responses provides an adequate
foundation for the
313
analysis of the government's purposes.
When the court finds that the purpose of a regulation is an
illegitimate one, the remedy is plain: hold the regulation invalid on
its face, finding it unconstitutional as applied to this speaker, all
speakers, and even to non-speakers. 3 14 When the government
effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional." OBrien, 391 U.S. at
384. "On its face" indicates that the Court does not look at empirical evidence about
actual effects, but rather at what anyone reading the statute would expect its effect
to be. "Inevitable effect" indicates that it is not just any effect that will suffice but
only one which seems to be a necessary and obvious consequence of the statute. The
"objective" conception of purpose would certainly qualify as this type of effect.
" The "objective" conception of purpose may seem to be somewhat at odds with
the theories of free speech that underlie the concern with content discrimination in
the government's purpose. The theories, after all, are concerned with what actually
motivated the government, not with what a reasonable observer might see as the goal
of a regulation. The tension is real, but the "objective" conception of purpose
represents a compromise that should be acceptable to a pragmatic theorist in light
of the institutional and practical difficulties with actual motive.
The compromise is acceptable because it will weed out the worst cases of
legislative abuse, where it is plain even to an outsider that the legislature is attempting
to silence speech for an illegitimate reason. It may also catch a few instances where
the legislature did not intend what seems the 6bvious goal to an outside observer, but
that overinclusiveness is simply a useful prophylactic in the eyes of a negative theorist.
Conversely, it may miss some cases where the legislature cleverly crafts a statute to
hide its invidious motive. The direct inquiry into motive is, however, only the first
line of defense, and these cases of covert content discrimination-if they actually
suppress speech-should be caught by one of the later doctrinal stages.
Only one class of regulations can consistently escape under this conception of
purpose: those laws in which the legislature is cunning enough to try to hide its illicit
motive but incompetent enough that the final product does not in fact have the effect
of silencing or disadvantaging the targeted speech. This failure might be a real cost
from the point of view of a negative theorist; however, given the probably small
number of such cases, the cost should be more than outweighed by the benefit of
avoiding the institutional and pragmatic difficulties of the more "subjective"
conception of purpose that would allow a court to catch these cases.
314 A regulation should rarely have as its plain purpose, on its face, the silencing
of a certain content-category of speech for one of the reasons above and yet also
apply to non-speech activities. Such a situation might, however, be less rare if the
analysis of purpose were to include consideration of the state of affairs under which
the regulation was passed. Such an analysis would not involve an examination of
legislators' personal motives, only of the facts that were common knowledge at the
time. For example, if the Court in 0 Brien had taken account of the existence of mass
dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war and the fact that burning one's draft card had
become a common and well-recognized means of protesting that war, then it might
have seen the legislative purpose rather differently even without examining the
speeches of a handful of legislators. If the Court had in fact recognized that the
legislature's purpose was to silence speech that was critical of government policies and
offensive to some people, then it should have invalidated the regulation as a whole,
even though some of its applications might have been to non-speakers. Congress
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acts to further one of these illegitimate purposes, it acts outside of
its delegated powers and the act is invalid in all of its applications.
There are, however, many government purposes that are
suspicious without being per se unconstitutional.
Indeed, all
government purposes that are aimed at a communicative impact of
speech, but that do not fall into one of the categories of illegitimate
purposes, should be suspect. If one of these suspect (but arguably
legitimate) purposes is behind a regulation of speech, the law,
should not be automatically invalidated, but it should be subjected
to some variant of strict scrutiny. The scrutiny assures that the state
interest is seriously implicated in both the case at hand and the class
of cases addressed by the regulation generally and that the interest
is important enough to warrant the intrusion on speech. If this high
standard is met, then the suspicion about the government's
purposes should be allayed and the regulation upheld. If the
standard is not met, then ithe suspicion that the government is using
the purpose as an excuse to overregulate is confirmed and the law
should be invalidated.
For example, the government may legitimately seek to prevent
speech because it fears that the speech will lead listeners to behave
in dangerous or even illegal ways. Experience has shown, however,
that the government can be far too quick to stifle speech on this
basis, so the justification, while legitimate, is highly suspect.
Traditionally, and quite appropriately, the Court has responded to
this situation by demanding that the government show that the
dangerous behavior is serious, likely, and imminent. 3 15
The
seriousness and likelihood both address the issue of the weight of

could, if it wanted to, pass a new law punishing those who destroy their cards for
other reasons, but specifically exempting speakers.
I recognize that this approach to purpose raises some interesting difficulties. By
what standard must one establish the facts? Which party bears the burden of proof
on this issue? Is it enough to show that something was the case or must one also
show that it was known to the legislature, or even widely known to the public?
Although these issues are important ones for the doctrinal standard I am suggesting,
I will not attempt to answer them here. I do believe that it is worth attempting to
resolve these issues in ways that provide a manageable doctrine, as the alternative is
to leave the Court acting the undignified role of the ostrich.
si5 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (imminent and likely); cf
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(imminent and serious), overruhed, Brandenburg,395 U.S. 444 (1969). Although the
Brandenburg test also requires that the speaker intend to cause the dangerous
behavior, the intent requirement seems to have less to do with concern about the
government's suspicious motives and more to do with concern about the blameworthiness of the individual who will be criminally punished.
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the government interest, while the imminence can be understood as
a question about the efficacy of less speech-restrictive means, like
counter-speech. Thus, the Brandenburgtest can be seen as a variant
of the strict scrutiny "compelling state end/least restrictive means"
standard, modified to deal with the special character of a government interest in preventing behavior caused by speech.
When the purpose is suspect but legitimate, facial invalidation
will not always be appropriate. The question in such cases is
whether the government has given too much weight to other
concerns as against speech. Because the government's concerns
may vary somewhat in strength from case to case, it is possible that
the regulation could be unconstitutional as applied to some
speakers-whose speech, although fitting the statutory category, does
not pose a very great threat-while constitutional as applied to most
in the category. Thus, the remedy might be either invalidation as
applied to all speakers or invalidation as applied only to the present
speaker.
2. Administrative Purpose
The foregoing analysis has been directed exclusively to the
purposes of the legislature, but, as the Court recognized in some of
the earliest free speech cases, the purposes of government administrators can also raise content discrimination concerns. The laws at
issue in this series of cases were facially content-neutral-for
example, requiring all distributors of any type of literature to obtain
permission from the city manager 3 16-but the Court was worried
about the broad discretion they gave to government officials. The
Court's suspicion of such discretion arose, in large part, from its
fear that officials would use their power to discriminate among
speakers based upon the content of their speech.3 17 Indeed, in
3 ls
Cox v. New Hampshire,
one of the cases in which the Court

upheld a licensing scheme, the Court emphasized the limiting
construction placed on the statute by the highest state court: "the
316 See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 445 (1938).
317 See e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecti-

cut, 310 U.S. 296,305-06 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,516 (1939); Lovel4 303

U.S. at 451; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1941) (describing
the previous cases as involving licensing or permit schemes which created a risk of
official censorship). Of course, the fact that such licensing schemes were the classic
form of prior restraints provided an additional source of concern. See, e.g., Cantwel4
310 U.S. at 306; Lovel4 303 U.S. at 451-52.
318 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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court held that the licensing board was not vested with arbitrary
power or an unfettered discretion; that its discretion must be
exercised with 'uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of
each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination.'"3 19 In addition, the Court
specifically found that the board had acted within these limits:
"[t]here is no evidence that the statute has been administered
otherwise than in the fair and non-discriminatory manner which the
3 20
state court has construed it to require."
This concern with censorship is not an assessment of the
purpose of the state or local legislature in passing the regulation.
The Court has either accepted the government's assertion that the
laws were aimed at noncommunicative harms, like litter or public
safety, 32 1 or refused to consider the legislature's motive at
all.322 The censorship problem arises from the actual or potential
discrimination by officials administering the regulation, not the
legislature's purpose.
Evidence of impermissible administrative motive should activate
the same standard of review as evidence of the same type of
legislative motive. The remedy, on the other hand, would be
different. 3 23
Since administrative motive may vary with each
instance of application, while legislative motive colors the whole
regulation, a finding in favor of the speaker on the issue of illicit
administrative motive should lead to invalidation of the regulation
as applied to this speaker rather than on its face.
3. Vagueness
The possibility of illicit administrative purpose does raise
another issue, which forms a kind of bridge between concerns about
content discrimination in. the government's purpose and content
discrimination in the impact on the speaker. The outlines of that
issue become clearer when we examine why the Court invalidates
regulations based on the possibility of government abuse, even when
there is no evidence that any abuse has actually occurred. 2 4
319 Id. at 576.
320 Id. at 577.
321 See, e.g., Cantwel4 310 U.S. at 307; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162
322 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).

(1939).

323 If the administrators were moved by illegitimate purposes, then their action
should be struck down automatically; if their motives were suspect but not
illegitimate, then their action should be subject to strict scrutiny.
324 There was evidence of abuse in some of these cases, see e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307
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Assume that there is no content discrimination in either the
legislators' or the administrators' purposes, but the regulation is
open-ended and vague. What, then, is the danger to speech that
justifies striking down the regulation? The danger lies partially in
the harm that could be occasioned by a future illegitimate government motive, and in the practical difficulties facing the Court if it
were to attempt to distinguish in a particular case between a
legitimate exercise of discretion and a discriminatory denial of
permission.3 25 But there is also a harm that has nothing to do
with the government's motives: even if the government's motives
are perfectly pure from its own perspective, from the speaker's
perspective, vague and discretionary licensing generates a silencing
fear and encourages self-censorship, particularly of controversial or
unpopular contents. One important result of this anticipatory selfcensorship is that the audience may lose the opportunity to hear
speech with these less common viewpoints. It is, of course, this
danger of content discrimination from the perspective of the
speaker and audience, described by the Court as the "chilling" of
speech, that has long been at the heart of the explanation for the
Court's insistence on clarity and precision in the regulation of
3 26

speech*

There are three differences between this type of vagueness
analysis and the direct assessment of administrative purpose. First,
administrators can act out of illegitimate or suspect purposes even
when the guiding regulation is, perfectly clear and non-discretionary;3 27 an argument about present administrative purpose does
not require a showing of vagueness or discretion in the regulation
itself. Second, the remedy for an unconstitutionally vague or
discretionary regulation must be facial invalidation (if no clarifying
construction is possible) because the chill continues as long as the
regulation remains in operation. The harm, unlike in the case of a
present unconstitutional administrative purpose, inheres not in the
U.S. 496, 505 (1939) (noting findings that officials enforced a policy of forbidding
communications of views regarding the National Labor Relations Act), but such

evidence was noticeably lacking in others. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
559 (1948); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 157-59, 163-64 (1939).
-25

See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988).

326 See id. at 757-58; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); cf. Schneider,
308 U.S. at 164 (describing the licensing examination as "burdensome and
inquisitorial" and indicating a concern that it could intimidate speakers into silence).
327 For example, a local official consistently might find that civil rights marchers
do not meet the clear and non-discretionary standard of order and convenience that
is the precondition for a license to parade.

704

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:615

particular application, but simply in the continued existence of the
regulation. And third, the harm caused by vagueness has as much
(or more) to do with content discrimination from the speaker's
perspective as with content discrimination in the government's
purpose.
On the surface, vagueness and discretion appear to be problematic because of the risk of hypothetical (presently nonexistent) illicit
administrative motives. This superficial concern appears to connect
vagueness and discretion to the type of content discrimination that
exists in the government's purpose. The serious, present harm in
vagueness and discretion lies, however, in the concept of chill, a
concept more closely related to content discrimination from the
speaker's perspective.
Chill implicates content discrimination
through the mechanism of self-censorship by speakers who perceive
administrators as a threat, and it inheres in the speaker's view of
what the government is doing-and the consequent impact of the
regulation on the speaker's behavior-rather than in the government's own purposes. Curing or avoiding chill requires changing
the regulatory scheme so that speakers no longer feel threatened
rather than changing the motives of government actors, who, by
hypothesis, need not actually be discriminating. Thus the issues of
vagueness and discretion form a bridge between the content
discrimination residing in a bad government purpose and the
content discrimination occurring in the impact of the regulation on
3 28
the speaker.

328 Overbreadth, although often coupled with vagueness, raises distinct and
unrelated issues. In its more colloquial usage, overbreadth refers simply to the lack
of fit between the regulatory means chosen by the government and the goal they are
intended to serve. This tailoring issue is relevant, in varying degrees, to all types of
speech regulation.
In its more technical usage, overbreadth refers to an exception to the usual
standing requirements that allows a person-whose own behavior could constitutionally be regulated-to raise the free speech claims that a third party might make against
the law at issue. Because those speakers to whom the regulation could not
constitutionally be applied might be silenced by its very existence, we allow the party
before the Court to raise these third-party claims.
This type of chill is, however, distinct from that involved in vagueness, and
generally will be unrelated to content discrimination. The category of speech chilled
by vagueness is likely to be defined by the content of the speech because speakers are
more likely to fear government censorship of controversial or unpopular views than
commonplace and popular ones. The chill in overbreadth, on the other hand, arises
from the fact that the regulation does, in fact, prohibit the contemplated speech and
the would-be speakers are disinclined to break the law in order to test its constitutionality. The category of speech chilled is that category actually, and unconstitutionally,
covered by the law, which need not be defined in terms of content. For example, the
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B. Impact on the Speaker

If neither an illegitimate nor a suspect government purpose is
present-the regulation is aimed at a noncommunicative harm-and
the law is neither too vague nor too discretionary, then the doctrine
should next explore the impact of the regulation on the speech act
from the perspective of the speaker. A regulation may affect a
communicative aspect of the speech or a facilitative aspect or both.
If the regulation affects a communicative aspect-a part of the
speech that actually expresses a message-then it strikes at the
content from the speaker's point of view and merits a fairly high
standard of review.
All true symbolic speech cases, where the government is
concerned about an activity that causes a noncommunicative harm
and the speaker chooses to use that activity as a means of symbolic
expression, will fall into this category.329 Indeed, it is precisely
this impact on an expressive rather than a facilitative aspect of the
speech that distinguishes symbolic speech cases from TPM cases.
The two lines can look identical in terms of the government
purposes at issue and the impact on the marketplace of speech. It
is the failure to attend to the difference in their impact on the
speaker that has led courts and commentators to collapse the two
330
sets into one category of cases.
regulation could legitimately prohibit parades in a certain part of town, but be
overbroad in also prohibiting street-corner oratory. All street-corner speakers might
be chilled by this law, regardless of the content of their speech. Thus overbreadth
has no regular correlation with content discrimination.
329 But cf. Friedman, supranote 9, at 593 (discussing a broad collection of reasons
why one might engage in symbolic speech, not all of which would qualify for the
protection proposed here).
When the government is aiming at a communicative harm, the regulation is also
very likely to impact on a communicative aspect of the speech. These cases will,
however, already have been disposed of by the previous prong of the analysis dealing
with the government's purpose. The standard of review under that prong is at least
as high as under the one now being considered, so there is no need to consider such
cases again from the speaker's point of view. Thus I will consider here only those
cases where the government's purpose is noncommunicative but the regulation
nonetheless impacts on a communicative aspect of the speech.
3.. See id. at 601 (arguing that the focus must be on the speaker's purposes rather
than only the government's purposes). Recognizing this difference between the two
types of cases also helps to dispel the lingering effects of the "speech plus" doctrine.
The question is not whether we have an instance of "pure speech" or of "speech
plus." As many commentators have noted, all speech is "speech plus" something:
noise if it is oral, litter if it is written, etc. The real question concerns not the size of
the "plus" part, but the relationship between the message and the "plus." See Henkin,
supranote 185, at 79-80 (arguing that the constitutionally significant distinction is that
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The difference between symbolic speech cases and TPM cases
has some important doctrinal implications. First, the "adequate
alternatives" branch of the TPM test is inapplicable in symbolic
speech cases. Where the regulation impacts on an expressive aspect
of speech, there are no adequate alternatives. It is true that verbal
and written means of expression are left open when symbolic speech
is foreclosed. But saying "I hate and resist the Vietnam war" was no
more an adequate alternative for O'Brien 33 1 than if Thomas
Jefferson had been forced to write that "The tree of liberty must be
refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and very bad
rulers."3 32 An alternate content is never an adequate alternative.
What makes this test relevant in the TPM context is precisely the
fact that content, at least from the speaker's perspective, is not at
issue.
The second doctrinal implication of this difference is that, all
other things being equal, 3 3 the standard of review for a symbolic
speech case should be stricter than for a TPM case. Although this
conclusion violates the accepted wisdom in the field,3 34 it is
required by the recognition that symbolic speech cases involve a
type of content discrimination which is absent from TPM cases.
Indeed, the content-discriminatory impact in symbolic speech cases

between "conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of conduct"). If the
physical activity about which the government is concerned is expressive, we have a
symbolic speech case; if it is facilitative, we have a TPM case.
331 Indeed, even burning a facsimile of his draft card, would not necessarily have
been an adequate alternative. See Redish, supra note 4, at 148 (suggesting that
burning a copy of the card would not have been as effective, not because of the
illegality, but because burning the actual card demonstrated a rejection of the
authority of the U.S. government). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 12-23, at 983
(suggesting that the only reason that burning a copy of the card is less effective is
because that act is legal and furthermore, that reliance on an act's illegality to
establish its unique effectiveness is impermissible).
32 He, of course, wrote "tyrants." T.JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON: WRMNGS 911 (M.
Peterson ed. 1984) (reprinting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William S. Smith

(Nov. 13, 1787)).

333 In particular, assuming there is no content-discriminatory impact on the
speech market available to the audience. Such an impact would itself be a form of
content discrimination deserving of stricter scrutiny. As I will discuss in the next
subsection, the TPM test as it presently stands is an adequate mechanism for
determining when such an impact is likely to be present. A TPM regulation that does
not cause such an impact is content-neutral in all three senses and is therefore
deserving of less scrutiny than a regulation that discriminates against certain content
from the point of view of the speaker.
334 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8
(1984); Day, IncidentalRegulation, supra note 18, at 493 n.6; Werhan, supra note 18,
at 642-46.
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should, it would seem, require some version of strict scrutiny if the
various types of content discrimination are to be treated as equally
serious. After all, both parts of the strict scrutiny test address issues
that would be relevant in justifying the intrusion here: the weight
of the government's interest and the fit between the means chosen
and the end served. The strict scrutiny test simply demands the
highest level of justification on both of these points: the state end
must be compelling and it must be served through the least
restrictive means.
It would be impracticable to invalidate all the regulations that
fall into this category unless they meet the high strict scrutiny
standard, because almost any activity could be used in an expressive
way by someone. The whole range of government regulation would
then be vulnerable. Such an approach would essentially eliminate
the much lower standard of review traditionally applied to regulations-like most of the ones in symbolic speech cases-that only
rarely have anything to do with speech.
There are two fairly straightforward ways to avoid this difficulty.
The first, and simplest, is to reduce the stringency of the standard
of review. It is possible to read United States v. O'Brien33 5 as
having done precisely that: the required government interest went
from "compelling" to "substantial" or "important,"3 36 and the fit
requirement, at least in its application if not in its wording, was
considerably less stringent than in the strict scrutiny standard. 3 7
Certainly, the later cases applying the O'Brien standard fall far short
33 8
of strict scrutiny.
Nonetheless, I think the O'Brien standard, as resuscitated in my
approach, should be interpreted as essentially equivalent to strict
scrutiny. The first reason for this interpretation is that it is the best
reading of the O'Brien case itself. The standard calls for an
"important or substantial" government interest. In the sentence
immediately preceding this statement of the test, the Court
describes its precedent as "employ[ing] a variety of descriptive
terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent;
strong." 33 9 This list-and the fact that the cases cited for each
term are all strict scrutiny cases-suggests that the Court did not see
335 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
3 6
1 Id. at 376-77.
337 See id. at 382.
38
3 See e.g., Wayte v. United

States, 470 U.S. 598, 610-14 (1985).
9 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
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a real difference between the traditional "compelling" interest
required for strict scrutiny and the "substantial" interest required
under O'Brien. Similarly, the language of the test calls for the
restriction of first amendment freedoms to be "no greater than is
essential to the furtherance"3 40 of the state interest. It is difficult
to discern in the wording of this phrase any meaningful difference
from the traditional strict scrutiny standard, which requires that the
government use the "least restrictive means" of furthering its
goal.3 41 The O'Brien standard, in both its phrasing and in the
background explanation that the Court offers, is simply a version of
strict scrutiny.
Two apparently contradictory aspects of O'Brien must be
explained in order to support this interpretation. First, the Court
states that O'Brien's behavior involved both speech and nonspeech
elements, apparently indicating that such mixed behavior was not
deserving of as much protection as "pure speech."3 42 The response is simply that the "speech plus" language has functioned in
the Court's opinions almost exclusively as a makeweight; it never
developed as the basis for an identifiable, different standard of
review and should not be so taken here. Indeed, in O'Brien itself,
the Court eschewed reliance on the speech/action distinction and
assumed that the burning of the draft card was protected
3 43
speech.
The second, and stronger, objection to my interpretation comes from the fact that the Court applied the standard in the
O'Brien case in a much more lenient way than would be expected
from strict scrutiny review. That leniency appears, however, to arise
from the Court's concern over the seemingly endless variety of
behavior that could come under the protection of the first amendment as symbolic speech.:34 4 If the "slippery slope" was, in fact,
the Court's concern, then the appropriate response would have
been to design a fairly restrictive test for the behavior that can
qualify as symbolic speech. The Court in fact adopted such a test
at 377.
Ely, supra note 9, at 1484-85.
342 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
343 See id.
340 Id.
341 See

344 See id. As Steven Shiffrin has pointed out, the Supreme Court knows how to
write a toothless test when it wants to, and O'Brien, on its face, is not one. Also, the

Court often has allowed lower federal courts to apply the O'Brien test fairly strictly.
See S. SHIFFRIN, supra note 1, at :184 n.97, 187 n.122. These facts indicate that the
Court recognized the potential stringency of the test it designed even while it applied
the test toothlessly.
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in Spence v. Washington.a45 Once the category of symbolic speech
is restricted, however, the high standard suggested by O'Brien is
both less threatening and more suitable.
There are other reasons for interpreting the O'Brien standard as
a strict scrutiny variation, in addition to the language of the opinion
itself. One of these is that a high standard of review best fi6 with
the coequal status of the different types of content discrimination.
Unless one is prepared to eliminate some of the theories of speech,
or to rank them in importance, there is no basis for believing that
discrimination in the government's purpose is more troubling in
first amendment terms than is discrimination from the speaker's or
audience's point of view. The standard of review for all three types
of content discrimination should, therefore, be comparable in
severity even if different in detail.3 46
Finally, it is unnecessary to weaken the O'Brien test because
another means exists to avoid the damaging effect such a stringent
test would have on the vast range of regulations that might impact
on symbolic speech: the nature of the remedy may be altered. The
remedy in a symbolic speech case should not be invalidation of the
whole regulation, or even invalidation as applied to all speakers, but
only an exemption for those speakers upon whom the regulation
acts to restrict an expressive aspect of speech. For example, in my
315 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (reversing conviction for "improper use" of a
United States flag, stating that "[a]n intent to convey a particularized meaning was
present and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it").
346 It would, of course, be possible to offer an argument for the reduced
importance of some of the theories of speech. The different types of content
discrimination would then properly receive different levels of review depending on
the importance of the theories that recognize each type. Although I see no reason
to offer such an argument, it would not alter the basic point of this Article: there are
different types of content discrimination; they are all constitutionally suspect (even
if not equally so); and they each require a particular doctrinal response tailored to
their particular characters.
Eliminating certain theories altogether would, of course, have a much greater
effect on my argument. If enough of them were eliminated, it might be that only one
or two of the three types of content discrimination would remain. For example, if
only negative theories were accepted, then both the audience's and speaker's
perspectives might become irrelevant. Only government purpose discrimination
would continue to seem very important. This approach might, therefore, generate
something akin to the present state of the doctrine. Nonetheless, a total reliance on
negative theory will not explain the present doctrine because the Court consistently
has relied upon positive theories as well as negative ones. See, e.g., New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964). Unless the Court is prepared to
abandon the positive theories it has so long endorsed, it must broaden its conception
of content discrimination to include all three types.
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hypothetical concerning the two student groups, 347 neither persons who build fires for noncommunicative reasons (burning trash),
nor the students who used the fire as a facilitative aspect of their
speech (to draw a crowd) would receive an exemption. The high
standard of review should apply only in the case of speakers like the
Chinese students, for whom the fire was itself expressive of their
message, and if the regulation fails, only those speakers should
348
receive an exemption.
There are several objections that can be, and have been, raised
against this type of exemption. First, there is whatJustice Marshall,
dissenting in Clark, called "the imposter problem": the danger that
persons who wish to engage in a'prohibited activity for noncommunicative reasons will pretend to be symbolic speakers in order to
qualify for the exemption.3 49 The government would then be
forced to assess the sincerity of each speaker's motives in order to
determine whether he or she is entitled to the exemption. But as
Justice Marshall pointed out, the various branches of government
have had some experience with such assessments already: the free
exercise clause of the first amendment has, until recently, afforded
similar exemptions, but only when a sincerely held religious belief
would be violated by the required or prohibited action.35 0 The
347 See supra text accompanying notes 182-87.
348 As a result, the relevant daas to consider in assessing the government's interest
is neither the present speaker alone, in which case the interest would almost always
be quite small, nor all possible violators of the regulation, in which case the interest
very often would be quite large. The relevant class is the class of potential violators
who have the same type and strength of first amendment claim as the present
speaker. For further discussion of this issue, see Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,296-97 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1980).
349 Clark, 468 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J, dissenting); see also Stone, supra note 20,
at 76-77 (noting that content-neutral analysis "comes at the cost of encouraging
strategic behavior by people who want to violate laws").
350 See Clark, at 307 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215-16 (1972)). This whole line of free exercise cases, beginning with Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), has been called into question by the recent decision
in Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). The Court held in Smith that
a member of the Native American Church, who sincerely believed that his religion
required him to take peyote as part of certain religious rituals, was not entitled to an
exemption from the state's generally applicable criminal law prohibiting the use of
that drug. Along the way to this conclusion, the majority opinion denied that free
exercise doctrine ever included religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.
See id. at 1600. The Court reinterpreted the earlier cases, including Sherbert and
Yoder, in narrower ways. Admittedly, the Smith case is strong evidence (if any was
necessary) that the Court is unlikely to adopt the approach that I am suggesting in
the free speech context, having just abandoned it in the free exercise context.
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analogous inquiry in the symbolic speech context would require the
government to ask whether the person seeking the exemption
sincerely wished to engage in the activity for reasons relating to
speech. This inquiry would, of course, rely heavily on the petitioner's own statements about her purpose, but also could consider both
statements and actions of the would-be speaker in other contexts
that shed light on the sincerity of her motives.3 5 1 Indeed, there
have been some fairly obvious attempts by "imposters" to take
advantage of the exemptions in the free exercise context, but all
easily were prevented.3 5 2 And there does not seem to have been
any of the "floodgates" effect that the government purports to fear.
There is no reason to believe that such an effect would be more
likely in the speech context than in the religion context.35 3
In light of my proposed approach, however, the analogy to free
exercise of religion is not entirely fair. After having enquired into
the sincerity and speech-relatedness of the would-be speaker's
motives, the government must, in the speech context, go a step
further and determine whether the activity at issue is actually an
expressive aspect of the speech or merely facilitative. There is no
354
analogue to this step in the free exercise context.
Nonetheless, the majority in Smith is considerably less than candid when it claims that
such exemptions were not a part of the free exercise doctrine before this year.
Therefore, I believe that it is both relevant and valid to look to the experience with
free exercise exemptions over the past 25 years in order to assess the practicality of
free speech exemptions.
s51 Consider these comments:
[M]any of our actions [can] be understood only in relation to a norm....
There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday and refusing the
sacraments, between having a snack and desecrating the fast of Yom Kippur,
between banking a check and refusing to pay your income tax. In each case
an act signifies something new and powerful when we understand that the
act is in reference to a norm.
Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 7-8 (1983) (footnotes
omitted).
352 See, e.g., State v. Randall, 540 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting
the claim for an exemption for the use of marijuana, LSD, and hashish by the
members of the Aquarian Brotherhood Church).
353 Indeed, the "imposter" argument depends upon the assumption that some
substantial number of potential imposters will go to the trouble of discovering the
current state of first amendment doctrine before they engage in the prohibited
activity. Without such advance preparation, it would be very difficult for the imposter
to tailo her story to the very particular issue of constitutional concern: the contentdiscriminatory impact on the speaker.
s54 The analogy is quite fair when used byJustice Marshall in his dissent in Clark
because neither he nor the majority sees any need to treat expressive and facilitative
aspects of speech differently.
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This additional inquiry will, undoubtedly, increase the difficulty
for the government, but it should not render the approach
unworkable. First, because there is substantial protection against
interference with facilitative aspects of speech, 55 less is at stake
for would-be speakers, and there is less of an incentive to pretend
than there might be on issues that would eliminate the constitutional protection altogether.356 Indeed, if the impact on the facilitative aspect is severe enough to cause content discrimination from
the audience's perspective, then the standard of review should be
identical. 57
It is important to recognize the limits of this incentive argument. Some activities may be so consistently rewarding to such a
large group of people that the incentive to pretend will remain
strong regardless of the alternatives. For example, many people no
doubt would feel compelled to undertake a symbolic refusal to pay
their income taxes.
Similarly, some laws simply will become
unworkable or inequitable if exemptions are allowed. The Court
has dealt with these sorts of difficulties in the free exercise context
by simply refusing exemptions to certain laws, such as the tax
laws.35 8 I see no reason why the same approach would not suffice
in the speech context.
Second, while any aspect of speech conceivably could be
intended to be symbolic-including the time, place, or manner of
the speech-intention alone is insufficient to make an aspect
symbolic rather than facilitative. In order to qualify as symbolic
speech, the activity, in its context, must be such that some intended
audience is reasonably likely to understand its symbolic significance.359 This objective requirement places some limits on the
pretenses of imposters.
Suppose I wished to march down Main Street at rush hour with
the message "Vote forJoe and make our town a nuclear free zone."
I have chosen that hour because I believe it will get me the largest
audience. I could attempt to construct some explanation of why the
hour and location are themselves symbolically communicative of my
355 See infra notes 361-74 & 387-405 and accompanying text.
356 For example, issues such as whether the motive is sincerely communicative,
or-in the free exercise context-sincerely religious.
357 See infra notes 361-71 and accompanying text.
358 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982) (rejecting claim by
Amish employer, who was exempt from paying his own social security tax, for
exemption on religious freedom grounds with respect to his employees).
35 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
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message, albeit a rather far-fetched explanation. But, in the context
of my whole behavior-my posters. and shouts of "Vote for Joe and
make our town nuclear free"-no audience is likely to perceive the
time and place of the demonstration as symbolic. I could, of
course, change the surrounding context in ways that would make
the symbolic message of the time and place clear enough that the
audience would perceive it. For example, I could put something on
my posters like, "Move forward withJoe-he will march through the
city's most tangled problems" and argue that the traffic congestion
of rush hour will symbolically represent the tangled problems as we,
Joe's campaign, march through it. If I were willing to alter my
communication in that way, however, it would indicate that my
concern for the time was in fact related to its message, at least in
part, and not merely a ruse to reach a larger audience. It is, in
other words, always within the power of the speaker to make the
symbolic speech claim credible, but the cost in terms of the real
message often will be high enough to dissuade imposters from the
effort.
The second objection to this exemption approach is that it is
itself a type of content discrimination: exemptions are available to
some speakers, because of the content of their speech, and not to
others. 3 60 This charge is true, in a technical sense, but it misses the
360 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 619-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative

Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Lee, supra note 181, at 770. But see Wat 703
F.2d at 598 nn.31-32 (the majority's response).

Perhaps because of a fear of content discrimination, the Court generally has
refused to provide exemptions from regulations that it classifies as content-neutral,

even for those who have a special interest in the behavior limited. The only notable
exceptions to this generalization involved political campaign regulations that posed

a very serious threat to the continued existence of a minor party,

see

Brown v.

Socialist Workers Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982) (holding that the first
amendment requires exemption from the campaign disclosure rule), and a municipal
ordinance requiring disclosure of membership lists, see Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 527 (1960) (holding that the first amendment requires an exemption for groups
who can demonstrate harm to associational rights from disclosure). Cf. Stone &
Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the FirstAmendmen
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583, 589-92 (arguing that the exemption provided in the Brown
case turned a content-neutral statute into a content-based one). Stone and Marshall
argue that this extraordinary remedy was appropriate in these limited cases, but only
because the exceptionally severe impact of disclosure requirements on unpopular
groups might actually destroy those groups. See id. at 607-13. This position is related
to the issue I consider in the next subsection: what is the appropriate remedy when
the regulation leaves the speaker with no adequate alternatives? That is one of the
central questions in dealing with a TPM case. In this section, however, I am
concerned with the quality of the impact as content discrimination from the speaker's
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point of my argument. The exemption is given to everyone who can
make a claim Qf content discrimination, regardless of the subject
matter or viewpoint she is expressing, and to no one else. A
speaker can only make that claim if the content of her speech is
connected in a certain -way to the activity at issue-the activity
symbolically communicates the content-but that connection does
not set any predetermined limits on subject matter or viewpoint.
Even if the connection did correlate systematically with certain
subjects or viewpoints, this exemption approach would be appropriate. The situation would then be analogous to one in which a law
has two separate provisions, one facially content-based and one
content-neutral. If the content-based provision is struck down, then
all those whose speech involved the prohibited content category
would be freed from that impact of the law. They would still have
to obey the content-neutral part of the law, but their situation would
be better than it was before. Those whose speech did not involve
the prohibited category, however, would be in exactly the same
position as before because the invalid provision never affected them
at all. The same is true of the content-discriminatory impact on the
speaker: those who experience it are freed from it by exemptions
and those who never experienced it are left in exactly the same
position they were in before. The exemption singles out content
categories for a special benefit only in the sense that invalidating a
content-discriminatory law singles out that category for the special
benefit of no longer being particularly harmed.
When a regulation restricts the content of speech from the
speaker's viewpoint, it must be tested by a very high standard of
review. The O'Brien standard-as written rather than as applied-is
an appropriate one for this purpose. The potentially disruptive
implications of this strict review are reduced substantially by
limiting the remedy to an exemption for the class of speakers who
experience this content-discriminatory effect. The symbolic speech
line of doctrine thus serves a special and important role in remedying one type of content discrimination.

point of view, rather than with the quantity of the impact on the speech market
available to listeners. See id. at 610, 625-26 (pointing out that the effect on the speech
market is the central issue). In other words, I am considering symbolic speech cases
here rather than TPM cases. As Dean Stone has recognized elsewhere, exemptions
in a symbolic speech situation do not necessarily involve the court in drawing lines
explicitly in terms of the content of the speech: anyone who undertakes the activity
as speech, regardless of the message, would get the exemption. See Stone, supranote
20, at 71 n.111.
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C. Impact on the Audience

If neither the government's purpose nor the impact on the
speaker is content-discriminatory, then the next question should be
whether the impact on speech available to the audience is contentdiscriminatory.361 Content discrimination in this context means
that the result of the regulation is systematically to silence or
disadvantage certain content categories of speech. Some regulations
that affect only facilitative aspects of speech-that is, TPM regulations-will, nonetheless, make speech concerning certain content
categories consistently difficult or impossible. Such regulations are
an example of this third type of content discrimination and deserve
62

strict scrutiny.3

A direct inquiry into the general content effect of a regulation
would, however, be both difficult and troubling. Such an inquiry
would require the Court to determine not only how the regulation
affects the speaker, but also whether there are other speakers
offering messages with the same content and how the regulation
could affect them. The Court would be forced to consider other
speakers because, from the audience's perspective, it does not
matter whether everyone speaks, but only whether everything gets
said. 63 The prospect of the Court's deciding whose speech is
equivalent to-and replaceable by-someone else's raises serious first
amendment concerns in its own right. And the determination of
how the regulation affects such alternate speakers would be terribly
time consuming and, in the end, often highly speculative.
Once again, the doctrine resolves this dilemma with a compromise between the theoretical concerns over content discrimination
and the pragmatic (and perhaps constitutional) limitations of the
institution. In the TPM context this compromise is'the adequatealternatives branch of the test, which asks whether the particular
speaker has adequate avenues of speech available other than those
foreclosed by the regulation. The doctrine establishes a presumption that every speaker has something unique to say, so that there
is no question of replacing one voice with another. The impact on
other speakers becomes irrelevant to the question of whether the
-61 The first branch of the traditional TPM test-that the regulation be contentneutral-can be understood as a requirement that the two other types of content
discrimination previously discussed already have been ruled out.
362 See Karst, supra note 31, at 36-37.
363 See A. MEIKLEJoHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 245, at 27. But cf. Karst,
supranote 31, at 40 (claiming that even repetition sends a message of wide support).
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If the speaker

has adequate alternative channels of communication available, then
there is no content-discriminatory effect from the audience's
perspective because the speaker will remain able to convey her
message to them. If, on the other hand, the speaker does not have
adequate alternatives, then we must presume that whatever was
unique in this speaker's'message will be lost to the audience. From
the perspective of free speech theory, this approach might overprotect: some speakers whose messages could be duplicated elsewhere
will, nonetheless, receive protection.
Such overprotection is
necessary in order to consider the impact of speech on the audience
without creating serious constitutional and practical problems.
The definition of an adequate alternative must be constructed
realistically in light of the characteristics of the particular speaker
in each case.3 65 Nonetheless, some general comments are possible. First, the adequacy of the alternative and its availability are
distinct issues; a failure of either should be decisive. To be found
adequate, an alternative channel of communication must reach
roughly the same audience-in size and character-and must not
predictably distort the message the speaker wishes to send-for
example, by making it shorter or less detailed than the foreclosed
channel.366 To be considered available, the alternative must not
place the speaker at the mercy of potentially hostile "gatekeepers,"
public or private, and must not use substantially more of the
speaker's resources than the activity foreclosed by the regulation.367 These two requirements are fairly stiff and should serve
to put some teeth back into the adequate alternatives test.
This approach is far from easy or determinate. Difficulties arise
because it is not possible to prove a negative on this issue: the
speaker could never demonstrate to a logical certainty that no
alternative exists because the possible alternatives are practically
infinite. It is appropriate, therefore, to place on the speaker only
the prima facie burden of showing that the most obvious or
reasonable alternatives are unavailable. The burden should then

36 It remains relevant, however, to the question of the breadth-of the appropriate
remedy. See infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
365 See Quadres, Content-NeutralPublicForum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic
State Interes4 the Fall ofJudicialScrutiny, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 439, 481 (1986).
366 See Redish, supra note 4, at 143.
367 See Lee, supra note 181, at 806. See generallyWright, The Unnecessaty Complexity
of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L.
REV. 57, 77-88 (1989).
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shift to the government to prove that some adequate alternative
remains.
One of the likely results of putting some teeth back into the
adequate alternatives standard is that bans on whole formats of
speech will be more effectively controlled. When the government
forbids an entire format (e.g., no sound trucks) it wipes out a rather
large avenue of communication. It may often be possible for
speakers to show that no other format provides them with roughly
the same audience without costing substantially more. If, on the
other hand, the government restricts a format without totally
eliminating it (no sound trucks in residential areas between the
hours of 5 p.m. and 9 a.m.) then the speaker has the more difficult
task of showing why the remaining uses of the format are insufficient (sound trucks in business areas and in residential areas during
the permitted hours). This is a question of degree. There is no
clear line between a ban and a regulation; there is, instead, a
continuum defined by the amount of opportunity restricted. The
adequate-alternatives test responds directly to this important
variable rather than relying on inaccurate and simplistic categorization. 68 Because this test addresses precisely the issue of concern
in format bans, it could be a useful tool in controlling them.
If the Court determines that no adequate alternatives exist, then
it must subject the regulation to a strict scrutiny standard. Only if
the rule narrowly serves a compelling state interest is the contentdiscriminatory impact on speech justified. The Court can only
determine the extent of the state interest, however, after it has
decided whether the appropriate remedy is facial invalidation or
exemption, because the remedy will determine the number of
3 69
people who will be authorized to flout the government policy.
368 Justice

Brennan has suggested that format bans are a separate category of TPM
regulations, perhaps deserving of a different standard of review. See Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 823-24 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). While I sympathize with the concern motivating this suggestion, I believe
it is misguided: there is no obvious place at which a restriction becomes a ban. The
adequate-alternatives test is appropriate for all regulations on this continuum and
should be effective at invalidating the more restrictive ones. A separate test is,
therefore, both theoretically incoherent and practically unnecessary.
369 If the class of speakers for whom the alternatives are inadequate or unavailable
is likely to be large, then facial invalidation would be the appropriate remedy. This
may often be the case when less expensive formats are banned, leaving only more
expensive ones. Cost is likely to concern a great many speakers to whom the
regulation applies. If, on the other hand, the class of speakers for whom the
alternatives are inadequate or unavailable is quite small, then exemptions would be
a more responsive remedy. Although exemptions do treat some speakers differently
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While the government interest in preventing one or a few speakers
from using billboards, for example, should usually be fairly small,
the interest in preventing the visual clutter that might result from
widespread use of billboards is substantially larger. 370
Thus,
before the strict-scrutiny analysis can be carried out, the Court must
make a rough estimate of the size of the class of speakers who could
371
raise this first amendment claim.
If the Court determines that adequate alternatives do exist, then
strict scrutiny is not necessary. If alternative channels are both
adequate and available, then there will be no content-discriminatory
impact on the speech market available to the audience. A TPM
regulation that leaves adequate alternatives has a content-neutral
effect on a facilitative aspect of the speech. Although this effect is
itself an interference with speech, and deserves something more
than a rational-basis review, it will generally be of less concern than
content discrimination. 7 2 The remainder of the traditional TPM
test-calling for a significant state interest and a reasonably direct
means/end fit-is an appropriate standard of review for such
cases. 373 If the regulation then fails this test, it should be invali-

from others, "when the commitment to neutrality conflicts with the commitment to
preservation of ideas in the political marketplace, the latter will prevail." Stone &
Marshall, supra note 360, at 626.
370 Some government interests will be strong enough to overcome even an
exemption for a single person. For example, if the prohibited activity would cause
substantial physical danger to other people, even one exemption would implicate a
compelling state interest. In the context of garden variety TPM regulations such a
situation should be rare. As a result, when only a small number of potential
exemptions are at issue, the government should usually be unable to demonstrate a
compelling state interest and meet the strict-scrutiny test.
s 1 While this determination of the size of the group is admittedly difficult, it is
not very dangerous from the perspective of protecting first amendment rights. If the
Court underestimates the number of people affected, and therefore orders
exemptions rather than facial invalidation, then the flooding of the government
mechanism for processing exemptions will soon indicate the need for a broader
remedy.
372 A possible instance in which it should be as much of a concern as content
discrimination is when the government's purpose devalues speech as opposed to
other activities. See supra note 180; see also Baker, supra note 180, at 956-60.
373 I still envision a stricter test than mere rational basis-review and, therefore, a
stricter means/end fit than the Court has adopted in its recent interpretations of the
TPM test.
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dated with respect to all speakers, 374 because it will impact in at
least this facilitative way on all the speakers it affects.
The adequate-alternatives branch of TPM doctrine is well suited
to the task of identifying content discrimination in the impact on
the audience. If such discrimination exists, then strict scrutiny must
be applied. If not, then the more lenient TPM test applies. The
TPM line of doctrine, like the symbolic speech line, thus serves an
important and independent function in the first amendment
response to content discrimination.
D. An Illustration: Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence
It may be useful to consider an example that involves both the
symbolic speech and the TPM doctrines. Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence375 concerned a regulation prohibiting camping-which was defined to include sleeping-in Lafayette Park. The
Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) wished to stage a
sleep-over demonstration in the park for two reasons. First, sleep
functioned as a symbolic means of communicating the plight of the
homeless, who are forced to sleep outdoors in the winter. And
second, sleep facilitated other speech in the demonstration: more
homeless people would be encouraged to participate if they were
offered a tent in which to sleep. Because sleep served both
symbolic and facilitative functions here, the regulation should be
invalid as applied to CCNV if it fails either the symbolic speech or
the TPM test.
It was undisputed in the case that CCNV's interest in sleeping
in the park was at least in part symbolic. Many of those witnessing
the demonstration-it involved the construction of a tent city across
from the White House on the first days of winter-would recognize

374 This conclusion will often mean facial invalidation. Whenever the regulation

is explicitly directed at a speech activity-parading, using loud-speaker trucks, holding
a public meeting--it will be facially invalidated. There will be some occasions when
more general regulations will be applied to speech as restrictions on TPM: traffic
regulations prohibiting the obstruction of streets, anti-noise ordinances, and hour
limitations on the use of the public parks. If these are found to leave adequate
alternatives but fail the TPM test, then they would be invalid as applied to speakers,
but not necessarily as applied to persons engaged in other activities that block the
streets, make noise, or use parks after hours, because regulation of these other
activities would generally receive no more than rational-basis review and the TPM test
should be a somewhat higher standard than that.
375 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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76
the sleeping as communicative of the plight of the homeless.3
The sleeping thus met both parts of the test in Spence v. Washington:3 77 that the activity be intended to communicate a particular
message, and that it be Rlikely to be understood as such. 78 Because the activity at issue should have qualified for protection under

the first amendment as symbolic speech, and the regulation directly

prohibited that speech, the strict O'Brien standard was appropri379
ate.
The broad government interest at issue was the preservation of

the nation's parks. The narrower question in Clark was how great
a threat is posed to that interest by sleeping in the park only by
those who do so as a means of symbolic communication.

The

government carries the burden of proof on the question of a
compelling interest, and the record in Clark was simply devoid of
evidence that any substantial harm would be caused by this group

of potential speakers sleeping as part of an already approved
376 See Note, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence: The Demise of First
Amendment Protectionfor Symbolic Expression? 36 MERCER L. REV. 1371, 1392 (1985).
377 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
378 See id. at 410-11; Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct 84
COLUM. L. REv. 467,478,488-93 (1984) (discussing the relationship of the Spence test
to theories of speech and certain practical issues in the application of the test).
The two requirements I mention are the only parts of the Supreme Court's test.
Perhaps there ought to be a third requirement: that the activity be intended to serve
no other purpose than communication, or at least that communication be its
predominant purpose. This additional requirement would alleviate the problem of
dealing with speakers whose actions are intended partly to communicate and partly
to make a practical change in the world-say by occupying a building until demands
are met or by destroying government property used in the production of weapons.
These activities cannot be immunized from generally applicable laws simply because
expression is one of the purposes they serve. See Note, supra note 189, at 1103; cf.
Henkin, supranote 185, at 82 (distinguishing civil disobedience from communicative
action because civil disobedience involves an act intended to have an effect on the
operation of the challenged law). If the Supreme Court were to take the symbolicspeech issue seriously, then it would need to face this issue. The protestors in Clark
would satisfy this test because the sleeping served only speech functions. It was
facilitative, rather than only expressive, but it facilitated speech, not some other, and
otherwise illegal, activity.
379 If the regulation merely restricted the time, place, or manner of the symbolic
speech-by allowing sleeping only for three consecutive nights, or only in a particular
area of the park, or only on cots rather than sleeping bags-then it would be analyzed
in terms of that restriction rather than in terms of sleeping generally. If the length
of time, precise location, or manner were themselves expressive, then such
restrictions would be analyzed under O'Brien. If the length of time, precise location,
or manner were simply a means of facilitating the expressive act of sleeping, however,
then these restrictions should be analyzed as TPM regulations. The question in any
case is whether the precise activity restricted is itself facilitative or expressive.
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demonstration. Moreover, even if such a harm could have been
demonstrated, the ban on sleeping was "greater than is essential"3 80 to the protection of the parks. A limit on the number of
tents or sleepers would more narrowly have served the interest while
3 81
allowing the symbolic speech to take place.
The Court rejected many of these same arguments, 8 2 but did
so because it believed it should apply a lower standard of review
than the one I am utilizing. The Court chose that lower standard
because it failed to recognize the content discrimination in the
impact on the speaker, and because it had already destroyed the
independence of the symbolic speech doctrine that was designed to
deal with that discrimination. I don't believe there is any question
that if the Court had subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny, it
would not have survived.38 3
The TPM issue is a bit more complex. Because the presence of
the homeless was an important aspect of the message, a demonstration without them should qualify as a distorted and inadequate
alternative. Would there have been alternative means through
which CCNV could have drawn substantial numbers of the homeless
to participate in the demonstration? In theory, such alternatives as
hot meals (they could not be prepared at the site because of the
camping regulations, but they could have been eaten there),
blankets to keep warm, and, of course, companionship and caring
were available. But evidence in the record, based on similar
demonstrations in previous years, indicated that these other means
were insufficient.3 8 4 This is the type of factual question on which
CCNV would bear the initial burden of proof.
Assuming that the burden was met, the obvious alternatives were
shown to be inadequate, and the government could not suggest any
less apparent alternatives, then the regulation would receive strict
scrutiny. The balance under this standard would differ slightly from
that under the symbolic speech analysis, because the class of
potential exemptions, all those speakers whose opportunities for
speech would be inadequate if they were prohibited from sleeping
s80 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
381 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586,598-99 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), rev'd sub noram. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.

288 (1984).
382 See e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 299.
383 IndeedJustice Marshall's dissent suggests that even under the lower standard,
the regulation should have failed. See id. at 308 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
384 SeeJoint Appendix at 14, Clark (No. 82-1998).
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in the park to facilitate their speech, might be somewhat larger.
Although the potential for harm to the parks would be correspondingly higher than in the symbolic speech analysis, the argument that
a less restrictive means would serve the government interest would
remain. The regulation should, therefore, again fail strict scrutiny.
On the other hand, if :CNV was not able to establish that the
obvious alternatives were inadequate, then the regulation would be
tested against the much lower TPM standard. The disagreement
between the majority and the dissent in the Clark case arises
precisely 6ver the question of whether the regulation should survive
this level of review. Clearly the protection of national parks is a
significant government interest. The difficulty lies in determining
the stringency of the test's means/end fit requirement.
If, as the recent cases suggest, the fit requirement means
nothing more than that the! government interest would be less wellserved without the regulation than with it, then CCNV would lose.
Such a standard, however:, reduces the TPM test to rational-basis
review. If the first amendment generates any concern about
content-neutral regulations of speech, as the Court appeared to
admit in Clark,385 then such regulations should receive stricter
review than the level reserved for economic regulations, which
implicate no constitutional right. It makes more sense, therefore,
to interpret the fit requirement of the TPM test as requiring means
that are reasonably tailored to the end they are supposed to serve.
On that interpretation, CCNV might well win.
As this example indicates, the suggested framework does not
eliminate the need for judgment or the ambiguity of the constitutional standards. It is not intended to do so. It does, however,
structure the inquiry in a way that highlights the different types of
content discrimination and explains the relation of the doctrine to
the problems posed.
E. Indirect Impacts on Speech
Government regulations sometimes affect speech even when
they impact on neither an expressive nor a directly facilitative aspect
of the speech activity. Although the terms "indirect" or "incidental"
regulation of speech have become quite common, 38 6 I suggest
385 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 295.

386 See, e.g., Day, IncidentalRegulation, supra note 18, at 492; Schauer, supra note
9, at 780-82.
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they be reserved for this last type of interference. The regulations
considered up to this point have all impacted directly on the speech
activity, whether on the content of that activity (from one perspective or another) or on the facilitative aspects of the activity.
"Indirect" or "incidental" should be used to describe only those laws
that may affect the ability to speak, but do so without regulating
either the expressive or facilitative aspects of speech at all.
Perhaps the best examples of this category of indirect regulation
lie in the run-of-the-mill regulations of businesses and individuals
that also apply to speakers: traffic laws may prevent a reporter from
speeding to turn in a story; labor laws may restrict the managers of
newspapers; or income tax laws may take away money that would
have been used for speech. It is usually accepted, both by courts
and commentators, that such generally applicable laws do not raise
38 7
a first amendment issue when applied to speakers.
Under my approach, these regulations would also usually raise
no first amendment issue. The activity proscribed-for example,
speeding-is almost never a communicative or symbolic aspect of the
speech. If it were, the analysis discussed above38 8 would apply,
but in the vast majority of cases, there will be no impact on a
communicative aspect of the speech. It might appear, however, that
the activities at issue are facilitative aspects of the speech. Getting
to the office faster certainly helps the news story appear more
quickly, and being free of labor law restrictions might well allow
more funds to be used by a newspaper for speech purposes. In this
sense, it is true that labor policies, speeding, and additional money
might all facilitate speech. Regulation of these activities or
resources, however, is not regulation of a facilitative aspect of
speech.
It would be convenient if there were some clear principle
demarcating the line between those activities and resources that
should be considered facilitative and those that should not. For
example, perhaps only those activities or resources that are
themselves a part of the speech act, like the decibel level or location
of speech, should quaify as facilitative. This close a connection
cannot, however, be deemed necessary. Owning a printing press is
not an aspect of a speech activity itself, and yet we would surely
387

See Schauer, supra note 9, at 779-80.

388 See supra notes 329-60 and accompanying text (discussing analysis of symbolic

speech cases).
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consider regulations prescribing who may own printing presses to
be regulations of speech, unlike the labor or tax laws.
There is, in fact, no clear dividing line between facilitative
aspects of speech and other activities. Instead, there is a continuum
running from facilitative aspects of the speech activity itself at one
end, through separate activities that are specifically designed to
facilitate speech, to general activities or benefits that may facilitate
many behaviors-including speech-at the other end. Some cases in
the middle will be difficult, but at least when we reach the most
general sorts of benefits (such as money), the first amendment
cannot be implicated unless speakers are treated differently from
others.
Attempting to place various benefits and activities on this
continuum will, admittedly, be a difficult task. Indeed, the
distinctions may be almost metaphysical. The task is required,
however, because the alternatives are simply unacceptable. Some
activities or resources that are not themselves a part of the act of
speaking are, nonetheless, so closely related to speech that it would
be absurd not to recognize that regulating them raises first
amendment issues. Access to paper or typewriters might be a good
example. On the other hand, without some limit, the free speech
guarantee would be transformed into an invitation for all speakers
to violate any generally applicable law if the violation contributes in
any way, no matter how indirect, to their ability to speak. The
constitutional solicitude for free speech demands that speakers
receive special protection from regulations (even generally applicable ones) that affect either a communicative or a directly facilitative
aspect of their speech activity. Nonetheless, at some point the
connection to speech becomes so attenuated that the protection
must disappear.
This does not mean, however, that speakers subject to such
general regulatory schemes are entirely at the mercy of the
government. Several protections from regulatory abuse exist:
regulation derived from an actual intent to silence certain content
categories is subject to strict review;3 8 9 excessively vague or
discretionary statutes, which threaten to chill speech, also receive
searching scrutiny; 3 90 and regulations that apply only to speakers
or, worse, only to a subset of speakers, rather than to persons
389 See supra notes 308-23 and accompanying text.
390 See supra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.
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involved in a broad range of activities, raise a problem of chill
analogous to the one involved in vagueness.
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue,3 9 1 for example, the Court subjected to strict scrutiny and
struck down a state law imposing a special tax on newsprint that was
not imposed on other materials used in the manufacture of
consumer products.3 92 In its application, the law affected only a
handful of the largest newspapers in the state. Although the Court
found no evidence that the state legislature was trying to silence
those papers because of their content,3 9 3 and despite the fact that
no other type of content discrimination was present, the Court
94
applied a stringent standard of review.
The Court justified this high standard by pointing to the
tremendous potential for chilling speech that is inherent in a
statutory scheme that singles out speakers (here the press), and
particularly a small number of speakers (here large publications), for
special treatment. 3 95 This chill is very similar to that caused by
vague regulations: self-censorship by speakers trying to avoid
content that they believe the government would not like.39 6 In
this case the chill is caused, not by vagueness or discretion, but by
the very narrow focus of the law on an easily identifiable group of
speakers. This narrow focus allows the government to target
rewards or punishments at a small group. Such power may be
abused by varying the treatment the group receives based on the
content of their speech. 97 The more specific the focus, the
greater the chance of content-discriminatory self-censorship, and
the greater the need for stringent review. In light of Minneapolis
Star, it appears that only truly general regulatory schemes that have
a merely incidental impact on speech raise no first amendment
3 98

concerns.
391 460

.S. 575 (1983).
392 See id. at 591.

See id. at 592.
See id. at 585.
395 See id. at 591-92.
316 See id. at 585, 588.
397 The structure of the argument here parallels that regarding vagueness.
313
394

Superficially, the problem lies in the potential for content-discriminatory abuse by the

government. The more troubling problem lies in present, content-discriminatory selfcensorship by speakers in response to their view of that possibility of abuse. See supra
note 328 and accompanying text.
398 See Stone, supra note 20, at 109.

726

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 139:615

One of the most interesting and difficult cases involving an
indirect impact on speech is Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.. 99 The
state brought proceedings to close a bookstore selling pornographic
materials because prostitution was taking place on the premises.
The Court found that the first amendment was not implicated at all
400
and refused to apply any type of heightened scrutiny.
-The substantive law under which the injunction was sought was
aimed at the noncommunicative harms associated with prostitution,
not at any communicative 'harm arising from the materials sold or
distributed by the bookstore. As a result, there was no content
discrimination in the government's purpose. Nor was the owner
using the prostitution as symbolic speech communicating something
about his wares or anything else. Moreover, the prostitution was
not facilitating the owner's protected speech-it was not intentionally being used to draw the customers into the store. The prostitution
simply was not directly related to the speech in any way. From the
perspective of the first amendment, prohibiting prostitution in this
instance was not a regulation of speech at all. The underlying law
itself was, therefore, immune from attack under the free speech
clause.
Nevertheless, the state did interfere with speech by using the
injunctive remedy to close the bookstore. This remedy must be
assessed independently of the underlying prohibition to see if it
presents any first amendment problems. Such an assessment is
necessary to prevent the government from using general laws as a
mechanism for limiting speech, for example by punishing people for
traffic violations by refusing them permits to leaflet on the streets.
The assessment of the remedy raises at least two issues. Firstthe issue that seemed to primarily concern the dissent in Arcara-is
the remedy unrelated to the bad act proscribed by the underlying
law? The dissent compared the closing of the bookstore here to the
closing of a church because of a traffic violation by the minister.40 1 In fact, a better analogy would be to the closing of a
church because of a health code violation in the building. In Arcara,
it was not the personal wrongdoing of the owner that led to the
closing, but rather the existence of a dangerous condition in the
building. Of course, the person managing the premises could have
corrected the condition-indeed, was ordered to correct it before

399 478 U.S. 697 (1986).

400 See id. at 706-07.
401 See id. at 710-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the injunction could issue 4°2 --just as would be true of a health
code violation in a church. The remedy of closing the building
responded directly to the harm caused by the violation and reduced
the danger. Thus, if some type of relation was required, it would
seem to have been met in this case.
The existence of such a relation is not, in any event, a primary
concern of the free speech clause. There might be some type of
due process claim available because of the lack of relation between
the violation of law and the punishment or because of the dispro40 3
portionality of the punishment to the seriousness of the crime,
but there would be no greater claim under the due process clause
when the law operates to close a bookstore than when it operates to
close a hardware store. The only first amendment issues raised by
such a lack of relation would be the doubt cast on the government's
purposes and the suspicion that the underlying prohibition may
simply be an excuse to impose the punishment on speakers.
The remedy raises a second issue that is more directly relevant
to the first amendment analysis: does the remedy impact on a
communicative or facilitative aspect of speech? The remedy in
Arcara did precisely that. Owning a bookstore, like owning a
printing press, is directly facilitative of speech. It is true that the
remedy at issue here did not apply exclusively to bookstores but to
all businesses found to have a public nuisance on the premises.
Nonetheless, as applied in this case, the effect of the remedy was to
close a bookstore. The situation was, therefore, analogous to a
classic TPM situation in which a regulation prohibiting the obstruction of the street is applied to prevent a parade. The impact in the
case at hand must be assessed to see if the first amendment is
implicated. If the impact falls on a resource or activity that directly
facilitates speech, such as owning a bookstore, organizing a parade,
or having access to paper, then the first amendment applies. If the
impact falls on a resource or activity that is not so closely tied to
speech, such as the labor policies of a newspaper, speeding by a
402 If no such opportunity to correct the problem was offered before the
injunction was issued, then a constitutional claim could be made in both the free
exercise and the free speech contexts. Such a harsh and irrational response would
raise an inference of illegitimate administrative purposes. See supra text accompanying notes 316-23.
403 See Note, Dropout Statutes: Prompting Reform of Traditional Due Process
Doctrine and Equal Protection Rationality (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Cornell Law Review).
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reporter, or simply access to more money, then the first amendment
does not apply.
Under this approach, most generally applicable laws that are not
facially directed at speech activity will not raise a first amendment
issue at all. Similarly, legal remedies or penalties such as fines,
imprisonment, or community service, generally will not raise a first
amendment issue. Such laws and remedies can be applied to
speakers and non-speakers alike without the necessity of any first
amendment analysis. Some generally applicable laws, such as the
prohibition on highway obstruction, may implicate the first
amendment in their application to certain speakers. This phenomenon is familiar from the long line of TPM cases. Other remedies or
penalties, even when used to enforce laws that do not otherwise
raise first amendment concerns, may require a free speech analysis. 404 Such an approach provides substantial first amendment
protection without allowing speakers to cripple the normal
functioning of government regulation.
The doctrinal framework I propose is far from complete. I have
not addressed every possible issue related to content discrimination,
let alone many of the other, non-content-related concerns of the
first amendment. 40 5 Nonetheless, I hope that this brief sketch
indicates that a richer, more rounded concept of content discrimination can be doctrinally useful.
CONCLUSION

Content discrimination is not the only important first amendment issue, but it is a crucial one. Moreover, given the attitudes of
the present members of the Supreme Court, content discrimination
promises to be one of the central first amendment issues for some
time to come. In light of this constitutional significance, the
concept deserves a fuller explication.
4o4 1 have not addressed the question of what standard the courts should use in
assessing remedies or penalties that cause such problems. I am inclined to believe
that the general approach outlined in this Article for assessing the underlying
regulations could also be applied to the laws or decisions imposing remedies. Some
modifications of the general approach maybe required given the special circumstances of the assessment. In any event, if no content discrimination is involved and if the
impact falls only on a facilitative aspect of the speech, the level of review would
generally be fairly low.
405 First amendment doctrine is, and should be, concerned with several other
important goals, including the creation and maintenance of a lively and accessible
forum for public discussion and debate.
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I have attempted to show that a broad concept of content
discrimination is both appropriate and useful. Two recent and
related trends in the doctrine have led to a narrowed focus on

content discrimination only in the government's purpose and to the
collapse of the independent symbolic speech and TPM doctrinal
lines. These trends are related in that they both rest on an overly
restrictive concept of content discrimination that ignores the fact
that there are several types of content discrimination, including not
only discrimination in the government's purpose, but discrimination
in the impact on the speaker and in the impact on the speech
available to the audience. All three of these types of discrimination
are related to equality concerns and to the values enshrined in the
popular free speech theories. They deserve serious first amendment
consideration. If all three types were recognized, then the unfortunate doctrinal trends could be reversed and this area of first
amendment doctrine could attain a greater degree of responsiveness
and coherence. Greater responsiveness would result from the
availability of a variety of tests tailored to disparate problems.
Greater coherence would be achieved by bringing to the surface
some of the concerns that underlie, and give order to, the application of specific doctrinal tools and standards.
The broad concept of content discrimination can help bring
order to this confusing area of the law without diminishing the
awareness of or the appreciation for the complexity of the world in
which legal doctrine must apply. Indeed, a certain degree of
complexity is necessary if the doctrine is to respond adequately to
the intricate and constantly changing social phenomenon of speech.
Order and complexity are in tension, but they need not be in open
conflict. By adopting an oversimplified version of content discrimination and then abandoning all other distinctions among "contentneutral" regulations as insignificant, the Court has sacrificed a
carefully tailored collection of doctrines to the desire for orderliness. Free speech doctrine is in need of greater clarity and order,
and some simplification is essential if any structure is to be imposed
on an unruly reality. The Court, however, has struck the balance
between order and complexity in a way that achieves order at the
cost of the very values the Constitution was designed to protect.
The values of equality and of free speech, two ideals that are
ingrained in our national character and our Constitution, are
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inadequately protected by the Court's impoverished notion of
content discrimination. If content discrimination is to play the
important role the Court has assigned to it, it must be a richer,
broader, and more complex concept.

